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EWYS President Sadat, an observer suggests, is like an athlete in a circus mounted on a unicycle. As he rides the wheel gradually becomes smaller and smaller and the audience can see the exact moment he will either come to a full stop or fall over — or else strike out on a faster, wider circle. In the last three years of cease-fire he has achieved no more than two of war of attrition. The wailing noises now coming from Cairo are desperate cries for help. Hold me up, do something or else I will have to start over. That is what he seems to be

His assumption is that he has nothing for a diversion to tide over the celebration of the anniversary of Israel's exodus and the great military pantheon in Jerusalem. His promises that 1971 would be a "year of peace" have almost been forgotten. The unceremonious way he sent the Russians last summer brought him credit for a moment for one brief golden moment to appear in the guise of another hero who liberated Israel from foreign domination. His power has been closed since then and has re-opened now only to appear the end of the

ser, his predecessor, played the real stage, and he unexpectedly had the gift of calling the entire audience from all the Arab states and creating the illusion that a tremendous war was about to unfold. When the script provided blood and disaster the dramatic atmosphere was maintained, the audience was satisfied. Later over his audience was really great to enable him to stop the cease-fire of 1970 when casualties began to become heavy even for Egypt, to vast reserves of man-

rick-cvillst cannot depend on the well-springs of deep de- and he must perform or the arena. He lost his nerve matter of proximity talks in interim solution. This have made it possible for to re-open the Suez Canal, the last moment he demand- impossible — that Israel itself in advance to total equal on all three fronts to "the restoration of rights of the Palestinians." would mean anything, up to including the dismantling of sovereignty. It seems like- he was given bad advice the decision.

decided to try out a peace
The Soviets never ap-
of the plan, which might
as ending the need for
forced Soviet presence and
Soviet military aid to
states. France probably ad-
against any such ex-
from which only the
of the four powers earlier
on the problem, could ex-
any political credit. Britain
calously jukswarm at best
will committed to the or-
E.U.N. Resolution 242 of 1967,
was formulated by the Brit-
representative at the U.N.

U.S. Chief of Staff Elazar
perceived recently that Sadat
is not risk war on any lo-
pounds, but that he was
known for his powers of
reasoning and that his ac-
tions were not capable of being
predicted. For weeks past Sa-
adat has gone through all the
motions of a head of state about
to become involved in war, with
no real differences, Preparations

...the greatest secrecy have
not so much been
proclaimed. The Cabinet
it was moving
underground "war cham-
ber" there is a partial blackout
to be stepped up "as the
for conflict approaches";
we have been inspections along
front, and reports of addi-
tional Soviet technicians return-
ing to their posts, which may or
may not be exaggerated. Even
large planes sold by France



by Lea Ben Dor

to Libya were brought into Egypt without much attempt at concealment.

Sadat is aware that the relative military strengths of Egypt and Israel are too well known here for him to be able to frighten Israel with his warlike ruminations. However deeply reluctant we may be for any more fighting on any scale, it is not considered probable here that he can stage more than a minor assault. He may figure correctly that it is much

various well-intentioned powers which do not realize that an Egypt contained behind the Canal and divided from Israel by the wide expanse of the Sinal desert makes preventive action by Israel in the style of 1967 unnecessary. This is the real meaning of the phrase that there can be no withdrawal that there can be no withdrawal.

just appear sufficiently set on war, Sadat apparently feels, European powers and perhaps also the U.S. will press Israel into major concessions that could keep his wheel rolling steadily again for a while, and the audience cheering.

SADAT'S political analysts have no doubt been studying evidence of a softening up in Israel. There is Finance Minister Sapir's urgent desire to get out of the West Bank as fast as possible. He always adds the condition "after peace" but even peace is no long-

er as clearly defined as it used to be in the days of Napoleon or of formal treaties signed at the end of hostilities in a railway carriage on a siding. Hlataadrut Secretary-General Ben-Aharon

been willing to dispense with the peace formula altogether, and he is necessarily viewed as an influential personality from Cairo, and a member of a party still down in the intelligence reports as hawkish. The conclusion is wrong, of course, Mr. Sapir means what he says, and the fact that he

One can also imagine the wise men of Cairo sitting over reports of the Syrian spy group, and the security of the ex-panthermen

who went to Damascus to learn sabotage techniques from the terrorists, and noting the fact that leftist groups gathered to protest near the court house while the trial was on.

"Perhaps they will not feel sure of their reserves," one can imagine one smartly uniformed intelligence officer saying hopefully. "Perhaps they will have to have troops in reserve in the cities against the threat of riots, like we do," a colleague might continue. Should one even attempt to explain to Sadat's advisers? Any attack by Egypt, across the Canal or by air from the sea, would effectively silence all critics of the government in Israel and bring the fringes of the nation back into the fold as no amount of argument at home could expect to do.

WE have brought upon ourselves at least part of Sadat's attempts to activate pressure on us. We exhibit to the

POST — 25TH INDEPENDENCE

public view a government not so much split on policy as unwilling to evolve any clear lines, paralysed at the thought of having to decide on a new premier when the incumbent seeks to retire on grounds of age and long service and racked by inflation and spiralling prices.

The Italian peace device of a new canal that could be built for Egypt without any need to obtain Israel's withdrawal is extravagant and clumsy by any standard. Compared to the hope that Sadat's war threats can be used as a lever to stampede Israel it is, however, the height of economy, wisdom and foresight. If it exists.

★ ★ ★
IT does not mean that there is no danger. Army patrols have already captured several small groups of infiltrators on murder and sabotage missions. Perhaps

some other group will get through and do its work, though for all of us the likelihood of being killed on the roads is much greater. Dr. Gunnar Jarring has been invited by Egypt to prepare a full record of his peace negotiations for discussion by the U.N. This suggests that there will be no serious attempt at aggression by Egypt until this report is ready at the end of this month, when there is likely to be an all-out effort to combine every weapon available to Egypt in appeals to the Arab-Soviet majority at the U.N. terrorism in Israel and against Israel targets.

abroad, and attacks by Egyptian regular forces "in accordance with the demand of the people."

Attacks on American targets could be stepped up as a means

DAY SUPPLEMENT

of creating pressure on Israel. The Jews of Israel, and also those abroad, have learnt to be systematically patient under attack and to discover how to hit back. Europe is not geared to terrorism and under pressure will please the Arabs by protesting to Israel about its policies rather than take the riskier course of penalizing the assailants. The terrorists have discovered this vulnerable area.

BEHIND the relatively manageable threat of Egypt, Jordan and Syria lies the enigmatic threat of the Islamic Mu'ammarrath, the so-called Islamic fundamentalist, who sees oil wealth erupting in golden streams wherever he turns his eye. Gaddafi has bribed and incited half the formerly friendly states of Africa against us. Gaddafi has worked for several years past on his secret merger of Libya with Egypt and Syria. In the clear hope of taking over from Sadat, the Egyptians are not enchanted by the idea of a merger with Libya, which they consider a primitive desert fief, and Gaddafi might not last there, but his desire to emulate Nasser as the leader of the Arab world is too great for him to consider such obstacles as Egyptian criticism.

Recently, Libyan representatives have become active in OPEC, the organization of the oil-producing states, leading the demand for higher royalties, although several of the oil producers have long since ceased to be able to make any practical use of the accumulations of money. Gaddafi evidently renews his threats to France periodically, declaring he will leave the oil underground if France does not comply with Arab wishes. No part of Western Europe could accept an oil stagnation crisis.

It seems the more reason why they should take a leaf out of the American book and look beyond the pressures of the oil states directed against Israel.


Let it be assumed that they are even partially successful, that Israel is not totally dismembered, but, exposed once more to continuous military threats along the 1967 borders against reduction in good neighborly relations. It is possible that Gaddafi would choose this and then settle down to problems of the home front? He has already given notice that he objects to countries trading with Rhodesia and South Africa, and he has his likes and dislikes in Black Africa as well. He has won control of part of the Fatah. He will have more political conditions later for his clients that may be more

Unless the chance distribution of oil under the ground is to decide the political face of the world, at least until nuclear power becomes more manageable, the oil-consuming countries will have to organize themselves in the same way as the producers, even if OPEC declares today that it will not sell to a buyers' combine. They might be able to do without one customer, but they cannot do without all of them, any more than the customers can do without oil.

The U.S. has been the first to realize that the oil blackmarket is a threat that goes far beyond relations with Israel and that cannot be accepted any more than the war threats of the Soviet Union could be passively accepted in their day. The London "Observer" wrote recently that it was frivolous of the U.S. to disregard the oil-producers' wishes with regard to Israel. The "Observer" will not like it if Britain is forced into close and friendly relations with those who would like to say with racist Idi Amin, as a condition for being able to buy oil freely, or to withdraw its troops from Ulster because Gaddafi favours the I.R.A., to whom he has already channelled assistance.

It is frivolous, one would say to keep the diplomatic eye so closely glued to the immediate advantage that the further prospects are totally obscured.

THE COMMEMORATIVE COIN



FOR ISRAEL'S 26th ANNIVERSARY

Unfortunately, we are not able to show you the coin that we will issue next May for Israel's 26th Anniversary. The artists are working on the designs, the final selection has still to be made, the dies will then be cast and the coin minted. However, we would

suggest that if you were one of the very many people who unfortunately were unable to purchase the 25th Anniversary coin you should immediately become a subscriber to Israel Coins and Medals, so that next year we won't have to say "Sorry, oversubscribed".



ISRAEL GOVERNMENT COINS AND MEDALS CORPORATION
11 Keren Hayesod St., Jerusalem.

...hostility, con-
...rejection, incessant vi-
...such as the phrases
...Arab attitudes towards
...over the 25 years of state-
...there is a lot of truth in
...but hardly all the truth.
...among the many facets
...the complex of Arab
...some have hardly
...over the years; others
...gradual modifica-
...the former are those most
...rooted in traditional think-
...most closely linked to the
...social and political crisis
...Arab world itself. The lat-
...are more to do with the
...patterns of Middle East
...-ties.

...these Arabs whose think-
...ing is to be informed by
...values and whose emotions
...to the traditional division
...into two ever-hostile
...— the true believers and
...— Jews are still a
...entitled to the gracious
...of their Moslem over-
...a return for such protec-
...they are expected to be-
...becoming hostility. Sel-
...a State of their own in
...of an otherwise Mos-
...does not fit into this
...of things. For them to
...is outrageous; to win
...nothing short of blas-

...these basic Islamic atti-
...being carried over into,
...overcome with, current po-
...vements can be seen in
...made by an Arab states-
...the occasion of the Pro-
...-day:

...they talk today about direct
...They were the neigh-
...Mohammed... and he con-
...a treaty with them, but
...proved... a mean and
...people... The most
...thing our Prophet did
...he evicted them from
...the Arabian Peninsula... We
...never negotiate with them
...We know our history...
...celebrate on the next an-
...God willing... not only
...of our hand but
...defeat of Israeli conceit
...importance, so that they may
...return to the condi-
...in our Holy Book:
...and submissiveness
...has cast upon them."

...in the same vein as
...which are taken from the
...made by President Sadat
...in April 1972, can easily
...in any one of the 25
...of Israel's existence. (What
...worth noting here is
...they are used indiscriminate-
...to Israel and Jews.)
...unchanging are the
...made over and over again
...representatives of Arab
...thinking and by the
...of "Arab Socialism".
...is the "outpost of Im-
...-ism."

...there is a "global con-
...-ity" to keep the Arabs
...embracing Israel, the
...the oil companies and Arab
...— or, if the speaker
...to be a Saudi, Israel and
...communism."

...Israel is a "wedge" separat-
...Arab Africa from the Fer-
...and the Arabian Pe-
...thus preventing the reali-
...of Arab unity.

...Israel is planning to gain eco-
...domination over the
...Middle East by means of
...skills and advanced tech-

...the common denominator of
...allegations is that, in the
...of the life of Arab society
...— stagnation, disas-
...into the Arab-Israeli sit-
...This being so, they are
...impenetrable to refuta-
...national discussion.


...another set of Arab argu-
...which has not changed
...the years focuses on the
...of Israel's statehood; the es-
...of the State was a
...the continued existence
...of Israel; its very being
...aggression"; Israel is
...by nature and by de-

...sign. Therefore, Israel and the
...Arabs are locked in "a fateful
...struggle," "a battle of destiny."
...The dispute is a matter of "to
...be or not to be" (a phrase fre-
...quently used by Mohammed Has-
...sanein Heykal, editor of the Cairo
...daily "Al-Ahram").

...As a summary of these atti-
...tudes, it is still worth while going
...back to a lecture given in 1962
...at the Arab League Institute of
...Higher Arab Studies by the Iraqi
...lawyer, diplomat and one-time pre-
...mier, Abd ar-Rahman al-Bazzaz.

...The "Zionist danger," Bazzaz
...says, is not primarily a mat-
...ter of a "vital and important part
...of the heart of our Arab home-
...land" having been taken away
...and its inhabitants made refugees;
...it does not derive chiefly from
...Israel's being a "foreign body" in
...the region, dividing Arab East
...from Arab West, nor from expan-
...sionist ambitions or the threat to
...Arab economic development.

...The chief danger of Israel re-
...sults from its being "an ideologi-
...cal threat to our nationalism by
...the establishment of a new na-
...tionalism which challenges our en-
...tire national existence in the en-
...tire region. The existence of Is-
...rael nullifies the unity of our
...homeland, the unity of our na-
...tion and the unity of our whole
...of this region. Moreover, the exis-
...tence of Israel is a flagrant chal-
...lenge to our philosophy of life
...and the ideals for which we live,



Jordanians and Israelis at Allenby Bridge: Contact seems to have had some effect on the Arabs' former ideas about Israel. (David Rubinger)

The current period seems to be one of "hesitancy and uncertainty, perhaps of transition, in Arab attitudes towards Israel," writes DANIEL DISHON of the Shiloah Institute, editor of "Middle East Record." He sees the likelihood of all-out war as receding, but finds traditional Arab attitudes remaining as "formidable barriers to a settlement, particularly in a peace treaty."

...and a total barrier against the
...values and aims to which we as-
...pire in the world."

Solidarity slackening

It was the combination of the
...Islamic world outlook with pan-
...Arab sentiments of the kind ex-
...pressed by Bazzaz that produced
...the amazing phenomenon of coun-
...tries as far apart as Morocco and
...the Yemen "identifying" with the
...Palestine cause, despite the ab-
...sence — for most of them — of
...any tangible interest in the fate
...of Palestine.

But — ritual anti-Israel ver-
...biage notwithstanding — this so-
...larity is no longer what it was.
...The fact that over the last few
...years Iraq has withdrawn her mi-
...litary contingent from Jordan, and
...Sudan and Algeria have repatriat-
...ed theirs from the Suez Canal, is
...indicative of a broader trend. It
...Arabs themselves have felt this:
...since 1968, the term "the con-
...frontation states" (*duwal al-mu-
...wajaha*) has been commonly used
...— an implied recognition of the
...division of the Arab world into
...one group of states directly in-
...volved with the Israel issue and
...another not so deeply committed.

This loosening of Arab solidari-
...ty where Israel is concerned re-
...sults from a number of causes.
...There has been a general slacken-
...ing of pan-Arab convictions, a
...loss of faith in Arab unity as a
...precept for practical politics
...though not, perhaps, as the ob-

logy and rhetoric — to the coun-
...tries bordering on Israel.
...But even for the confrontation
...states the Israel issue has not
...always been (and may thus not
...always be in the future) the prob-
...lem at the top of the scale of
...national priorities. In 1948, the
...promotion of Hashemite ascen-
...dancy in the Levant was more
...important to Jordan's King Ab-
...dullah than the destruction of Is-
...rael. From 1962 till 1964, Nas-
...ser's principal concern was to get
...the British out of Egypt. From
...1968 till 1969 inter-Arab infight-
...ing was on the whole more im-
...portant to the confrontation
...states than the confrontation with
...Israel.

The most instructive instance
...of some other national problem
...taking precedence over the "Pa-
...lestine problem" was provided by
...Egypt in the summer of 1972.
...The decision to dismiss the So-
...viet advisers and to repatriate the
...Soviet units stationed in Egypt
...was taken because their pre-
...sence had become, in the eyes of
...the Egyptians, a new form of oc-
...cupation. This would have been
...tolerable on one condition: if the
...Russians had been ready to inter-
...vene actively against Israel and
...to provide the Egyptians with a
...military victory by proxy. Since
...they were not ready to do so,
...they had to go, even though their
...departure actually weak-
...ened Egypt's military capability vis-
...a-vis Israel.

It would probably be wrong to
...assume that the Egyptian leader-
...ship took a rational, calculated
...decision that the ouster of the
...Russians was now more im-
...portant than the recovery of Is-
...rael-held territory. Yet it was
...felt — in Egypt itself — to imply
...just that. "Al-Gumhuriyya,"
...Egypt's second-ranking daily after
..."Al-Ahram," wrote in an edi-
...torial: "To some people it be-
...came more important to drive the
...Russians out of Egypt than to
...drive the Jews out of Jerusalem."

New dilemmas

THE situation since 1967 has
...created new dilemmas for the
...three confrontation states which
...lost territories during the war.
...They quickly realized that intran-
...sigent attitudes implying the ne-
...gation of Israel's right to exist
...would diminish their chances of
...recovering their losses: in the face
...of express threats to her very
...existence, Israel would cling to
...border lines as far away from
...her heartlands as possible.

On the other hand, unequivocal
...statements that the recovery of
...the territories lost in 1967 was
...the sole objective of national pol-
...icy would imply some kind of
...recognition for Israel in its old
...borders. But such recognition
...would mean a negation of all
...that had been said, written and
...felt for 20 years about the "in-
...justice" inherent in Jewish state-
...hood in Palestine. It would be an
...admission of defeat on the
...part of leaders who had always
...found it easier to live down de-
...feat rather than admit it.

In facing the dilemma, Syria
...unhesitatingly elected to remain
...true to her usual militancy. King
...Hussein of Jordan, with equal de-
...cisiveness, preferred the recovery
...of territory, even if this would
...prejudice the eventual Arab claim
...to do away with Israel.

Egypt tried to have it both
...ways. The struggle against Israel,
...Nasser and other spokesmen of
...the regime explained, would be
...carried out in two stages: stage
...one would restore the pre-1967
...situation (and for this purpose
...the U.N. Security Council Resolu-
...tion 242 of November 1967, as
...interpreted by Egypt, was the
...proper instrument); stage two
...would lead to the "solution of
...the Palestine problem" (a cau-
...tious euphemism for the "exter-
...mination of Israel").

The Khartoum Summit resolu-
...tions of August-September 1967,
...with their notorious "Noes," sym-
...bolized the dilemma. They autho-
...rized the three countries which
...had lost territories to work for
...proper instrument; stage two
...would lead to the "solution of
...the Palestine problem" (a cau-
...tious euphemism for the "exter-
...mination of Israel").

(Continued on page 15)



ON THIS YOUR
25th INDEPENDENCE DAY,
WE SHARE YOUR JOY AND
STAND WITH YOU TO
COMPLETE THE TASKS AHEAD.
UNITED JEWISH APPEAL

Paul Zuckerman
General Chairman

Irving Bernstein
Executive Vice Chairman

Chaim Vinitsky
Director General
UJA, Israel

Edward Ginsberg
President

Herbert A. Friedman
Executive Vice President

A MILITARY POWER



Today figures prominently as a major military power in the Middle East, one which has been considered in every evaluation of events, not only by Middle Eastern powers but also by the powers of the world. It is to credit that only months after the establishment of the State of Israel, Ben-Gurion was met with incredulity and a series of pitying glances by his senior officers when he ordered to embark on the purchase of armour, artillery and

reason for this reaction was that of ability in his senior officers. They were later to find their mettle on the battlefield indeed, it is thanks to their initiative and resourcefulness that the State of Israel is today. However, the type of event suggested by Ben-Gurion's dramatic departure only logistically but also ideologically as far as the armed forces of Israel was concerned. The Hagana, precursor of the Israel Defence Forces, had evolved over the years primarily as a force of Jewish villages, which was designed to defend the Jewish settlements from repeated attacks by Arab marauders.

Hagana strategy
The Arab offensive, after the UN partition plan of November 29, laid main emphasis on cutting off of communications between Jewish centres throughout the country. The Hagana was therefore, to reassess its strategy and to embark on operations based on formations which were mobile and progressive. The Hagana joined the fray, there was no alternative but to adopt conventional patterns in the army of Israel.

The first step on the field of battle was that Israel had to adapt its traditions from the British Army in World War II from the Palmach, the Hagana and the other underground forces. But as a conventional force, the army had little to learn from the past and almost unique, resembling in the way the revolutionary army of George Washington in the American War of Independence.

for the Israel army's concentration on the essential requirements of a combat organization and its abandonment, as effort consuming and time-wasting of many of the outward trappings normally associated with armies throughout the world. It grew up as an army which had little time for anything but fighting; as an army which fought in conditions in which, on

political, and subject only to the elected civilian authority of the country. Today, this may be considered quite natural, but 25 years ago, many people thought it anything but natural. Ben-Gurion, with his vision and political acumen, foresaw the dangers inherent in a military establishment subject to partisan influences. He took his stand

many occasions, no quarter was given by the other side; as an army in which it was clear to every soldier at all times that the problem facing him was, to be or not to be; as an army whose secret weapon was popularly declared to be the feeling of *ein breira*, no alternative.

Because the Israel Defence Forces were established without any preconceived ideas, and without the advantages or burdens of tradition, it became possible to adapt their organization to strategic combat requirements without, as in many other armies, having to struggle against deep-rooted traditions and diehard protagonists of such traditions. There were few vested interests and those that did manifest themselves — as in the case of the Air Force, which brought with it the traditions from the Royal Air Force — were summarily dealt with by the founding fathers, who felt that Israel could not afford the luxury of independent services.

The result was that Israel in many ways blazed a world trail for the concept of an integrated force with the ground, air and naval arms under the direct command of one general staff. This example was later to be adopted and cited in many other countries. The most significant and historically most important moves in the establishment of the armed forces were those made by David Ben-Gurion, when he insisted that the Israel Defence Forces be non-

development of the Israel Defence Forces as a highly effective armed force, and in the emergence of Israel as a major regional military power, writes Aluf (res.) HAIM HERZOG, former head of Israeli military intelligence and a popular commentator on military affairs.

Effective combat organization with a minimum of ceremony. Integration of land, sea and air forces. The 'follow me' principle of leadership. The reserve system. A necessary talent for making its own equipment and adapting that which it could obtain. All these elements were essential in the

absence of militarism in Israel, despite her military preoccupations as a nation.

Great intuition
Today, his actions appear to go without saying in a Western type democracy. At the time, many individuals who are now prominent politically fought him tooth and nail on these issues. His decision in respect of the relationship of the Israel Defence Forces to the civilian authority, which was later further strengthened by his requirement that senior officers go into retirement at a comparatively early age, combined to show his great intuition and to emphasize the manifold debt the nation owes him.

Another major decision which affected the character of the army of Israel was that which based it on a reserve system in which all, with very few exceptions, would serve. This system adapted itself to the requirements of a nation struggling for its economic existence. For while Israel could not in any circumstances maintain the burden of a regular army, it could not, having regard to the nation's military requirements, be without a comparatively large standing

army at any given time. It in effect created a civilian army. Thus the army has never been cut off from day to day life. It is, in fact, the man in the street, and as such it has created a sense of personal involvement for each citizen which has undoubtedly had considerable influence on its character and success as a military force. Herein, too, lies the secret of the complete

did French duplicity in 1967 encourage Israel's entry into areas of military production and development hitherto undreamt of. Today, this is one of the very few countries in the world developing and producing its own missiles, not to mention other highly sophisticated equipment. Partly because of the difficulties created by the French embargo, Israel's electronic and aeronautical industries have developed out of all proportion to the country's size. (See article by D. Kochav on page 24.)

BECAUSE of the integrated nature of her forces, it was possible for Israel from the outset, to evaluate objectively the military requirements of the situation which faced her. Priorities were allocated without reference to inter-service rivalries, as is the case in other countries. Israel appreciated correctly the importance of air power, not because an air force lobby applied pressure but because a natural assessment of Israel's strategic problems led to this conclusion. Again, the naval arm never achieved a high degree of priority, because of the evaluation that naval superiority would have little or no effect on the outcome of any struggle which would have to be ground based, and in which air power would play a leading role.

In the ground forces, the problems which Israel faced in its early years of border skirmishes and marauding produced a need for elite units which, regardless of the cost, would always guarantee results. These elite units ultimately became the basis of Israel's parachute, airborne and commando forces, which in their turn set a standard for all the ground forces. The importance of armour as opposed to infantry in achieving a rapid decision on the battlefield was emphasized in the Sinai Campaign and thereafter this arm, too, was given a high degree of priority. The results of all these priorities were only too evident in the Six Day War.

Similarly, Arab intransigence and hostility have tended to keep the Israeli military establishment on its toes and to require it to be always one step ahead of its opponents. Furthermore, Israel today is not only a military power, but is possessed of an industrial infrastructure which is capable of giving considerable support to its armed forces. Just as the Arab boycott provided the motivation for the development of Israeli industry, so

When Israel came into being, the major power in the Middle East was Britain. Thereafter, as Britain's standing as a military power waned in the area, the U.S. Sixth Fleet replaced British forces. The Soviet Union finally achieved its age-long ambition to operate a fleet in the warm waters of the Mediterranean when in 1955 Nasser opened the doors of the Middle East to the Rus-

(Continued on page 18)

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(Continued on page 18)

Small voice of realism

(Continued from page 15)

their recovery by political rather than military means. In the same breath they barred them from employing the political means that could have won them Israeli concessions: negotiations, recognition, peace. It was like telling someone: "you can walk into a department store and buy just anything you like — on one single condition: that you don't spend any money."

EROSION OF INTRANSIGENCE

The attitudes which produced the Khartoum resolutions have created the post-war stalemate that still prevails. And yet there has been some erosion in Arab intransigence.

For one thing, since the end of the war of attrition and since the quiet passage of Sadat's "year of decision" (1971), there has been less faith on the Arab side in the chances of winning a new war than at any time since 1948. The discussion, ever since 1947, of the relative merits of "the political solution" against "the military solution," even though it ends more often than not in advocacy of the latter, has made the political solution something to be talked about. And a political solution can, after all, only signify some kind of settlement.

Even though usually equated with defeatism or surrender, even though rejected again and again in official speeches and statements, talk of a pacific settlement has become part of the Arab political lexicon in a way that would have been unthinkable before 1967. There seems to be, in Egypt and even more in Jordan, a first glimmer of realism, a still small voice saying that one really can no longer expect Israel to disappear from the map.

For some Egyptians, the second part of the two-stage theory — the solution of the Palestine problem — is still the ultimate aim of the country's policy with regard to Israel; for others, it has come to serve as a disguise for the fact that the first stage alone — the recovery of territory lost in 1967 — is now enough.

Entirely missing in this type of Arab political thinking is a view of Israel as a partner with whom a settlement could be worked out. If there must be settlement, let it be one imposed by the outside world, so that the Arab side might forever absolve itself from any "guilt" of reasonableness, forever blame third parties, and forever maintain the posture of a victim.

THE present, then, seems to be a period of hesitancy and uncertainty, perhaps of transition, in Arab attitudes towards Israel. There is a somewhat more realistic appraisal of mutual military and political capabilities, but a failure to draw realistic conclusions from them. A certain measure of contact with Israel — trade across the open bridges, the

summer visitors and travel by West Bankers to Arab countries — has gradually become acceptable but is still being resented. The old ideas about Israel have not lost their hold over Arab minds; but, for some, they have receded into a more distant future. Rather than providing guidelines for day-to-day politics, they seem to have turned into an apocalyptic vision.

POINTERS TO THE FUTURE

Nothing is predictable about the Middle East except unpredictability, and the present writer does not have the temerity to prophesy. There are, however, certain factors which may serve as pointers for the immediate and short-term future:

- The rejection of Israel, rooted in Islam and Arab nationalism, shows no signs of changing. The rigidity of Arab ideological thinking and the emotional tensions underlying it will continue to act as formidable barriers to a settlement, particularly to one incorporated in a formal peace treaty.

- The likelihood of all-out war is receding (though certainly not approaching the point of impossibility).

- Both the above points increase the probability of *de facto* arrangements of an open-bridges type or of limited agreements on such matters as, for example, access by Arab nationals to Moslem holy places, a Jordanian trade outlet to the Mediterranean and, possibly, the reopening of the Suez Canal or the *de facto* demilitarization of a part of Sinai.

- The tendency of Arab states not bordering on Israel to concentrate on regional issues in other parts of the Arab world is likely to increase.

- Co-ordination of policies among the confrontation states is on the wane and present trends would indicate that they are heading for a period of everyone for himself and devil take the hindmost.

There is, however, an important proviso to these points. All but the first are a function of the weakness of the present Egyptian regime. Should Egypt continue to be beset by irresolute leadership and internal dissent, or slide (as is not entirely unlikely) into a period of power struggles, take-over bids or even military coups, the trends outlined above are likely to be strengthened.

However, should the present low in Egyptian domestic politics end in the emergence of a new, charismatic leader, who would not only rule Egypt more firmly than Sadat but also reassert Egypt's leading role in the Arab world at large, we might well find ourselves back in a situation reminiscent of the spring of 1967. Unfortunately, Egyptian domestic politics are even less predictable than any other development in the Middle East situation.

Israel — a military power

(Continued from page 17)

signs on the occasion of the "Czech arms deal." It was clear to those in charge of Israel's defence policy that she could, at no stage, rely on others to come to her support. It was equally clear that, should she be able to defend herself adequately for a long enough period, inter-power interests would come into play in order to prevent an extension of the conflagration.

In 1967, one failure in the Israeli defence posture was revealed, namely, that it did not constitute a deterrent. As a result, Nasser's brinkmanship led to war. Since the Six Day War, Israel's policy has been to present a defence posture which should act as a deterrent. In other words, Israel's policy today is based on a conscious effort to avoid wars rather than to ensure winning them.

THE pressure of events, the hostility of her enemies, the intransigence of their leaders, the fierce desire of the Jewish people

to live — all these have combined to convert Israel into the major local military power in the Middle East and a local power to be reckoned with.

Israel's forces today have, with the possible exception of those of the U.S., the highest proportion of combat-experienced personnel in the Western world. Few if any forces can, for instance, match the combat experience that Israeli pilots have accumulated.

Basically, the secret of Israel's success lies in the fighting man and above all in the "Follow me" leadership which has become the hall mark of the I.D.F. There are no bad soldiers, it is commonly said; there are only bad officers. Israel has officers who are trained to lead their men whatever the odds.

AS Israel faces the next 25 years, the problem of her defence must be paramount. The problem is an involved one, because the sophistication of the new weaponry in the world must create additional intolerably heavy

burdens for small countries as Israel.

But Israel's strategic position is important, not only to the maintenance of Western freedom in the Middle East but also to the very existence of many of the Arab and pro-Western regimes in the area. The answer lies in the application of the Nixon doctrine. This doctrine recognizes the position of countries such as Israel as an integral part of Western policy designed to contain any further Soviet or Chinese expansion into the Middle East is of paramount importance.

Above all, the maintenance of Israel's deterrent posture and the emphasis on the defence factor and not on Israel's offensive capabilities provides the guarantee that when the country's importance as a power will no longer be of consequence within the context of the civilized relations which to be hoped, will then prevail in the Middle East.

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THE NATIONAL INSURANCE INSTITUTE

ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES



"The aspiration to live a proper social life has characterized the Jewish nation ever since its appearance on the stage of history, and the zeal of its prophets for the poor and for widows has left its mark on the development of human culture. The founders of Zionism — headed by Theodor Herzl who prophesied the establishment of the State of Israel, and the leaders who laid the foundation of the State — linked our revival with the doctrine of social justice."

With these words the then-Minister of Labour, Mrs. Golda Meir, introduced the National Insurance Bill to the Knesset on November 18, 1953. The passing of the Bill was the crown of four years of intensive study and research which had started in 1949 when the first

Minister of Finance, Eliezer Kaplan, appointed an interdepartmental committee to study the problem of social insurance. At the same time it marked the beginning of a series of legislative measures aimed at providing the citizens of the young State with a comprehensive system of social insurance. From the modest beginnings — the Bill covered only three categories of insurance: Old Age and Survivors, Work Accidents, and Maternity Insurance — till the present almost comprehensive scheme, it has been a long road.

The National Insurance Institute presents to the public, on the 25th Anniversary of the State, this survey of its achievements and activities — its contribution to the stability of Israeli society.

OLD AGE INSURANCE

In this branch of insurance, which is the core of the National Insurance Law, the Institute's two principal objectives in the last year have been to stop the erosion in the real value of pensions, and to ensure a national insurance pension for every aged person. Until now Old Age and Survivors pensions were linked to the cost-of-living increment. The latter, however, does not reflect the changes in the standard of living, as it is influenced only by price rises, and consequently, the relative value of pensions declined from year to year. At present the pension is linked to the national average wage at a rate of 15% for a single person, 22.5% for two persons and up to 40% for five persons. These percentages do not include supplementary benefits, seniority increments and deferred retirement allowances. During the last year, between April 1972 and April 1973, Old Age and Survivors pensions went up by about 40% for single persons and for those with one to four dependants. Pensions of people with five to six dependants rose from 60%-80%.

More than 40% of all pensioners receive a supplementary benefit of more than 40% of the flat rate. Income declarations of applicants are not checked but accepted at face value. The State — through the Institute — provides all pensioners not insured in one of the Sick Funds with medical care and medications. Recipients of old age grants from the Ministry of Welfare are now included in the National Insurance scheme. Immigrants who are at the pensionable age at the time of their immigration are equally entitled to a National Insurance pension.

Although under the National Insurance Law the pensionable age for men is 70, and for women 65, pensions are paid at the age of 65 and 60 respectively to persons whose yearly income

	April 1973	1973 rates
Single	154.80	(111.00)
2 persons	232.20	(166.50)
3 persons	294.15	(210.00)
4 persons	356.00	(261.00)
5 persons	417.80	(302.00)

These rates do not include seniority increment, deferred retirement allowances, and supplementary social benefits.

from work does not exceed a fixed minimum (IL6,000 for a single person, IL8,000 for a couple, and IL750 for each additional person).

Employment restrictions for the 65-70 aged have been abolished, and the ceiling of permissible income from other sources has been raised.

For new immigrants in their first year in Israel, for women who have become widowed within one year of their marriage, and for divorcees older than 55 there is no qualifying period.


In April 1973 an amendment to the Law was passed under which a widow who is entitled to both an old age pension and a survivors pension may receive half of the survivors pension in addition to the old age pension. Persons deferring their retirement are, under the new amendments, exempt from insurance contributions.

MATERNITY INSURANCE

Maternity Insurance consists of a birth grant and a maternity benefit.

Every woman in Israel, whether she is a citizen or not, either insured in her own right or through her husband, is entitled to a birth grant, provided she gives birth in a hospital. This latter provision, to a large extent aimed at immigrants from oriental countries and at Arab women for whom home-births were the traditional practice, induces those women to utilize the modern and hygienic facilities of hospitals. Since 1954 this grant has been paid to more than one million women, and it can be said that the legislator's aim has been achieved; 100% of the Jewish mothers and 98% of Arab mothers (5% before 1954!) give birth in a hospital. In addition to this grant, mothers receive a layette grant of IL180.

Maternity benefits also cover self-employed women, members of kibbutzim, moshavim and moshavim ahituvim. These categories as well as working mothers are entitled to a benefit of 75% of their average monthly income (calculated on the basis of their earnings during the three preceding months) not exceeding IL1,500, for a period of 12 weeks, provided they have been insured for 10 out of the 14 preceding months, or 15 out of the 22 preceding months. New immigrants are entitled to the maternity benefit for a period of six weeks, if they have been employed or self-employed, for at least 6 months out of the 14 preceding months.



LARGE FAMILY ALLOWANCES

During the last few years the National Insurance Institute has been paying a great deal of attention to the plight of large families, and considerable changes and improvements have been introduced. Whereas originally the scheme only provided for allowances for large families with four or more children under the age of 14, in 1965 the age was raised to 18, and, in special cases, also step children, adopted children and even grand-children were included in the scheme. In April 1970 the allowance was extended to the third child of insured non-employees, and at the same time the allowance for the third child of employed persons was transferred from the Employed's Children Allowance system to the system of Large Family Insurance, so that now all families with three or more children come under the latter system. A far-reaching reform, effected in October 1972, resulted in the considerable increase of the allowance for children of large families. In the wake of this reform about 160,000 families now receive an allowance for the third child. As the allowances are now linked to the national average wage, they maintain their real value and are increased more

or less in accordance with the overall rise in the standard of living. Following the recent considerable price rises the large family allowances have again been increased. Special additional benefits are paid for children of persons serving in the Armed Forces or in the Reserves.

	IL per month	With Post-Army Benefit
First child	20.00	20.00
Second child	20.00	20.00
Third child	40.80	40.80
Fourth child	59.80	79.80
Fifth child	61.70	81.70
Sixth child	59.80	79.80
Seventh child	58.10	78.10
Each additional child	58.10	78.10


From April 1973 an employee with four children, and entitled to the Post-Army Benefit, will receive approximately IL160 a month; with six children: IL321, and with eight children: IL488. The family allowance for an employee with six children, and entitled

to the Post-Army Benefit, amounts to 20% of the national average wage and for an employee with 8 children to 42.5%.

EMPLOYEES CHILDREN ALLOWANCES

In August 1965 the National Insurance Institute introduced an Employees' Children Allowance for the first three children which replaced the relatively small allowances for children, paid until then by employers, and of which only about 1/3 of the employees benefited.

With the introduction of this allowance the burden was divided equally among all employers according to uniform, fixed rates, which are raised occasionally. Plans exist to merge Large Family and Employees' Children allowances, and to pay an allowance for every child (including the first and second child of self-employed who are at present excluded from the scheme), at such a level that children will no longer be a cause of poverty. At present a monthly allowance of IL20 is paid for each of the first two children.



WORK ACCIDENT INSURANCE

This insurance covers all employees, self-employed and members of co-operatives in the event of work accidents and occupational diseases. Amendments to the law have widened the definition of the term "work-accident" to the extent that it now includes accidents during a meal break in a restaurant, or during a meeting or other activities of a workers' committee after regular working hours. This branch of insurance provides for injury, disability and dependants benefits, as well as for medical services, convalescence and medical and vocational rehabilitation.

Injury benefits are paid during a maximum period of 26 weeks at the rate of 75% of the injured's regular average wage not exceeding IL1,500 per month. This calculation ensures the employee of the better part of his wages, and at the same time encourages him to return to work.

After the period of 26 weeks a disability pension is paid. Persons with a disability of more than 75% are entitled to additional benefits in the form of personal assistance payments, and a lump-sum grant. Survivors of persons killed in, or as a result of, a work accident receive 60-100% of the disability pension according to the number of dependants.

Percentage of the National Average Wage	Category A: unemployed whose wife (husband) is unemployed and not eligible for unemployment pay	Category B: unemployed who are not married	%
1. up to 50%	60	70	
2. 51%-75%	50	50	
3. 76%-100%	45	35	
4. more than the average	40	30	

The maximum number of days for which a benefit is paid is 138 days; for unemployed older than 45, or with three dependants this period is 175 days. In times of country-wide unemployment or prolonged unemployment these periods may be extended, as well as, in special circumstances, in specified areas. Income tax is deducted at source at the rates applicable to daily workers. In certain circumstances, unemployed minors between 15-18 years receive grants which are exempt of income tax.



A VISION OF THE FUTURE

The Director-General of the National Insurance Institute, Dr. I. Katz, does not consider the many achievements of the Institute a reason for resting on laurels. On the contrary, he holds that much is still to be done. Of the many goals and challenges he sees, we mention only the following:

1. A research project which will provide more, and more accurate information on the distribution of national income.
2. A still broader expansion of national insurance, to cover more and new groups of the population, and to alleviate additional forms of hardship. The Institute should join forces with the Hitaadut pension funds in order to reach a comprehensive, income-related system of pension insurance. A Bill on comprehensive disability insurance has recently been tabled in the Knesset.
3. People need not only money, but also services-kind. The Institute tries to find ways to explore new services and the means to finance them. Facilities for the aged chronically ill should be developed, and school meals introduced; family counselling and vacation facilities for mothers, homes and clubs for the aged are needed.
4. A still greater effort to reduce the number of people in need of public assistance should be made.
5. The Institute endeavours to strengthen the role of the public in decision-making.
6. The launching of a pre-retirement programme. Experiments in this field are already being made in Haifa and Jerusalem. The aim of the programme is to prepare people approaching retirement, by guidance and counselling, and by training for a hobby or a new occupation, for a meaningful life after retirement.



EQUALIZATION FUND

Since 1948, defence tasks in Eretz Israel were carried out by volunteers. The young people serving in the illegal fighting organizations (Haganah, Etzel) received no financial compensation for the fact that they had forfeited their place in the labour market. This changed after the establishment of the State. Military service was introduced, and up to the very day the great majority of Israeli men and many women as well serve in the Reserves till advanced age. When the Administration of the young State started looking for ways to solve the social problem involved, it found an example in Switzerland, whose army is also built mainly on Reserves. The Swiss paid their Reservists from a special fund which they called an "Equalization Fund" because all employees and all employers, including those who do not serve in the Army, shared the expenses involved equally.

In 1952 the Equalization Fund Law was enacted by the Knesset.

The newly founded Fund had three objectives:

1. To ensure the enlisted Reservist and his family of a regular income during the period of his service.
2. To release the employer of the burden of paying wages to workers during their period of service.
3. To lessen the expenses entailed in the maintenance of an army of reservists.

Under the new law the expenses of the Reservists' pay were equally shared by three groups: the employer, the reservists themselves and the I.D.F.

As to all other insurance branches considerable improvements and expansions have been introduced in the Law, especially after the Six Day War when the burden became still heavier. Since 1968, every soldier in the Reserves, receives his full salary or bonus, up to a maximum of IL1,500 per month.

All levels of the population are now included in the Fund. Initially only salaried workers received payment, which constituted only part of their regular salary; now self-employed, unemployed and students are entitled to this payment.

And the latest amendments have also abolished the two restrictions: the Fund now also pays, even if the worker is for less than three days.

SURVIVORS INSURANCE

The flat rate of a widows' pension is equal to the regular old age pension, and in accordance with the number of dependants. Childless widows under 50, who are considered to be capable of supporting themselves, receive a reduced pension. Widows under 40 receive a lump sum grant in lieu of pension, amounting to two years' pension. A widow who remarries, but is divorced within two years, becomes again entitled to a pension. Orphans up to 18 years receive benefits at old age pension rates. Supplementary benefits are paid if additional income is less than a fixed minimum. The qualifying period is one year.

Since 1970, widows with limited means are entitled to vocational rehabilitation if they did not work before widowhood. The Institute pays the vocational training expenses. Orphans continuing their secondary or vocational education receive a monthly grant of IL75. In the future the grant for orphans will be linked to the average wage at a rate of 9%. Thus, in the 1973-1974 school year the monthly grant will be raised to IL90.

The Institute also pays a fixed sum to the burial society to cover the costs of interment. The burial society is not allowed to demand or to accept any additional payment from the bereaved. This grant is paid to all persons, whether they are insured or not.

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
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1998:

Not-so
optimistic
look at
Israel
15 years
from today

by
Helga
Dudman



BY the year 1990, the population of Israel may — but then again, may not — be 4,566,000. This figure is based on Hypothesis D (70,000 immigrants annually). Hypotheses A, B, and C (25,000; 40,000; and 50,000 immigrants annually) get you three other figures.

"It is not claimed that the future will in fact be like this," says the Central Bureau of Statistics' Special Bulletin No. 393 gently. "It is merely claimed that if the conditions assumed... prevail, this will be the population." To get to the year 1998 (*Zaf Shin Nin Hat*) 25 years from now, when Israel will be a pudgy, middle-aged 50, is quite simple if the computers are properly air-conditioned: but you must compound the interest so that the varying fertility rates assumed for the assumed varying composition of immigration (proportions from Europe, Asia, and so on) are reflected; this, alas, space does not permit.

Futurology is a booming field (and booming right along with it is, of all things, nostalgia), although, as we see, even the most statistically abstract of predictions are entirely interchangeable, given the range of hypotheses assumable.

Strawberries, for instance, on which you might expect the experts to be on firm footing, can trip up the observer. Early this spring, the severe frost led agricultural experts to predict the loss of the strawberry crop. But shortly after the frost, it was reported that these predictions were entirely incorrect, and "strawberry fields that seemed to have been destroyed suddenly started to sprout and produce record-breaking crops."

Aware of all these pitfalls, I am sure of just one thing: 25 years from now, we will be looking back on the early seventies as the good old days. "Ah," we will say with a nostalgic choke, "Ah for the summer of 1973, when we still had a pioneering spirit and the nation's moral fibre was strong and positive! When youth was polite and diligent and the air of Tel Aviv and Haifa was still — comparatively — pure and delightful!"

When our national leaders were young and feisty — or at least, 25 years younger than they are today! When the sea was still liquid, and before we had commercial colour television! Remember those wonderful programmes in black-and-white, on that single noble channel!

Tomato nostalgia

"When people rarely invited more than 700 guests to a bar-mitzvah, and a tomato tasted like a tomato, and you could still get a kilo of eggplant for IL6?"

"Of course, 1973 was heaven compared to 1983, and '83 was bliss to be alive in compared to five years ago, which in turn was pretty good compared to today. Back then the scientists were saying, 'Just give us an authority with teeth and a budget of two billion, and we'll clean up the — what did they call it, the Quality of Life — in a trice'. Today they say, 'Give us an authority with fangs, and a four billion budget.'"

The year *Tashnakh* itself produces a few hints. "Tash" means "weak, feeble" and is, as well, an acronym for the word "Tashnakh". "From this you may learn." It also means "audio-frequency," to give technology its due. "Nach" means "quietest." Also "Noah," with all the name implies. And, acronymically: "debtor" and "miracle," as in Hannukah. So, to give the thing a Chinese flavour, we have something like the Year of the Quiescent Mouse, deep in debt and waiting for a miracle, surrounded by bands of electric current frequencies — and with a lesson for us all.

Astrology is one of the longest-established forms of futurology. Hans Zeuger, of Moshav Tal-Shahar, has had a good batting average in the past (back in the days when Egypt's Nas-

ser seemed far healthier than Jordan's Hussein, he told me that the playboy king had much the better stars, and I asked him how he saw Israel in 1998.

"I'm not a prophet and not a clairvoyant, only a very simple astrologer," he told me, "and looking ahead 25 years is not easy. But I've made some calculations as to where the planets — which move at different speeds both in relation to us and in relation to each other — will be 25 years from now, and have tried to reach some conclusions as to what the 'Zeitgeist' may be then."

Here came a specific analysis of the predictable paths of Uranus ("related to revolutionary aspects, and the future...") and Saturn ("associated with tradition"), Neptune, Pluto, and others. "The star of the Jewish nation, till 1947, was Saturn," explained Mr. Zeuger. "But on the very day of partition, November 29, 1947, Saturn and Uranus were in a harmonious angle, so I believe that Uranus has now taken up the part of the Jews, and I see the date of the U.N. partition vote, rather than May 14, 1948, as decisive for us."

"My predictions have not always been rosy, but I think that in 25 years things will be better. Not only — as I understand things now — will there be peace between the Jews and the Arabs, but there will be a real reconciliation; for you can still have a formal peace with bad feelings."

Our achievements in scientific progress, especially health, will be significant; we may benefit from a kind of 'cosmic inspiration' and indeed feel a sense of responsibility for mankind."

And what, I asked, of the malaise of 1973? "I'm not blind to the mood of the present. But the stars are changing."

Back at Rosh Hashana in 1970, incidentally, a few days after Nasser's death, when I last spoke to Mr. Zeuger he said, "The death of Nasser will not radically change developments in Egypt." Two days later, Sadat said, "The hour of peace has already come, and it must be concluded as soon as possible through the Jarring mission."

And, said David Horowitz that same week in 1970: "Prices rose more than expected."

"And what will we be wearing in 1998?" I asked our fashion reporter.

Where wool went

"Nothing but synthetics," she replied in a flash. "No more natural fibres. Wool and cotton won't be around — they're pricing themselves out of the market." (Just as silk and linen are no longer around.)

"It's a horrible thought," she continued. "My three-year-old daughter hates her synthetic clothes; she always wants to wear her real cotton slacks and her real wool sweaters." (But by the time she is ten, she will have

to come to terms with progress?) "Perhaps there'll be a bit of the real thing around for the upper classes. Perhaps we'll just spray on our clothes. Who knows."

A hair-raising chart (one of many) on p. 143 of a fat publication entitled "Solid Waste Pollution in Israel," published by the National Committee on Biosphere and Environment — under the auspices of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities (a good straw in the funny-smelling wind: the fact that Solid Waste has come to roost under the wing, to mix a metaphor, of the Sciences and the Humanities) shows us the growth rate, in tonnage, per capita, of solid wastes — i.e., garbage — in selected cities.

Tel Aviv, which leads the race in the lurch into the future, goes right off the top of the page. In 1967 — the Six-Day-War marked many things — each Tel Avivian produced a mere .34 tons of garbage per year, well under the desired American average.

By 1971, his productive capacity for the manufacture of garbage had leaped to .44 tons. Projecting to 1975, the dotted line goes off the page.

Going back to 1968, when per capita tonnage was still modest, the national costs of collecting and disposing of solid wastes, "mostly with unsatisfactory methods," amounted to IL40 million a year. Costs forecast for 1980 are (Continued on page 28)

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(Continued from page 27)

about 1L350 million. Pick your own hypotheses for 1998. In any case, highly trained professors will be devising the production of newer and trickier disposables, while other highly trained professors will be devising newer and trickier ways of trying to get rid of them.

"So what will it be like in the future?" I asked Dr. Peter Preuss one of the scientists who worked on the Solid Waste Pollution publication (which, of course does not touch on our old friend Liquid Waste Pollution, not to mention Air Pollution).

"I don't think we can continue as we are," he said. "We must work on the assumption that there will be more control, and more enforcement. The amount of garbage per capita will get higher, but so will the amount recycled."

The future thus holds less freedom, but more and better quality garbage, with a larger proportion of our social efforts going to figure out ways of re-using it.

For Tel Aviv, the publication's projection does not go further than 1980, when the city's population is estimated at four million and its annual garbage production at 2.2 million. For 1998, pick your own hypothesis. And budget.

'Warm in Winter'

"The New Shape of Comfort" is the subtitle of one of the more painfully idiotic advertisements which this newspaper has carried recently, and it would make a good little item to put into a Time Capsule. "Climate Control" is the catchy-elleche name of the firm, and the accompanying drawing (made, I must point out, rather in the style of 1934) shows a young man done up in furs like a cossack drinking some steaming brew; he, you see represents "Cool in Summer, and what you must wear to ensure the air-conditioning you are invited to buy."

On his knees he is cuddling a rather crotchless looking girl in a bikini, who in turn is cuddling a triple-ice-cream-sundae (made of polyesters and re-cycled hub-caps) and she represents the spirit of "Warm in Winter." In other words: install all this stuff, use all this fuel and energy (of the fanciest, atomic varieties) so that you can sweater in the winter and freeze in the summer.

The point seems too horrifyingly basic to miss; but when one of America's leading biologists, and the author of a book explaining the inter-relatedness of all this with beautiful clarity, "The Closing Circle," Barry Commoner, testified before a Senate Committee on the "energy crisis," his comments made news. "We have raised temperatures and avoided a very simple way of keeping warm, which is wearing clothes," Mr. Commoner said. Lowering thermostats and putting on sweaters "would help end our enslavement to the oil companies and allow Americans to look them in the eye and talk back to them."

At the turn of the century, the "accepted norm for room temperature was about 60 degrees, whereas it is now about 75." And lowering temperature in summertime is an even more energy-consuming business. But we in the Middle East insist on pushing buttons — and wearing synthetic shirts, and increasingly ties — and then complaining about the Arab Oil Lobby.

But the sensitive button-pusher and climate-controller is not just a link in the chain of pollution and politics; he has also given up one very easy and, I have found, very satisfying physiological phenomenon: adaptability.

The Bible might not have been written if the desert had been air-conditioned by day and centrally heated for those chilly evenings; but in 25 years children may, universally, throw tantrums in their absence. I already know one infant who will not go to sleep at night unless she hears the reassuring hum of the air-conditioner in the summertime — in her flannel pajamas, of course. So: sweaters will be out, except in the summertime (as in the ready case in certain well-sealed offices and hotel lobbies); bikinis will be out, except in the winter (beaches will be obsolete); and intellectual discussions will centre around whether the dial should be up to "Hi Fan Exhaust" or "Cool, Number Seven."

Terrors of traffic

During the next 25 years, 12,500 Israelis will be killed in traffic accidents, and 84,750 seriously injured. (And this means seriously injured, not just a minor little shake-up, for which the figure will be 396,100, which is hardly worth mentioning.) These predictions are wildly conservative, because they are based on the 1970 rate (528 deaths, rate of serious injuries per 100,000 population at 108, minor injuries at 15,844 or 534 per 100,000). I am assuming a zero population growth of people, cars, and speed limits, which is of course silly. Between 1980 and 1990, the number of private cars increased by 375 per cent; the two-car family is already not such a fantasy as it was a brief ten years ago, and by 1998 should be widespread; and whereas today only 74 per cent of our cars are fringed benefits, or "necessary for work" or some other form of hypocrisy, in 25 years it should be around 250 per cent of all private cars.

Changing speed limits have also not been taken into account but are likely to be 130 km on the open road between cities (where such spaces will exist), with actual speeds in the cities at around 0.3 km. per hour (down from 18.2 in 1970). Sherut drivers, chosen for their sang-froid, will be doing around 180 km/hr. Forty-three per cent of the coastal plain will be under asphalt. Audio-visual advances will be breath-taking and we will all have advanced media-poisoning; but it will still be terribly important to get physically fit where you are to where you are not, and more and more people will be travelling further and further with less and less gratification, because scenery and natives will have grown everywhere indistinguishable.

Nevertheless, "Israel will be host to about two million persons a year," the El Al spokesman told me, adding that his prophecies were, of course, pure speculation. "Air buses" will be commuting between here and the major European cities — a new generation of planes carrying up to 1,000 passengers. On the New York run, there will be supersonic planes making the trip in four hours, "so that you will arrive there earlier than when you left Tel Aviv."

To which may be added, with respect to the Arab states, that in 25 years their consortium (which will have had ten Concorde stored in hangars throughout the Middle East) will be nearly ready to graduate the first Arab pilot qualified to fly the Concorde.

Do we even learn from the present? Not if it costs money. In *Shant Tashmash*, the Israeli pound will be firmly linked to the American penny, and the cost of doing complicated things — such as going to the moon, or calculating by computer the probability of blue-eyed persons

sneezing on Tuesdays — will be relatively low; the cost of primitive activities, such as breathing fresh air on a balcony or seeing heaven in a wild flower, for instance, will be well beyond the average budget.

The following vignette helps make a useful forecast: At a prosperous Galilee kibbutz, a torrent of sewage churns ceaselessly out of a long pipe into a small body of water which was once the Jordan river (and served as the kibbutz swimming pool before the chlorinated, cement-lined arrangement was constructed).

My friends at the kibbutz were largely unaware of this (it takes place several hundred metres from their house; besides, arguments at the settlement centre around more burning issues, such as should members have television in their rooms). When I prodded them about it, they made inquiries, and learned that to cope properly would cost three million pounds. (In Tel Aviv, 100,000 cubic metres of inadequately processed sewage water are pumped daily into the sea north of the well-known Reading Power Station; a little further north, in spite of a peace-no-war, they mingle absolutely freely with the unprocessed sewage from Beirut.

Nature of progress

What is progress, anyway? This is the age of best-sellers which sniff around as to its character — "Future Shock," "The Biological Time Bomb." An original and controversial view is presented in a non-best seller called "The Coming of the Golden Age," by Gunter S. Stent, whose lectures at the Weizmann Institute a few years ago caused considerable annoyance to the scientists in the packed audience, because for Professor (of Molecular Biology) Stent, the "Golden Age" of the foreseeable future means the "end of progress" in both science and the arts.

"Science will become the mere filling in of detail in concepts already known; the arts will quite appropriately conclude as random sensation." He also manages to annoy the social scientists, whose future activities he describes as being, in any given case, "yet one more subjective interpretation of data." Beyond the pale of successful theoretical formulation.

None of this is nearly as simple-minded as I have managed to make it sound. In fact, the non-professional will have to work hard on "The Rise and Fall of Molecular Genetics," which will up the first half of the book (the "Classic," "Romantic," "Dogmatic," and "Academic" periods) — the author's specialty, presented as a "paradigm of the history of creative activity in general."

The very notion of "progress" — that history embodies a "movement toward a better world" — is itself relatively new, with roots in the rise of science in the 18th and 19th centuries, the French revolution, the Industrial Revolution, and culminating in Marx, Darwin, and Herbert Spencer; the idea of progress was alien to the ancient world, which valued stability and deplored change; the "Golden Age" was always past, and 2,000 years ago our forefathers looked back to the good old days of their ancestors — and forward only to the apocalypse that would precede the millennia.

Professor Stent quotes widely from a book called "Inventing the Future," by physicist Dennis Gabor (who recently visited Israel). "Gabor recently visited Israel," Gabor recently visited Israel, after showing his people the Promised Land, led them around in the wilderness for 40 years so that a new generation could grow up that would be worthy of

it... The instinctive wisdom of the social body has found the 20th century equivalent of the biblical wilderness: none other than "Parkinson's Law," which reduces the degree of leisure that our present technology could already afford by creating enough unnecessary work and waste."

A largely forgotten futurologist is put into startling relevance by Professor Stent when he plots Henry Adams' "Law of Acceleration of Progress: the curve is based on a 'rate of progress' measured by the time unit in which the world's consumption of energy doubles — as it has always kept doing. Some items come in cycles (hair length, models of romantic love), but the rate of energy consumption, till now, has always sloped upwards."

In Henry Adams' day (1838-1918), this meant power utilized from coal; and during the 19th century — a poky old century — the world's consumption doubled every ten years; from the 15th to the 18th centuries, he judged the "doubling period" of the rate of progress to be between 25 and 50 years. Even based on this old-fashioned rate of acceleration, the curve starts going off the page shortly after the year 2000; and the energy consumption in 1980, Professor Stent calculates for us, represented a 100,000-fold increase over the 1,000 B.C.E. base (a thousand years after the stark moral precepts of Moses, and just about the time of the luxuries of Solomon).

The oily reefs

Solomon and Elliot: If we plot on a graph the effects of oil — the source of that 100,000-fold energy — equals — progress increase — on the corals of Elliot, we will get a curve going off the paper even faster — but downwards. "Ten million tons of oil are poured into the sea each year — into what was once a balanced and very ancient bio-system," said Professor Lov Fishelson, an eloquent marine biologist of Tel Aviv University, at a recent poorly attended symposium on marine pollution. The oil interests had been invited by the Nature Reserves Authority but did not show up.

"We are dumping waste into the sea at a rate that increases tenfold per person annually," said Professor Fishelson, echoing some sort of fallout from Henry Adams. "There is a dualism here: on the one hand, our huge advance in technology; on the other, the maintenance of a conservative attitude toward the results of that progress... What we throw into the sea is now far beyond its capacity to re-work and break down — a delicate chain which may be destroyed by many links... Where is the border between what man thinks is necessary for his welfare, and what means the death of his surroundings?"

Between 1969 and 1973 — a very small space on the paper, as most graphs go — Dr. Josef Loya, a young marine biologist at Tel Aviv University, was doing his doctorate on the effects of industrialization on the coral reefs of Elliot. "When I saw what had happened during this short period, I was shocked," he announced at this symposium in 1980, in an average ten-square-metre reef area under observation there had been 40 colonies of corals including 13 types, with 181 individuals of one particular type. By 1971, there had been quite a change: 8.3 colonies, 4.3 types, four individuals. In one specific area, where there had been 42 types in 1969 only 26 remained in 1971. Nineteen types present in the earlier period had disappeared completely by the second.

Avraham Yoffe, Director of the Nature Reserves Authority (whose credentials in the Israel movement are in perspective, but who is fond of saying that the Jews, during 40 years in this country, have done more damage than the Turks in 400 years), will have to look at another place."

But will it really matter? oil which runs the jet bringing tourists, and the conditioning of Elliot's (which by then will have been applied by who-knows-what will certainly have knocked the corals — and the fish on the beaches — in 25 years by then a type of world war have evolved who will not what is no longer available.

In other words, will today's year-olds develop models of adaptability to fit into the Brave New World, disproving the old adage that man's standard-of-living is other man's poison? My standard of living — often confused level of consumption — is much higher before the dawn of the 20th century than it is now. But is he instinctively ing himself deaf — and what are the sources from which the sources spring?

People concerned

Not necessarily, says Dr. Ben-Shaul, zoologist and environmentalist with the Nature Reserves Authority. "I've noticed definite shift in the people concerned with our problems, from people who ask me to speak and tell me to my office with questions, to people who ask me to speak and tell me to my office with questions, to people who ask me to speak and tell me to my office with questions."

Against this optimism, it is relevant to quote Dr. Rene Loya in his book "Men, Medicine and Environment": "The most disturbing aspect of the problem is that for the first time, a generation, a code word is no longer the modicum of 'Zionism' but 'Zionism' is a word which is rooted in the past, the exact opposite of the former stereotype. The hope not seriously held, like the mechanical repetition of 'Next Year in Jerusalem,' before these words had again assumed immediacy and could arouse passion. Today, because of Israel, ceremonial phrases and remote Biblical place names have the sharp relevance of the day's headlines. The forgettable past has reappeared as the inescapable present. In this rekindled awareness lies the chief influence of Israel upon American Jewry, as upon Soviet Jewry today or perhaps Argentine Jewry tomorrow."

For the first time in centuries, Jews have a viable alternative to benign assimilation, discrimination, or active persecution. This revolutionary turn in Jewish history looms so large that its very immensity makes comment superfluous. Yet reduced to its essence, and what is its brief existence has meant to American Jewry.

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Israel and the Diaspora

A COMMON DENOMINATOR

The existence of Israel compels Jewish identification whether through acknowledgement or rejection, writes Dr. MARIE SYRKIN, former member of the Jewish Agency Executive and editor of 'Jewish Frontier'

logical cohesion of American Jewry is threatened by intermarriage — the inevitable consequence of the weakening of spiritual cohesion.

What then remains?

The second great impulse to Jewish identification, other than religion, has been Jewish nationalism, the awareness of belonging to one people. But Zionism as an ideological current could not flow indefinitely in the kindly American Diaspora without being fed by new sources. These were provided by the agony of the Holocaust and the emergence of Israel. The reality of a Jewish State prevented what had been a powerful sentiment from swivelling into sentimentality, at best a vague attachment to a hope not seriously held, like the mechanical repetition of "Next Year in Jerusalem," before these words had again assumed immediacy and could arouse passion. Today, because of Israel, ceremonial phrases and remote Biblical place names have the sharp relevance of the day's headlines. The forgettable past has reappeared as the inescapable present. In this rekindled awareness lies the chief influence of Israel upon American Jewry, as upon Soviet Jewry today or perhaps Argentine Jewry tomorrow."

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ous Zionist or pro-Israel organizations engaged in good works.

There are other subtler ways in which the impact of Israel may be felt. I refer particularly to the new imagery about the Jew that Israel has introduced into the popular mind. Not everyone may be charmed by cartoons depicting an aggressive Israeli fighter, but there is no denying that they represent a new stereotype. Of course, the anti-Semite is not dead. He puts the same long nose on his Jewish "aggressor," even if he be as snub-nosed as Dayan, as he did on the cringing Jew he formerly enjoyed depicting; but by and large, images of vigour and independence have replaced those of cowardice and obsequiousness in the consciousness of the Gentile world.

New symbols

In addition to changing Gentile stereotypes, the comparatively few decades of Jewish independence have given new symbols to the national imagination. The Jew of the Diaspora proved curiously unable to create forms to express the central Jewish tragedy of our time. This impotence was a psychic malady of the Hitler years, a poverty of spirit of which we were aware. Israel, in being or in becoming, created the poetry, as well as providing the actuality, of resistance. Let me give one instance. At the height of the Holocaust, a Palestinian youth group marched to the Dead Sea and ascended Masada years before that fortress had been excavated to become a tourist attraction. It was a tough march. At the top of the hill they erected a monument to which they affixed a tablet engraved with the words, "If I forget thee, O Diaspora." These Palestinian boys and girls were able to express imaginatively what no other contemporary Jewry found the inner strength to phrase — the indictment of an era.

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Finally, in considering the whole of Israel's impact on American Jewry, we should not omit the many who are self-consciously nervous about Israel's errors and imperfections. Where is the dreamed Utopia which would give the answer to social and national ills?

Let me in this connection quote Maimonides. In describing the days of the Messiah, Maimonides writes: "Let no one believe that when the Messiah comes, anything in the world will be destroyed, or that there will be some change in creation. This will not be so. The world will go on even as it did before. The Tanna'im said 'That is all.'"

American rabbis at the Western Wall. (David Rubinger)

that there will be no difference between the present day and the days of the Messiah except for the fact that the Jews will cease to be subject to alien domination. That is all."

The one condition for the ideal time set down by the medieval sage is independence — the ability of a people to act according to its lights. Perhaps the chief impact of Israel on the Diaspora lies in the realization that at last, through Israel's existence, the Jewish people has this capacity. "That is all."

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A change in Jewish self-image

By JACK MAURICE
Jerusalem Post Correspondent

PARIS. — FOUR leading French Jews agreed that the existence of the State of Israel has wrought a transformation not only in the image of the Jew in the eyes of the world but in the Jew's own image of himself.

Leon Pollakow, historian of anti-Semitism and the Holocaust, said:

"The emergence of Israel as a state has completely transformed the traditional image of the Jew. Before Israel existed, the gentile regarded the Jew as a physical weakling without loyalties to any state or throne. He was typified by such characters as Shylock and Judas. But all that is over now."

"But in the Diaspora there are negative aspects of the new Jewish condition. There is an increasing tendency among non-Jews to identify all Jews with Israel. This means that Jews in France and other countries are taking the blame for Israel's handling of the Middle East conflict. And this phenomenon is certainly not a desirable one."

A more optimistic interpretation of the new situation came from Albert Memmi, Tunisian-

born author of "Portrait of a Colonized Man" and "The Liberation of the Jew."

"The Jew in the Diaspora used to be the traditional image of a man dominated by his fellow men. The Jewish condition was one of oppression. But the creation of the State of Israel gave a historic meaning and a new orientation to this condition. Many intellectuals are reluctant to use the word Zionism, but I am not. For Zionism has developed as a Jewish liberation movement in the same way as the other liberation movements in the Third World."

"A Jew who does not recognize that he is a Zionist is refusing to admit his new status. Since the Jewish condition is objectively one of oppression, a national solution — the State of Israel — is its objective solution. Even if he attains the highest ranks within the society in which he lives, the Jew remains oppressed, because he cannot shake off his historical social stigma."

"So, regardless of where he lives, and whether he himself feels oppressed or not, his condition has undergone a revolutionary change. He may not have noticed it, but like the young Tunisian or the young Algerian living in Europe, the European Jew has changed radically as an individual since Israel cast off the shackles of colonialism."

Leon Leneman, president of the Association of French Jewish Writers, like Mr. Pollakow, pointed to the identification of the Diaspora with Israel.

"Each Jew is now, willy-nilly, jointly responsible for the conduct of the Israeli Government. Each of us felt guilty when the Libyan Boeing was shot down by the Israeli Air Force. When Israel is attacked by the world press, every Jewish community across the globe is implicitly under attack as well."

"Israel's glories in technology, democracy and other realms of achievement have rubbed off on the Diaspora Jew and have endowed him with a new dimension. But when Israel's behaviour is questionable, the image of the ordinary Jew is at stake."

"Many Jews outside Israel feel that this mutual responsibility operates in only one direction. They consider that Israel does not feel as responsible for them as they do for Israel. For instance, cultural exchanges between Israel and the Diaspora are

a one-way affair. Then there is the problem of a state which is constantly appealing to Jewish communities abroad for funds and then spends them ostentatiously on luxurious offices and apartments for officials of the Jewish Agency and the J.N.F."

For Salomon Friedrich, Director-General of the Franco-Israel Association, the emergence of Israel means first and foremost that, whatever disaster may befall Jews in the Diaspora, they now know there is a free country where they can always obtain asylum.

"Until a quarter of a century ago, Jews were the constant victims of anti-Semitism; they were second-class citizens. Now that Israel exists, their situation has improved dramatically. We should not forget, either, that Judaism is a faith as well as a national identity. And it is easier for a Jew to practise his religion in

Israel than anywhere else in the world."

"Jews were always mocked, scorned because they were soldiers or labourers. As pioneers and defenders of a new respect for our people, the international scene. The Nazis massacred millions of people, but they did not know the meaning of the Jewish condition and the numerous Jewish instruments of Russia, Polish oppression against long before Hitler's gas chambers began their horrible work."

"It may take centuries for men to treat each other as equals. Meanwhile, the Jew remains alive to the threat of anti-Semitism. He must never get that in the Diaspora, he is a special status. And he is tempted to overlook the fact, he would be well advised to take another look at his life in the Soviet Union and Poland."

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


On tour with immigrants

Almost 9,000 new immigrants got a different kind of look at their new country over the Pessah holiday. Aboard 180 buses, they were taken to some of the sites of important War of Independence battles. Photographer Yisrael Simionsky of Israel Sun accompanied one of the groups, and provided this pictorial report.

LEFT: Three young newcomers from the Soviet Union stand in front of the statue commemorating the heroes of the siege of Negba. "We also want to be heroes," they told the photographer.

BELOW: The immigrant tourists chat with army reservists at the Iraq Suweidan police fort, now called Mezudat Yoav.



ENTERING THE MUSEUM commemorating and depicting the battle at Yad Mordechai. (Left).

JOINED BY SOME ISRAELIS, the immigrants climb aboard a tank at Negba to get their picture taken. (Below)



FOR THE TOUR, the immigrants attended a special show, sponsored by the Defense Ministry.



ASHDOD PORT, scene of many a battle on the labour front, was another stop on the group's itinerary.

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Communities without complexes

Deputy Knesset Speaker
YITZHAK NAVON discusses
the social gap in Israel.



Moroccan Jews proud of their tradition, at the Mimouna in Jerusalem two weeks ago.

Accomplishments of the Jewish people in Israel over the 50 years have no parallel anywhere. Fifty years ago there were no more than 70,000 Jews in this country. Today, far exceeding the dreams of its founders, the Jewish population has grown to 2.7 million. In the first Jewish tomato can, we careased it and sealed it. Today Israel not only has most of the foodstuff it needs for its own consumption, but also a wide variety. Where, during the War of Independence, a small pistol was in great demand, today we are building missile launchers.

Jewish people established kibbutz one of the most unique types of community — a society aspiring to real equality, and the fulfillment of the Jewish spirit. Of course, not Israel is a kibbutz; the movement represents only 3.5 per cent of the total population. But its influence on the country is enormous. In many countries are raising for agrarian and land reclamation more than 90 per cent of the land of Israel belongs to the Jews.

Natural that bombings, robberies and scandals make the headlines; but there is a mass cultural activity that is also in the theatre, concerts, art exhibitions, university and yeshiva studies.

The Hebrew language has been freed after its long slumber. It has been excavated near the Western Wall and suddenly comes across the enormous slab with the inscription, "You will rejoice in your language." You are astounded by greeting from your forefathers which you can read with the slightest difficulty and feel that you have re-created a magnificent and tragic past.

Free society

The amazing thing is that all has been achieved within the framework of a true democracy. Coming from more than 60 countries, speaking more than 60 different languages, the Jews have adapted to this democracy which grants abundant freedom of expression and freedom of organization — indeed, too much.

The summer visits from Arab states are helping destroy the propaganda image which for many years, painted Israel as a miserable and degenerate state, the "tail of the Zionist dog," or the monster sucking the blood of Arab babies. Visitors are able to see that the co-existence between Jews and Arabs is a reality.

A Jerusalem Arab writer once imprisoned for his anti-Hussein views has stated that his fellow Arabs are not the people they were before the Six Day War: for the first time they have learned the meaning of democracy, of concern for the worker.

There is, however, one important and disquieting question: What is the character of this nation, of Israeli society?

We know that 40 per cent of Israeli children belong to 13 per cent of the country's families; 60 per cent belong to the other 87 per cent. The fathers of large families are more often than not labourers. Their income is low and they are the first to be affected by the slightest economic downturn. This is where the social welfare problems are concentrated. Some years ago the Central Bureau of Statistics found that 202,000 men and women over the age of 14 could neither read nor write in any language; two-thirds of them were women, one-third men. It was surprising to find that 70,000 of these came from Poland and Rumania; but they were possibly people who, because of the Second World War, had had no chance of any schooling.

Problems of illiterate

However, the technical problem of reading and writing is not the only one. First we have to recognize the total dependence of the illiterate man. He is obliged to rely on an acquaintance to clarify matters of extreme importance — and is often too embarrassed to do so. A mother is often incapable of reading the letter she has received from her son in the army.

Secondly, the problem is one not only of numbers but of their concentration. If there are 30,000-40,000 illiterate people in Tel Aviv, that is a great number cut off from the cultural life of the city. But if illiterates constitute the majority of the population of a village, they dictate its very character.

There are 120 settlements in this country in which more than half the population is illiterate. What will happen in two or three generations? The argument that this is the generation of the wilderness and that the next one will flourish is invalid. If there is no change in the environment, in housing conditions, in the level of schooling and in the general atmosphere in which the child is raised, there is a strong possibility — and the indications are there — that the son will follow in his parents' footsteps. Few will advance; few will study.

There is another aspect of the problem which is not sufficiently discussed — that of security. We have a population of 2.7 million. Egypt alone has a population of almost 36 million and 800,000 Egyptians are born every year. If, until now, we have prevailed in three wars, it is because of our intellectual, scientific, spiritual and moral advantage. This supremacy, however, is no guarantee for the future.

And this leads to another serious question: How can we make ourselves into one people? How can we give a sense of belonging to one people to individuals coming from all corners of the Diaspora? Perhaps the term "melting pot" is not the most appropriate one, but we shall use it. Of course, the best "melting" would be intermarriage among the various communities, those from Europe and America with those from Asia and Africa.

There has already been a certain amount of progress in this direction. Ten years ago there were 11 per cent of what one might call "intermarriages"; today there are 16 per cent.

This, however, will not solve the problem. To give an example — and for this purpose I choose a young Moroccan because I am myself half Moroccan and it is therefore easier for me to say this: If a Moroccan youngster is asked "Where are you from?" his reply is either "From southern France" or else "From Morocco, so what?" Either he gives expression to a feeling of inferiority or he becomes aggressive. I would like to see, in addition to improvements in housing and income, a situation in which the youngster could answer, "I am from Morocco" as if it were an obvious, simple fact, free of any emotional overtones. In order to reach that state of affairs, he must first have a sense of well being and identity. He must

not only come to terms with his identity, but must feel at ease within it.

Root of problem

Which brings us to the root of the problem. When one is embarrassed or feels inferior, it expresses itself in aggressiveness and an inability to listen to one's fellow man.

There should be a feeling in each community in Israel that it is giving something and not merely receiving, that it has something meaningful to contribute. There is no community which has not a contribution to make nor is there any which historically has failed to make a contribution, whether it be in beautiful stories, books, manuscripts, oral tradition, folklore, customs, manners or human relationships. All these are buried as soon as the members of the Eastern communities come to Israel and have to face adjustment to a Western society which seems to be calling the tune.

And what will be the outcome? If we encourage each community to maintain its culture, what culture will we have? What kind of society will this be? My answer to these questions would be this: There are some basic principles which we cannot surrender. First of all, the common denominator must be Jewish tradition, that adhesive force which keeps all the sects and factions in this nation together. Any culture which cuts us off from the roots of this Judaism will always be a foreign element in our midst and will be divisive.

Along with this, we must be open to the best that the world has to offer. This is something on which we cannot compromise: this is the first common denominator. Secondly, we must pursue our democratic path along the lines of the Western democracies. Here again we can make no concessions, no compromises. Thirdly, we must be in the forefront of modern Western scientific and technological development — we must not emulate the technological standards of Yemen or the scientific standards of Morocco. Here, again, no compromise can be made. But, for the rest, there must be a free market of ideas and values, so that everyone from the multitude of communities that have come and are yet to come may make its particular contribution.

What the nation wants, the nation will get. What it does not want will be rejected. The rose is a very beautiful flower. But must my garden have only roses? I can have lilies, jasmine, carnations, in all their variety, and still have harmony. This is what I would like our nation to be.




Low incomes, poor housing and social welfare problems. (Hans H. Pinn)

[illegible]

A "coffin" ship named "Paritha" which came to Palestine but its passengers were removed to a detention camp (1939)

Irqi and Indian immigrants at Shahr Ha Aliyah river

Kurdish Immigrants arrive (June 1951)



In 1932, the corner-stone of the Koren Hayesod building was laid. Left to right: Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, Berl Locker, Emanuel Neumann, Menahem Ussishkin, Leib Jaffe and Abraham Bilerman.




Ein Harod, kibbutz in the Emek (1926, five years after founding)

The Revolution will be



London Zionist Conference (July 1941) - Founded



...and Manifesto (December 1920)



Karni Hovsepi Building Dynamics



Kfar Gileon, first Orthodox settlement in the Eneq (1923).

53 YEARS AT A GLANCE	IMMIGRATION AND ABSORPTION	AGRICULTURAL SETTLEMENT, NEW TOWNS AND HOUSING	TOTAL FUNDS RAISED	TOTAL EXPENDITURES OF THE JEWISH AGENCY 1948-1972	GRAND TOTAL OF FUNDS RAISED
1920-1948 28 YEARS WORKING TOWARDS ISRAEL	487,000 immigrants, including 28,700 children brought to Palestine by Youth Aliyah, were settled and absorbed into the economy	257 agricultural settlements were established with a population of 80,000 working some 700,000 dunams of land	\$149,000,000 88% from the United States through the United Jewish Appeal 36% from other sources	Immigration, Absorption and Housing 960,000,000 Welfare, Education and Health 237,850,000 Youth Aliyah 103,000,000 Agricultural Settlement 188,000,000 Grants for Higher Education 212,000,000 Education Fund 28,000,000 Education and Culture, Organization & Information Activities 229,000,000 Administration and Service 76,000,000 Payment of Debts 7,400,000 Others 3,088,200,000	Total For Period Fulfilled 1920-1948 \$ 143,000,000 1948-1972 \$2,229,000,000
1948-1973 25 YEARS WORKING FOR ISRAEL	1,500,000 immigrants, including 100,000 children brought to Israel by Youth Aliyah, became citizens of the State	838 new agricultural settlements and 27 new towns were built; 380,000 new Israeli units provided permanent homes for over a million new immigrants	\$2,228,000,000 78% from the United States through the United Jewish Appeal 22% from 68 other sources		\$2,371,000,000

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The new Israeli as a Jew

How Jewish is Israeli youth? Answers to this question vary widely. They are seldom the result of thorough investigation; they do not set forth any clear-cut criteria as to what constitutes "Jewishness." When the answer comes from outside Israel, such criteria as are implicit in the evaluation are often taken from the culture of which it is itself a product.

Two facets

No particular examination of the subject limits itself to two facets — the relationship of Israeli youth to the Jewish people and their relationship to the Jewish past in the Diaspora.

In order to gauge the quality of Israeli Jewish identity, a Hebrew University research team in 1966 undertook a systematic study of a representative sample of 18-17-year-olds in the country's high schools. These were youngsters born in the year after the State was established, the first generation of "Israelis." For purposes of comparison, we explored the attitudes of their parents and teachers. Our study was in its final stages in 1967 at the time of the Six Day War which seemed to have a profound impact on the Jewish identity of Israelis. We accordingly decided to investigate the changes which had occurred. But the original subjects of our research were now in the army and not available for re-study; so we turned to the students who, in 1966, were in high school in Jerusalem and Haifa.

Other Jews

We discovered that the great majority of young Israelis do not see themselves — as some observers have supposed — as a new people; they regard themselves as part and parcel of the Jewish people and as continuing the Jewish historical tradition. They see themselves aligned with Jews everywhere.

What is the basis of this alignment? Most young Israelis do not feel much similarity between themselves and Jews in other parts of the world. But, at the same time, the overwhelming majority recognize the interdependence that exists, that what happens to Jews anywhere, as Jews, has implications for Jews everywhere. And this feeling of interdependence is accompanied by a sense of mutual responsibility.

Alignment with an ethnic group is not merely at a given moment in time, but across time — with the past and future, as well as the present, of the group. In this respect, Israelis face a peculiar psychological problem. They have grown up in their own sovereign state, but their Jewish past is, to a considerable extent, the annals of a dependent Jewish minority in the Diaspora.

They have no difficulty in relating themselves to the warriors led by Bar Kochba at Masada or, even much further back, to the Jews of the earliest Biblical times living in their own land. But there is an understandable

problem in identifying with the long period of Jewish minority existence that is so different from the conditions of their own life.

Memory of Holocaust

It is their attitude towards the period of the Holocaust which constitutes the touchstone of their relationship to the past. At the time of the Eichmann trial, some young Israelis expressed perplexity that the Jews in Europe should have gone meekly to their doom like "sheep to the slaughter" — for that is what it seemed to these Israelis viewing the past from their particular vantage point. What did they have in common, they asked themselves, with Jews of that kind?

In the years following the trial, increasing emphasis has been placed by educators on the Warsaw Ghetto revolt and on other instances of active resistance. Such acts Israeli youth readily admire. But this represents only a partial approach to the period of the Holocaust.

What of the relationship to Jews who showed only passive resistance, or who did not — often could not — resist at all? To what extent do they identify with them for what they were, and as they were? A further question which seemed to us crucial was: do Israeli youth see themselves as if they are survivors of the Holocaust, a surviving remnant of the Jewish people vested with the obligation to ensure its future?

Our study shows that a majority of young Israelis do see themselves as survivors of the Holocaust and, as such, charged with a special responsibility for the Jewish future.

"It must affect every Jew wherever he is," "This is a tragedy of the entire Jewish people." "It is our duty to prevent a repetition of what happened."

These expressions recurred again and again in our interviews. Not all youngsters hold these views, but the majority do. The proper presentation of the Holocaust and its implications for Jewish life today remains of the utmost importance in the education of Israeli youth, as well as in Jewish education elsewhere.

Jewishness and Israeliness

CRITICS of the Jewishness of young Israelis have maintained that many of them see themselves first and foremost as Israelis and relegate their Jewishness to the background. This holds true for a number of Israelis, just as there are others who see themselves primarily as Jews; some of them, indeed, regard their "Israeliness" as just an extension of their Jewishness. But the relative emphasis they put on their Jewishness or their Israeliness is not what is of most importance; what is far more crucial is whether the Israelis recognize the inter-relatedness of their Jewishness and their Israeliness.

We found that the majority of young Israelis perceive their Jewishness and their Israeliness as overlapping and mutually reinforcing. But a considerable minority of the secular among them

Most young Israelis find a substantial area of overlap between their Jewishness and their 'Israeliness,' writes Dr. SIMON HERMAN, of the Hebrew University.

regard the two as things apart. Where there is this strict compartmentalization, both the Israeli and the Jewish sub-identities are weakened. For these boys and girls, Jewishness holds little attraction.

When confronted with the hypothetical situation reflected in the question whether, if they were to be born all over again, they would wish to be born Jewish, their answer is often in the negative. And it becomes clear that an Israeliness shorn of the Jewish dimension is but a shallow nationalism. The patriotic devotion of such youngsters to Israel — which is not in doubt here — lacks the depth and intensity which the Jewish perspective provides.

Hard Jewish core

A Jewish identity is a peculiar blend of religious and national components inseparably interwoven, and our study demonstrated strikingly that a weakening of the religious component leads to a weakening of the Jewish identity. We found that this identity was strongest among the religiously observant (*datikim*) then followed the traditionalists (*mesorotim*), and the non-observant came third. Not only do the religious youngsters differ in the content of their Jewishness and the value they attach to it, but they appear from our study to be closer to, and have a greater identification with, Jews everywhere. They are the hard Jewish core of Israeli society.

While in the Ashkenazi communities the trends towards secularization had made serious inroads among the parents' generation, the process is only now taking place in some of the Oriental communities. Here, the parents have remained faithful to their traditional practices, but a number of their sons and daughters have broken with the established family patterns. Bereft of the traditional Jewish values, they remain without anchor or rudder.

An acute problem exists in regard to the Jewishness of these young Israelis, as well as the others with whom religious observance has declined or who can no longer accept a religious orientation. Increasing attention is now being given to the question as to how paths to an intensified Jewishness can be opened up which are in keeping with the historic Jewish tradition and can nevertheless be followed by members of these circles as well. Given the common traditional core, it would seem feasible, in a Jewish majority society, to form diversified expressions of Jewish living around it.

Contemporary Jewry

YOUNG Israelis have, of course, an extensive Jewish knowledge. But educators are becoming increasingly aware of the serious gaps in their knowledge and understanding of recent Jewish history and of contemporary Jewry.

An analysis of the young Israelis' conception of the Diaspora shows that it is based largely on what they have learned about Jewish communities in Europe and in the Middle East. While they may be able to understand the plight of a Jewry facing persecution or grave discrimination, and feel themselves close to the Jews who are so attacked, they cannot easily comprehend the problems of Jewish communities living in the Western democracies. They generally lack an insight

into the subtler predicaments and dilemmas faced by Jews in a free society, a compassionate feeling for the Jewish strivings and the Jewish unease peculiar to these communities.

The Six Day War sharpened the sense of Jewish interdependence among Israeli youth. The memory of the Holocaust had been slumbering at the back of the minds even of a generation born after that devastating catastrophe, and the events of May and June 1967 brought that memory strongly to the fore. Furthermore, Israelis saw how, in the testing hour of danger, Jews throughout the world spontaneously and unreservedly rallied to their side. The assertion of their identity by the Jews in Soviet Russia and their determined struggle to immigrate to Israel has also had its impact on Israelis, as on Jews in the United States and elsewhere.

The growing feeling of a common Jewish destiny and of Jewish solidarity, coupled with the wide acceptance of mutual responsibility, can serve as founda-

tions for an educational programme designed to intensify the Jewishness of Israeli youth.

The development of such a programme — even when the climate is favourable — is no easy matter. It would certainly have to be a considerable improvement on the programme for the intensification of "Jewish consciousness" initiated a number of years ago. In the case of the religiously observant young Israeli, the home, religious school and religious youth movement interlock to produce an intense Jewish identity. When we consider the problem of the secular youth, the school is again just one factor among many. But in relation to this one factor, which is, at least, amenable to change, much still remains to be done.

Prof. Herman teaches in the Hebrew University's Institute of Contemporary Jewry and the Department of Psychology. He is author of a recent book, "Israel and Jews: the Continuity of an Identity," on which this article is based.

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
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Aesthetics: Developing an Israeli synthesis

WHEN one leaves the Whitney Museum in New York, one gets the sure of having seen "American Art": Rauschenberg, Lichtenstein, and American art to the core. Indeed, it is necessary to travel far to discover that there is a specifically modern American — or old American, or Italian baroque — aesthetic. Is there, one may ask, a distinctive aesthetic in Israeli art?

The "Bezalel School" of the beginning of the century, for example, was composed mainly of German immigrants. For the Be-

were created in Israel. Alex Baerwald, a Jewish immigrant from Germany, was the ideologist of this artificial architecture. Having made a study of Islamic and Mediterranean building he tried to tack new forms onto old structures. European planning and new materials (reinforced concrete, for example) were mixed with mainly Islamic features. The synthesis can be seen in the building Baerwald

1949; but, even before that they had met the Druze debka. Yarden Cohen used local artifacts, especially Arab, for the requirements of dance: the wicker basket, the jug, the shepherd's rod, the keffiyeh, which all led the dancer to an authentic local movement. Side by side with this were to be found Eastern European products such as the krakowiak, the polka and the hora. The synthesis of styles shaped a specifically Israeli quality of dance.

And what about the theatre? Habimah is at root a Russian theatre and Ohel a European me-lange. However, Hebrew drama, until the 1950s, was a definite expression of Zionist aesthetics, themes of redemption clothed in European forms such as expressionism and realism. The Biblical motifs and language in the Hebrew drama of that time, the idealization of the pioneers, Masada epics — all these turned Hebraic drama up to the 1950s into a drama of the myth of Zionist redemption.

Two steps

We see, therefore, that the first stage of Israeli aesthetics was markedly one of content. The aesthetic was expressed in the Jewish myth which combined the heroic Biblical past and Hebrew mysticism with new European forms. The next step will be the concept that a genuine aesthetic results from a search for form which is not forced into a strait-jacket of content.

Whatever the reason, I believe that there is something Israeli in both the form and content of painting beyond the abstract lyrical essence. It appears to me that the light colours — the white, the special green, the pinkish pastel and so on — which have almost completely dominated the painters in Israel, are a direct result of the distinctive Israeli light.

An Israeli line

Similarly, the particular character of the line in the new Israeli painting seems to me to be unique. It embodies something intellectual, much more than, for example, freewheeling American expressionism. I would go further, and claim that there is a direct link between the abstract linear character of such painters as Rafi Lavi and Michael Altmann and the figurative lineal character of sketches and paintings of the Judean hills, by Ardon, Ticho, Krakauer and others. The famous Aviva Uri, who left her powerful mark on a generation of young artists in Israel, found her personal and abstract "handwriting" in the landscape.

The present Israeli exclusivity is one of necessity, a function of the surroundings in which the Israeli painter works and unavoidably interwoven with problems of content and form imported from Europe and the U.S. This is an absolutely vital and organic aesthetic, just as Israeli paintings are of necessity relatively small, because the living rooms — and concepts of life generally — in Israel are small in relation to those in the U.S.

As the Western influence and receptiveness to it increased, so did the involvement of the Israeli painter with his surroundings. Until the late 1950s, this was an involvement with the land.

(Continued on page 41)

GIDEON OPHRAT, who teaches at the Hebrew University and the Bezalel School of Art, looks at the roots and the prospects of the arts in Israel.

In considering this question today, it is important to remember that, from the point of view of art, 1948 is a purely arbitrary date. Israel art (or the Israeli aesthetic, insofar as it exists) really begins at the beginning of the century. Hence, the raw materials in the shaping of an Israeli aesthetic must be Israel's outstanding artists of the last 50 or 60 years.

In our search for the Israeli aesthetic we ought, however, to take due notice of such momentary factors as the national awakening (which often has a direct bearing on artistic awakening) and Israel's physical isolation which seems to invite an amalgam of indigenous myths and legends. I should like, however, to clear at the outset that, in the Israeli much vaunted cultural pluralism — not to speak of the alighting of the muses by the long-courting gods — suggests nothing so much as cultural

Long process

Stated in a nutshell, then, it seems to me that we are still going through a long process. Beginning with the casting off of artificial and forced myths and ending with the creation of an organic and natural style — in other words, a transition from a Zionist to an Israeli aesthetic.

Israel art until about the 1920s is dominated by what may be called "German Idealism." The artists influenced the development of a specifically Israeli aesthetic is surprising. It was a search for a synthesis between East and West, begun by a Biblical myth which glorified the Jew with all the elements of content and form that the artist finds in Israel — from

the Bedouin, through Islamic architecture to the landscape. But this was not a true imitation of the reality of Eretz Israel: it was, rather, a romantic glorification of this reality, identifying itself with the Bible and imprisoned in modern Western forms imported from Europe.

The "Bezalel School" of the beginning of the century, for example, was composed mainly of German immigrants. For the Be-

Herzl and architecture

The situation is no different in the field of architecture. The years 1920-30 were a period of eclectic architecture, aiming at a native Zionist style in keeping with the architectural ideal set out in Herzl's writings. It is this declared purpose which distinguishes the aesthetics of Israeli art of that period from that of the present and past. It was a search for a synthesis between East and West, begun by a Biblical myth which glorified the Jew with all the elements of content and form that the artist finds in Israel — from

designed for the Hebrew University on Mount Scopus. They display a mixture of local and European, of present and past which is, at bottom, identical with the myth of the national awakening worked out in Herzl's "Altneuland" — a new-old land.

Even Israeli music exhibited this type of German idealism: composers such as Ben-Haim, Boskowitz, Avidon and Partos, soaked themselves in famous studies of Oriental music, and went on to produce an Israeli music which until the 1950s, was in the nature of a collage the same artificial myth-based synthesis that we have observed in painting and architecture. For them, Israeli music, their declared objective, was European music (Bartok, for example) seasoned with quotations from Jewish folklore, mostly Oriental, or with a variety of strictly musical Oriental elements.

In the field of dance, Gurit Kadman explicitly identified the beginning of the aesthetics of dance with the Zionist revolution. Rivka Sturman and Yardena Cohen, for example, both emigrants from Germany and creators of the first dances in Israel, lived in the fantasy of "Altneuland." Sturman and Kadman together encountered Yemenite dances in Athlit in



The Israel Philharmonic at its recent Sharm e-Sheikh concert.

Aesthetics: Developing an Israeli synthesis

(Continued from page 43)

scapes, but it has now become partially a social involvement: the conceptual works done here in Israel deal with typical Israeli problems such as water shortage, life in the kibbutz, local ecology. It is true that many artists are not aware of this, and are concerned with neutral, philosophic or aesthetic questions (perspective, time, etc.); but the end product inevitably reflects their surroundings. This is precisely the claim of musicians such as Joseph Tal and Abel Elrich. They absorb the Western revolution created by Schoenberg and Alban Berg, by *musique concrète* and aleatoric music, without trying consciously to apply the content of Hebrew myths to them. Nevertheless, it is very important to note the effort to translate Israeli elements into clearly formal terms: Zvi Avni tries to re-create the archaic in music, Ben-Zion Orgad tries to translate the phonetics of the Hebrew language into musical substance, and Shidlovski transforms ideas from the "Zohar" into abstract, phonetic sounds.

Typical movements

Exactly the same principle applies to Israeli dance, in which Guri Kadman in 1961 found a number of typical Israeli movements (the aggressive lifting of the shoulder, the movement of the hands in lighting candles) which are merely the transformation of local elements — tradition, the sabra character, etc. — into purely formal terms. However, the Batsheva and Bat Dor companies state explicitly that, since they are Israeli, an Israeli quality will emerge automatically in their work, and that there is nothing wrong in adapting to a Western framework of modern dance.

Some people can certainly discern something distinctly Israeli about the expressive strength of our dancers. On the other hand, however, Sarah Levi-Tanai continues to struggle for a Hebrew aesthetic against the deluge of foreign choreographers who come to work with local dance troupes. It should be noted that "Inbal" has never made use of the "ideological" conventions of Jewish dances but has tried, intuitively, to draw from its Yemenite dancers and other characteristics that they possess as Yemenite Jews.

There is, then, a struggle between artists such as the composer Joseph Tal and the Batsheva company who believe in an internationalism with an inevitable Israeli stamp, and those, such as Ben-Zion Orgad and Sarah Levi-Tanai, who believe in a continuous and intensive search for the translation of Israeli values into pure forms.

Tug-of-war

A similar tug-of-war is going on within the new Israeli architecture, between the tremendous influence of giants such as Le Corbusier and Gropius and

the desire to adapt this Western influence to the Israeli problems of landscape, light and shade, air movement, and so on. Like Israel's young painters and dancers, the younger Israeli architects such as Rechier and Carmi, exhibit the Western influence of non-figurative art. So, too, the characteristic Israeli green inevitably appears in the lyrical abstract, and Mediterranean conditions compel the architect to design buildings which are light in colour and provide shade and coolness. The desert casbahs served as models for housing projects in Beersheva, and construction in Arad had to solve the problem of strong sunlight.

The Israeli uniqueness is to be found in the synthesis of the great Western influence and the local formal solution. Even the housing projects that many people regard as an Israeli invention were built according to Western models. In this connection it is worth noting the very interesting influence of the concept of the wall on the design of housing projects in Israel — the wall of the besieged city.

New Hebrew drama

And the theatre? Modern Israeli theatre continued to be Israeli as long as it presented Hebrew drama. But the new Hebrew drama exhibits that clear tendency that we have already observed: a growing Western influence as the style of the absurd becomes almost entirely dominant, together with an interesting attempt (similar to that already made in Poland) to place the universal absurd within a genuinely local Israeli context. Thus Nissim Aloni, like Joseph Tal and the Batsheva company, starts out on a non-Israeli path with theatre games and an escape to the past, for fear of death. Increasingly, new Israeli political themes enter his plays. "The Gypsies of Jaffa," for example, takes place in Jaffa with the holocaust in the background and with burning reality underfoot. It is a mistake, also, to believe that Hanoah Levin forgot about politics in his most recent plays of the absurd, "Hefetz" and "Jacob and Leidenhal"; the fact is that "Solomon Grip" was written before "The Queen of the Bath" and that Levin is currently working on a new programme of political satire.

And even in those two most recent plays there is a great deal of criticism of domestic politics. Besides, Konan converts Ionesco's language of the absurd into colloquial Israeli language, and Mundi changes the abstract images of Godot, Pozzo and Estragon into Herzl and the Messiah.

WHAT then, is the aesthetic of Israeli art? It is a pluralistic aesthetic which is still in the process of taking shape. The modern Israeli artist is usually concerned with purely formal problems and often Israeli values

only enter his work subconsciously. The Israeli aesthetic is, if one may say so, the digestion of clearly Western forms in a stomach that is inevitably Israeli. This digestion is mainly formal such as Rechier and Carmi, exhibit the Western influence of non-figurative art. So, too, the characteristic Israeli green inevitably appears in the lyrical abstract, and Mediterranean conditions compel the architect to design buildings which are light in colour and provide shade and coolness. The desert casbahs served as models for housing projects in Beersheva, and construction in Arad had to solve the problem of strong sunlight.

The problem facing a composer such as Shidlovski is the same — how to transform Kabbalistic concepts such as "formless void," "shrinking of the infinite," "before creation," into formal musical terms. This is a very fundamental matter in music: the content is never concrete but the ultimate in abstraction. The content turns into form (sound) and the Israeli element is therefore very difficult to trace.

This raises the problem of the medium: the less representational the art, the less "Israeli" it must be, because it is less capable of reflecting the milieu. It is no surprise, then, that modern Israeli drama is more Israeli (in content) than say, music. And if we compare painting and architecture, it is obvious that architecture is compelled by its functional purpose, to take local landscape conditions such as light and air into account, while painting is not obliged to do so.

Linking present, past

As I see it, it is precisely the synthesis of strong Western influences and local elements which are the distinguishing mark of the Israeli aesthetic. So too, the very attempt to link the present and the past is an essentially Israeli characteristic. It is these interlockings that create a distinctive Israeli style, if there is such a thing.

An isolated society such as the Israeli, which shuts itself off from the culture that surrounds it; a society which is so open to the West; a society of so many cultural layers; a society which always links the past with the present — such a society cannot fail to produce an aesthetic which is a complex synthesis of times, places and cultures.

What I have tried to show is that the Israeli aesthetic is moving in a certain direction to a synthesis which is no longer unidirectional but rather multi-directional. The new Israeli synthesis converts the Zionist idea of an old-new land into the simple Israeli idea of creating something inherent in the Israeli landscape and society. The new synthesis embodies more of here (Israel) and there (the West) than of today and yesterday.

The shape of tomorrow will be largely determined by the answers to two crucial questions: Will we open ourselves to the world, or shut ourselves off from it? And will we succeed in developing an original aesthetic rooted in Israel's native soil?

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NEW HEBREW WORDS FROM THE STREET AND THE ACADEMY

By JUDITH PERES

Jerusalem Post Reporter

THE transformation of Hebrew from a language used primarily in literature and liturgy to a language of everyday speech was only the result of the national renaissance but a necessary instrument for its total development — according to Prof. Morag of the Hebrew University.

Of course, the name of Eliezer Ben-Yehuda — as the man who created Hebrew as the means of communication among the Jews who came to Palestine at the end of the 19th century — is closely linked to the revival of the language, Prof. Morag says. But the new-old language was needed for the unifying force in the building of Jewish exiles — as an outcome of this movement.

After the State was established many groups of immigrants took Hebrew seriously. In 1948, the language was quite capable of serving the cultural, educational and technical requirements of the new State. Prof. Morag points out that there were great differences in the attitude of newcomers before and after the establishment of the State.

Immigrants who arrived after 1948 realized that they had to learn Hebrew, the official language of their new home. But the attitude was quite different from that of the so-called "German" immigrants who came between 1919 and 1939. Not all of them realized coming to Israel with the necessity of learning the Hebrew language and studying its literature.

Prof. Morag tells the standard about the gittes immigrant after 30 years in Israel, still speak Hebrew. Asked if he was ashamed of this fact, the answer was: "Yes, but it's a shame to be ashamed than to be Hebrew."

After 1948, when Hebrew was the official language of the State, it quickly became the language of most of its inhabitants as well.

Learning fast

The establishment of the State and the successive waves of new immigrants learn Hebrew very fast, says the expert, giving credit to the crash-course studies and to the army as the main teaching forces.

The language, of course, has continued to develop since 1948 although the pace could never match that of the period of the early revival of Hebrew. Prof. Morag notes two main areas in which the development of the language can be observed: slang and "sign of normalcy" for any developing language) and the use of new terms, necessary for the vitality and flexibility to modern language.

As to slang Prof. Morag says: "It has become part and parcel of modern Hebrew, regarded as something quite normal. Even those who are concerned with the standards of Hebrew — for instance, do not have a negative approach to slang; they just place it. He emphasizes

that slang is used, in informal speech, by persons of all social strata — although its exclusive use is associated with what Prof. Morag calls "low (substandard) Hebrew." ("High Hebrew," he sighs, is used by very few Israelis; and the standards of "middle" or "common Hebrew" are quite poor, he laments.)

Much of the current slang is borrowed from English ("boss", Arabic (kell, fun, nagle — turn, cycle) or Yiddish ("macher" — a V.I.P. or wheeler-dealer; "lokeh" — pay-slip). The frequently used "balagan" — mess — is from the Persian. Other slang expressions are derived from Hebrew words which have undergone minor transformations in form or connotation. (The word "mefunak" — spoiled — became in slang "mefundrak" — spoiled, rotten — incorporating the sound of the Yiddish slang word "drek.")

English derivatives

Several slang words are derived from English, but used in a different sense. "Puntcher," from puncture, means a foul-up or an unexpected break-down of plans. "Trump" from tramp, is to hitch a ride.


While slang words are coined spontaneously by the man-in-the-street and even more by the boys in the army, planned language development is the province of the Hebrew Language Academy on (Tivrat Ram. The Academy, established by a special law in 1953, produces hundreds of new words a year. After the committee on a given field (meeting with experts from that field) decides on the words necessary to do a day's work or hold a technical conversation on that subject, the plenum of the Academy gives its approval. The new words are then published (under the signature of the Minister of Education and Culture) in the form of a dictionary.

Not all the words approved by the plenum are new (or old-new) Hebrew words: in some cases the common foreign word is retained, or given a Hebrew form. For instance academy in Hebrew is "akademia"; "birman" means harmonization; "livrit" is a libretto; "klarnit" is a clarinet.

Some of the new words from Hebrew roots include "mazkhila" (gutter); "bagosh" (bumper) and "shlur" (interstation).

Not all the recent developments in the language have been positive ones, however. Prof. Morag says (even the children of Yemenite immigrants and those of the oriental communities tend to lose the correct elements of pronunciation that were inherent in their parents' speech), and "cultivated speech" in general is rarely heard. Even people in high public positions often speak poorly — although Prof. Morag declined to name any ("I wouldn't want to insult anyone").

"While educated persons in other language-cultures have a feeling for proper standards, many well-educated Israelis are unaware that their language is faulty," Prof. Morag says. Unfortunately, he adds, whose language "absolutely classifies him"



(to quote Henry Higgins in "My Fair Lady") not all Israelis can be classified by their language: modern Hebrew does not have the social aspects of many European languages. This may be because of the "melting pot" society in Israel, in which persons who may have spoken "high Hebrew" once have gradually adapted to the standards of newcomers who had only a basic knowledge of the language. In other words, social integration has led to a lowering of language standards.

New influence

In the next 25 years, if large groups of immigrants arrive from other language-cultures, there will probably be other influences on Hebrew. On the other hand, Hebrew words are slowly driving out foreign words. So the use of foreign words in everyday Hebrew will probably diminish by Israel's 50th anniversary, although the Hebrew syntax will probably change slightly in the direction of European languages.

In the long run, however, Hebrew should be strong enough

to withstand the influence of foreign languages," says the professor.

"The great need now is to create standards of good, aesthetically-satisfying Hebrew — and to make it the common heritage. Unfortunately, many people who have an adequate basic knowledge of the language stop at the post-urban level. And they don't feel the necessity to improve their Hebrew."

Prof. Morag, a member of the Hebrew Language Academy, was born in Petah Tikva in 1906 and has been at the Hebrew University (where he did his doctorate on the language of the Yemenites) since 1948. The winner of the Israel Prize for Jewish Studies in 1966, Prof. Morag has also taught at Harvard, Brandeis and Cambridge.


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Prof. MICHAEL FELDMAN

Biology: Secrets of the cell

STRENUOUS efforts to deepen our scanty understanding of the basic life forces — the processes which determine and control such vital matters as the birth, development and ageing of every living thing — have dominated biological research in Israel for the past 25 years.

"Once we have a better understanding of these fundamentals, we can widen our knowledge into their seemingly endless implications," states Professor Michael Feldman, the senior head of the Weizmann Institute of Science.

The life of every major organism, be it a mosquito, a snake or a president, starts with one

(Continued on page 48)

Prof. YUVAL NE'EMAN, physicist president of Tel Aviv University, and Weizmann Institute biologist Prof. MICHAEL FELDMAN.

Is there a specifically Israeli contribution to the world of science? What is it? To get answers to these questions, MACABEE DEAN talks to two distinguished Israeli scientists —

ISRAELI



Prof. YUVAL NE'EMAN

Physics: Mystery of the nucleus

AN important early link in the chain of development of physics in Israel was forged, inappropriately enough, in Italy during the 1930s, when two young scientists were on a walking and climbing tour. They were the late Giulio Racah, who was to become a professor at the Hebrew University, and his friend Emilio Segre, a future Nobel laureate. Segre had just returned as a birthday present a mathematical tool particularly appropriate for the description of symmetry. Devised in the 19th century, it was first applied to physics in the mid-twenties. Segre was not interested in the

(Continued on page 48)

No brain drain

Answer: "So far, we haven't had any brain drain of scientists, especially as compared to European countries. The question, however, still remains: what if we train too many scientists? I favour making a serious forecast of the absorptive capacity of the local 'market'."

"And all gifted students, who have both the talent and the desire to become scientists should be told they will have to compete, and compete hard, for the limited number of research jobs. If they decide to risk their future, we have no right to deprive them of the education they desire, provided they are truly talented and not deluding themselves. And those who fall by the wayside in their competition for research jobs should see their future in teaching science in high schools and colleges."

Question: What do you think about governmental support for basic research?

Answer: "I feel strongly that it is the duty of Israeli society — and this means via the Government — to support basic research for three reasons."

"First, we must realize that the main problem we face is improving life in Israel, and the quality of life is determined at least as much by the intellectual and cultural components of life as it is by material things. Today, basic research is an essential element of cultural and intellectual activity in any modern society and contributes directly to the creation of high standards of cultural values."


"Secondly, the quality of life depends on economic and technological progress. Fundamental research constitutes the basis for original developments in the applied sciences leading to significant industrial and technological development."

"Thirdly, if we aim at becoming a true spiritual and cultural centre for the Jewish world at large, we must remember that it is through centres of research such as the Weizmann Institute that great Jewish scientists have been attracted to Israel and become associated with our life in a way which otherwise would not have developed. Moreover, a great part of the activity within the sciences in the entire Western world is carried out by Jews. Basic research in Israel is an excellent means of reaching out for these Jewish scientists and creating a bridge between them and Israel even if they do not actually settle here."




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


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Group physics and the Israelis

(Continued from page 47)

subject, and gave the book to Racah, who was.

"What happened by chance that day greatly influenced the development of a specific line of physics to which Israel has made international contributions," says Professor Yuval Ne'eman, now President of Tel Aviv University.

"In discussing this line I am only talking about that part of the iceberg which is visible; the overwhelming proportion of the iceberg is submerged, but has also made important contributions. There is one connecting link which runs throughout this specific line — group theory."

Giulio Racah was already active in the "Fermi group" which helped lay the theoretical basis of nuclear and particle physics. Fermi, whose wife was Jewish, fled from Italy after the promulgation of Mussolini's racial laws and came to the U.S. where he played an important part in the development of the atomic bomb in the U.S. By that time, Segre had already been teaching in the U.S., while Racah, who had become a Zionist, had come to this country to teach at the Hebrew University.

"Racah found that fertile ground already existed here," Prof. Ne'eman recalls. "Several excellent teachers, such as Prof. Shmuel Sambursky at the Hebrew University and Prof. Franz Ollendorff at the Technion, were already inspiring their students with a love of physics." He himself was one of these students.

Racah's most important contribution was the sophisticated application of the techniques of group theory to atomic spectra, that is, to the calculation of energy emissions occurring when an electron, spinning in one of several concentric rings around the nucleus, jumps from one ring to another.

Two of his students were Igal Talmi and the late Amos de Shalit. In the early 'fifties they went on to work for the Atomic Energy Commission which sent them and four others, abroad for further studies.

On their return, Pinhas Lavon, then Minister of Defence, who was not interested in building research laboratories within the defence establishment, "sold" them for \$100,000 — the sum the Government had spent on their advanced training — to Mr. Meyer Weisgal, then President of the Weizmann Institute, who used them to establish an outstanding physics department. Amos de Shalit did much to obtain sponsorship for the work of the department and it was largely due to his organizational talents that it expanded as it did.

Talmi contributed much to the understanding of the atom's nucleus. He started off from the idea put forward by German physicists Jensen and Goppert-Mayer that, in the nucleus, protons and neutrons behave as if they were moving in orbits around a non-existent core. This was a startling idea, since it was known that the particles are held together by gigantic forces acting over very short distances. The effect was to represent the nucleus, which is one hundred thousand times smaller than the atom, as a sort of mini-atom. Working with this model Talmi applied Racah's atomic techniques with great success.

The next step was undertaken by Ne'eman himself. Having been head of defence planning, he left Israel as a colonel in 1958 to become Israel's military attaché in London, and combined this post with work for a thesis at the Imperial College of Science. His subject was the elementary particles which make up the nucleus. For this purpose he had to study group theory. Unaware at the time of Racah's work in this field, he picked up his knowledge of this tool from quite different development notes made by Russian mathematicians, which he found in the British Museum.

Ne'eman developed a theory called "unitary symmetry," which provides a classification of the "elementary" particles and an understanding of the forces acting between them. The theory was developed simultaneously and independently by Prof. Murray Gell-Mann, of the California Institute of Technology, who also used group theory. Neither idea was taken very seriously by the scientific world, which in 1960-63 preferred a model developed by Prof. S. Sakata, of Japan. His classification of protons and neutrons regards them as the fundamental building blocks and not as compound structures.

When he returned to Israel in 1961 to head the Nahal Sorek atomic reactor, Ne'eman met at the Weizmann Institute three men who had been using group theory to derive results in nuclear physics. They were Carl Levinson, Harry J. Lipkin and S. Meshkov. Upon being introduced to the problem of testing the various models proposed for the elementary particles, they applied their knowledge to this field. At the beginning, they too favoured the Sakata theory, which seemed simpler and easier to test. Later, they discovered its failings and began working on the Ne'eman-Gell-Mann theory.

In 1962, however, Ne'eman and Dr. Haim Goldberg, who is also now at Tel Aviv University, introduced a new model of the nucleus, in which three sub-particles would make a particle such as the proton. The treatment by the two Israeli scientists was entirely mathematical, with no call for a search for the physical identification of such sub-particles, which they regarded as abstract entities.

At the same time Prof. Ne'eman was teaching particle physics and the applications to it of group theory to a number of Israeli postgraduates, among some who are now professors — Haim Harari, Moshe Unger, Yitzhak Frishman, of the Weizmann Institute, and Joseph Dothan, Shmuel Nussimovitch and David Horn at Tel Aviv University.

In 1964, two things happened. Experiments at the Brookhaven National Laboratory on Long Island, N.Y., proved the existence of the Omega minus particle. This amounted to a substantiation of the unitary symmetry theory: indeed, the existence of such a particle had been predicted from the model, and was a crucial test for it. At the same time, Murray Gell-Mann and Zweig suggested that protons, neutrons, and other particles are made up of what they termed "quarks." These were the hypothetical sub-particles in the Goldberg-Ne'eman model, except that they were now treated more physically, even to the point of suggesting a search for them.

Within months, several extensions of unitary symmetry were suggested, as slow-motion approximations based upon the quark concept. One of the most useful, put forward by Profs. Lipkin and Meshkov at Weizmann, was named W-spin ("W" for Weizmann). Group theory was now again applied usefully by them and by the younger physicists at Weizmann, Tel Aviv and the Technion.

"Quark model" results were expected to be very approximate — but they turned out to be surprisingly accurate. In 1966, Ne'eman and Prof. Larry Horowitz (now at Tel Aviv) and the Italian N. Cabibbo, suggested an ad hoc model explaining these unexpected successes. Since that time, they have been developing this model and appear just now to have been able to connect it with the mainstream of particle physics, doing away with its ad hoc nature. It is worth noting here that 75 per cent of the useful new ideas produced in particle physics in 1968 and 1969 came from Israel.

In the meantime, the second

generation of Israeli elementary particle physicists succeeded in broadening the approach by becoming experts in the dynamics of the particles, beyond their symmetry properties. The first breakthrough was achieved by Horn (Tel Aviv) in 1967. This was followed by milestone contributions from Harari and Veneziano of Weizmann. The new theory which resulted from the work of these three, of Hector Rubinstein of Weizmann and Leo

nard Susskind of Tel Aviv and New York's Yeshiva University and of others in Israel and abroad, is known as "duality," and its present treatment uses the techniques of group theory.

Other important areas of physics are being investigated in Israel, unconnected with the group theory line.

For example, there is the group created by Prof. Nathan Rosen, at the Technion, which deals with Einstein's theory of relativity, and which includes two of his former students, Dr. Asher Peres, at the Technion, and Dr. Moshe Carmeli, at the University of the

Negev. Prof. G. Tauber at the University of the Negev is working in the field.

There is an important state physics group at the Hebrew University, including Professors Zeev (V.) Low, M. Gell-Mann, and Soly G. Cohen. This is represented by Prof. Shmuel Strickman at Weizmann. Strickman has done important work in magnetism. Among other lines being developed are high energy physics at Tel Aviv, Weizmann and the Technion, and low temperature physics and super-conductivity work at Tel Aviv and the Technion.

Biology of the cell

(Continued from page 47)

single event — the fertilization of the ovum (of the mother) by the sperm (of the father). Both the mother and the father contribute an equal quantity of genetic material. This fertilized cell splits into two cells, and then into four cells, into eight cells, and so on. At first, all these cells look alike. Until one group of cells develops into a brain, another into kidneys, another into a heart, and so on.

"How does each group of cells know what to develop into? This is not an automatic process," Prof. Feldman says, "for we have known for 50 years that the cells lying next to each other send development signals to their neighbours. Thus, if we slice off part of the layer of cells beneath a layer which is to develop into a brain, and implant these sliced cells on another part of the embryo, we get an embryo with two brains."

"Although all organ development is a response to specific signals, we don't know to this day the precise molecular nature of these signals," says Prof. Feldman. "There is no known case of any signal being isolated and its chemical nature analysed. And this is a problem which has intrigued investigators throughout the world for years."

Trying to study this process in the living body — or in any living body for that matter — is a most difficult and complicated task, for there are endless chemical processes going on at the same time. So, the investigators at the Weizmann Institute used isolated cell and tissue cultures grown in the laboratory.

To simplify the investigation further, it was decided to tackle — at least at this stage — not the signals which control the development of embryonic cells into mental processes in the adult organism, but the "immune response." This is a much easier matter, for the immune response can be triggered at will by signals called "antigens" which are chemically defined.

Defined most simply, an immune response or mechanism is the defence put up by the body against any foreign invader. Such a response can take several forms, such as the production by the lymphocyte cells of antibodies which fight the invaders, for example, bacteria containing antigens.

An antigen can be of many different types. There are infectious disease invaders which are destroyed by the antibodies; there are kidney and heart grafts which are rejected by the host body and destroyed by "killer" lymphocytes. In the first case, the immune mechanism preserves human life; in the second case, it destroys human life by refusing to accept a transplanted organ as part of its own body.

And there are other cases of special importance both to the researchers and to the population as a whole. There are specific diseases in which the immune response, for some unknown reason, "goes wrong" and destroys certain organs of the human body; and there are other cases in which the immune response is

too weak, and fails to destroy the deadly element.

PROFESSOR Michael Sela, head of the Department of Chemical Immunology, and his co-workers, attacked the antigen-antibody reaction from a different viewpoint. Prof. Sela succeeded in producing a synthetic antigen (the first ever) thus demonstrating its molecular structure and chemical properties in great detail.

This was a great step forward, and another step came from Prof. Amiel Globerson, of the Institute, who with Prof. Feldman and others developed an experimental system for producing an immune response outside the intact organism by cells and tissues grown in a culture medium.

Another area was also studied simultaneously: How does the lymphocyte cell recognize the antigen? Apparently, the surface of the membrane of the lymphocyte cell has receptor sites for such recognition. These are now being investigated.

Yet, as already stated, graft rejections are done by "killer" lymphocytes, not by antibodies produced by the lymphocytes. This is another fertile field for investigation, and a cell culture system has been developed at the Department of Cell Biology which allows scientists to study in detail the sequence of events associated with the recognition by the lymphocytes of the foreign graft — and their method of response.

This was based on the use of embryo cells of a mouse grown in culture and representing "the graft" and rat lymphocytes representing the "receiving host." These experiments showed that only a small part of the lymphocytes take part in the rejection process against a given graft. If it becomes possible to identify and isolate such lymphocytes, a great step will have been taken in maintaining rejection processes.

Still another problem to which investigators are seeking solutions: If the surface of the lymphocyte does the "recognition," what happens to make the surface build a "message" that goes to the DNA in the nucleus of the lymphocyte cell and instructs the DNA to react? And how does the DNA know how to respond to the message?

It has already been noted that attempts are being made to step up the immune reaction to cancer cells. Investigations have shown that cancer cells do contain specific antigens, yet they produce a very weak immune response. Methods of increasing this reaction against cancer in culture tissues are being studied, with Dr. Yaron Cohen for it has been found, that the rejection of transplants has been much enhanced in tissue cultures.

RETURNING to the problem of the signals, Prof. Feldman notes that different genes get messages to produce different proteins, and each different protein confers specific properties on the cells.

"We believe that the difference in the structure and function

between the brain and the kidney, for example, is due to the fact that each has different types of proteins. In fact, the difference between one person and another should be attributed to the differences in the proteins constituting each organism."

It is therefore immensely important to study the precise structure and properties of different protein molecules. The scientific approach can be from two different directions: Isolating proteins from the living cells and studying their structure; or trying to build proteins in test tubes.


Pioneering work in building synthetic proteins in a laboratory was initiated by Prof. Eliaz Katsir (President-elect of the State of Israel) and his co-workers. Moreover, Prof. Katsir and his co-workers did pioneering work in studying the functions of proteins bound to the cell membranes, an especially important field, since many of the proteins are enzymes — that is to say, molecules which catalyse (speed up or make possible) many chemical reactions within the cells, and these enzymes are bound to membranes.

Signals which direct developmental processes in higher animals create irreversible situations. For example, once the signal has been given that a certain group of cells is to become a brain, or a kidney, or muscle, nothing known at present can reverse that order; yet in bacteria, signals whose results activate genes are reversible. "You can, in bacteria, actually switch a gene on and off," says Prof. Feldman.

And while the signals which dictate that a group of cells is to become a heart, or a lung, are not yet understood, "we don't even have a theory how signals work which dictate the shape and size of a certain organ, the nose, for example. Of course, these shapes and sizes are determined by the genetic constitution of the father and mother, but these genes are nothing but units of information for the production of proteins. How do these genes give signals that a nose should be long or short, thin or fat? How do they dictate what the nose should "stop growing?"


The work of Prof. Leo Sachs and his associates at Rehovot on signals which direct the differentiation of blood cells is leading to the further understanding of the nature of the inducers of development, while the work of Dr. Eliaz Katsir and his team on the differentiation process of plants is contributing to the understanding of the precise signals which trigger developmental processes in plants.

"Yet little progress can be predicted in the foreseeable future," says Prof. Feldman, "about the signals from the cell receptors on the surface of the cell to the genes. Attempts to unravel these mysteries, as well as how the genes are activated, are being carried out at the Weizmann Institute. (This problem is under investigation by other groups in Israel as well.)"



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on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of

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the embodiment of the age-old aspirations for
a free, independent and creative

Jewish society in the homeland of the Jewish people,

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- * who were brought to Israel and socially, economically and culturally absorbed through the efforts of the Jewish Agency
- * **WHICH IS THRIVING** by the magnificent efforts of the people of Israel, who are inspiring —
- * the Jews in the Diaspora to express their deep sense of unity and solidarity with Israel —
- * and through the ever-growing commitment to unstinting support for Israel
- * **WHICH IS RESOLUTELY DEFENDED** by the valiant youth of Israel, the brave pioneers in the border settlements, and the courageous Israelis.

* * *

Israel's 25th Anniversary symbolises the
achievements of the State of Israel and its challenges
to the Jewish people

The 'school for diplomats'

WALTER EYTAN describes the pre-State civil servants' school, of which he was principal, which became known as the school for diplomats.

I do not know when exactly the Jewish Agency began to plan systematically for the State which, by 1942, with the "Biltmore Programme," had declared the objective of a Jewish State. It was certainly as early as 1944 that it completed the establishment of a school for the training of the State's civil servants. It was that Moshe Sharett suggested that I become principal of the school, which came to be known in English, as the Public Service College.

The Jewish Agency had over the years built up a devoted and efficient staff of its own, and in fact, quite largely the backbone of Israel's civil service in 1948. But it was not the Jewish State would be more civil servants than the Jewish Agency itself then employed, and that they would have to learn to think and act as civil servants: no longer men of military as in the past, but of sound, progressive administration.

In those days things moved faster than they do now, or so it seems as one looks back. Between April and September 1948 the building was put up with living accommodation for twenty-five students, offices, a hall, dining room, kitchen, and a bathroom. The curriculum of a two-year course was drawn up; a principal and his deputy were appointed; teachers were chosen; and applications were invited, and from young men and women eager to embark on this new career.

Selection process

The process of selection, which was completed by the late summer of that year, aroused interest throughout the Yishuv and some establishment. For the first time, party considerations played absolutely no part in it. Of the hundreds of candidates who applied, we knew we would have to select 75 of them, for we had only limited room (and a limited budget). In any case, we prepared not to launch on too grand a scale after all, was at that stage more than an experiment and a test.

Examinatory tests eliminated most of the candidates, and the entrance examination, conducted to the 60 who seemed to be the best, lasted three days. It was the usual kind of written test — from an essay on content and form to a simple "yes" or "no" answer to a large number of questions designed to assess Jewish general knowledge.

An entire day was devoted to interviews like over rough country, in which the future principal and his deputy took part. The aim was to get to know the candidates and to watch their behaviour. (We were interested in seeing, for example,

whether a young man would be a gentleman and help a girl up some particularly tough slope, or whether he would think only of himself and make sure that he got up it safely.)

There were also individual interviews and tests in English, and the proceedings concluded on the last evening with a grand banquet, partly as a reward for what had been, though fun, quite a trying ordeal, and partly to see whether the participants had at least rudimentary table manners.

Perhaps it was this that soon made the press and public nickname our college "the school of diplomats," but although we of course had also the future foreign service in mind, it was not in fact our original purpose to train diplomats alone, but responsible civil servants in general. In the event, most of our students later joined the Foreign Ministry, though a good many were to make a name for themselves in other fields.

As things turned out, none of these students completed the two-year course we had envisaged. Soon after the U.N. General Assembly's "Partition" resolution of November 29, 1947, I noticed that one of our students had vanished, and a week or two later another and yet another quietly drifted away. No questions were asked in those days, and indeed questions were useless, since everyone knew where the students had gone. In the end, by the early spring of 1948, every single one was in a combat unit, and we did not see them again until the War of Independence was over, and we began taking them into the Foreign Ministry which had by that time been set up. One, Moshe Salomon, alas! we never saw again. He fell in battle in the defence of Jerusalem.

However, before the students dispersed, they were to lay the foundations of the Foreign Ministry which so many of them later joined. Around mid-October 1947, the Jewish national institutions in Palestine appointed a commission to plan in detail the administrative structure of the Jewish State. No one could be sure that the state would in fact come into existence (the U.N. debate was still raging at New York), but it was taken for granted, and the commission set to work with a will. Almost its first decision was to delegate subcommittees to blueprint the machinery of government, step

by step, and it fell to me, as a one-man sub-committee, to be charged with planning the Foreign Ministry.

This was an ideal exercise to set our students, and they accepted it with enthusiasm. They formed themselves into study groups and began to investigate, mainly from books, how the Foreign Ministries of other countries worked. The raw material they accumulated became the basis for an "Outline Plan for the Foreign Office and Foreign Service of the Jewish State," the first draft of which we were able to submit to the parent commission by January 9, 1948. A second, final draft was ready before the end of the month — and stowed away in a drawer against the day of Jewish independence.

Tight budget

The outline plan was based on the assumption that "we should not spend more money on a Foreign Office than is absolutely necessary," though it was apparent that "even a Foreign Office and Foreign Service run on modest lines must cost a good deal." The Political Department of the Jewish Agency, which had in fact been a Foreign Ministry in all but name and external authority, had conducted a good part of its written work in English, partly because it addressed itself in the main to the British Government, and the British mandatory authorities in Palestine, and partly because some of its representatives abroad were not familiar with Hebrew. This was now to change.

The outline plan specified that "the language used in the Foreign Office, and for correspondence between the Foreign Office and Foreign Service establishments abroad, shall be Hebrew, subject to any special exigencies of the service." The Director General was to "take an early opportunity of standardizing Hebrew equivalents for expressions current in diplomatic practice."

These objects were duly carried out, though it is only fair to record that the task of "standardizing Hebrew equivalents" was accomplished, almost single-handedly, and as a labour of love, by the Foreign Minister himself.

The highest rank in the Foreign Service was to be "Minister in charge of a Legation." The Jewish State was not to have ambassadors and embassies. These were thought to be too grand and expensive for a new state whose budget was likely to be as modest as its ambitions. What was thought good enough, at the time, by Switzerland and Finland would certainly be good enough for us.

In fact, it was not long before Israel's first ambassador was appointed. Immediately after the elections of January 1949, the United States granted de jure recognition to the Government of Israel, which now replaced the old Provisional Government. Early in February the State Department made known its intention of raising what had been the U.S. "Mission" in Israel to an embassy and naming its "Special Representative," who had headed it, as ambassador. The announcement came as a complete surprise, but it was realized at once that this was not an offer that could or should be refused, particularly since at that time the United States was represented in several Arab countries by Ministers only. Soon afterwards, for all the modesty which had been ours in the "outline plan," Israel established her own embassy in Washington, similarly raising her "Special Representative" to the rank and style of ambassador. Today, of course, there are embassies everywhere — Legations, even for Finland and Switzerland, are practically a thing of the past.

Change of plans

Our original plan had not taken into account the possibility that the timetable for building up the Foreign Ministry might be upset by physical causes. At the outset, we still assumed that the U.N.'s resolution would be implemented peacefully, and our aim was to have ready by Independence Day "the nucleus of a working Foreign Office" as well as "the most essential Foreign Service officers at twenty-four hours' notice to leave." By March 15, 1948, the Foreign Office and Foreign Service were to be organized, and the senior officers in both appointed. The second

half of March was to see the dispatch of representatives to negotiate recognition with foreign governments. By May 15, 1948, officials were to be at their desks in the new Ministry, and 40 Foreign Service "personnel" poised to leave.


In the event, things worked out very differently. On May 15, only two officials started work with the Foreign Minister in Tel Aviv — the rest were caught in the siege of Jerusalem, unable to get away. The truce called by the U.N. Security Council came into effect on June 11. The following night, at 9 p.m., I set out from Jerusalem in a jeep which carried, besides me, an army officer, a driver and an old German MG-34 — just in case word of the truce had not reached all the Arab forces who commanded the highway from the woods on either side. Part of the route lay along the new "Burns Road," carved out of the secret hills only a few nights before. In the end, after a stop at Hulda, we reached Tel Aviv without too much trouble at three in the morning. By eight, I had started work in the villa at Sarona, now Hakirya, which since May 28 had housed the Foreign Ministry. Not till a day or two later did I ask who was to be Director-General. "Why," said the Minister, "I thought you would be."


The organization of the Foreign Ministry was now taken in hand in earnest. A month later the original staff of two had grown to just over a hundred. There was little time to organize before starting work. Everything had to be done at once. The Security Council was in session in New York — the truce was to last only four weeks. It was essential to have Israel recognized by the largest possible number of countries. The first diplomatic missions had to be established abroad. Some sort of budget had to be scraped together. Work was constantly interrupted by air-raid warnings; vital problems were discussed and decisions taken in the cellar. Many things were still wholly outside the experience of anyone on the staff. No one knew, for instance, how to draft letters of credence — a detail overlooked in the scholarly research which had gone into the drafting of our "outline plan." (The result was that when Israel's first Minister presented himself at Prague, his letters were not accepted by the Czechoslovak Government.)

It is impossible to forget the creative excitement of those early days. We felt we were taking part in what Jean Barteguy, the French writer, was to call "the finest adventure of all time." For some of us at least, this feeling has not yet left us, and to have lived through these past twenty-five years has been sheer privilege and happiness and pride.



Photo at top: Students at the school for diplomats on stairs of Beit Hakerem Seminary, where classes were held. Distinguishable in the photo are: (1) Haim Hafez (2) Elkana Gali (3) Aviad Yoffe (4) an unidentified boy, student of the Beit Hakerem High School (5) Moshe Erel (6) Moshe Salomon, killed during the War of Independence in Jerusalem (7) Pinchas Ellav (8) Gideon Elrom (9) Ella Japhet (10) Moshe Barbur (11) Zvi Ne'eman (12) Hama Poll (13) Kalman Anor (14) Gideon Shomron (15) Shimon Amir (16) Esther Herlitz (17) Arye Yaviv (18) Arye Lapid.





CHAIM WEIZMANN



IZHAK BEN-ZVI



MOSHE SHARETT



LEVI ESHKOL

An Israeli Album



YOSEF SPRINZAK



NAHUM NIR




KADISH LUZ



REUVEN BARKAT

Photos and biographies of Presidents, Prime Ministers, Knesset Speakers and Ministers who died during the State's 25 years, compiled by MOSHE RON.



YISRAEL BAR-YEHUDA




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
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
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












YISRAEL BARZILAI



YISRAEL BARZILAI



YISRAEL BARZILAI



Chaim Weizmann (1874-1952)
Israel's first President led the Zionist movement for decades, piloting the movement both in and out of office (as President of the World Zionist Organization from 1920 to 1930 and from 1935 to 1946). Born in Russia, he was involved in Zionism and science all his life. He studied biochemistry in Berlin, moving to England in 1906, where he first continued his research and later taught at Manchester University. In the early 1930s, he laid the foundation of and headed the Daniel Sieff Research Institute, which was the nucleus of the Weizmann Institute of Science and in 1937 he made his home in Rehovot. In 1942 he first outlined the project for a Jewish commonwealth which was later incorporated in the Biltmore Programme. In 1947, although out of official Zionist office, Weizmann made an impassioned appeal for a Jewish State at the U.N. General Assembly. He came to Israel in 1948 to take up the office of President of the Provisional Government, and in February 1949 he was elected by the Knesset as its first President in Jerusalem as first President of the State of Israel.

Izhak Ben-Zvi (1884-1963)
Israel's second President came to Palestine from Russia in 1906. A leader of the Labour Zionist movement, he was among the founders of Hashomer (the self-

defence organization which operated under the Turkish regime) and of the Histadrut, and was later Chairman of the Vaad Leumi, representing the Yishuv at the Round Table talks in London in 1939. During the First World War, Ben-Zvi was exiled to Egypt and went from there to the United States with David Ben-Gurion to recruit soldiers for the Jewish Legion, organized by Trumpeldor and Jabotinsky.

Kadish Luz (1895-1972)
A member of Kibbutz Degania Bet, who came here from Russia in 1920, Kadish Luz was a leader of the Ihud Hakibbutzim movement. He served briefly as Minister of Agriculture in 1955 and was elected Knesset Speaker in November, 1959. After 10 years in office Luz retired from politics and returned to his kibbutz, where he spent the rest of his life.

Reuven Barkat (1895-1969)
The Lithuanian-born labour leader was chairman of the Histadrut's Political Department and later secretary-general of Mapai. He became Knesset Speaker in 1969, and served in the post till his death.

Levi Eshkol (1895-1969)
Levi Eshkol immigrated from the Ukraine in 1915, and was among the founders of Kibbutz Degania Bet. His early experiences as an agricultural labourer served him in good stead as head of the Jewish Agency's Settlement Department. He was later Treasurer of the Agency. On the establishment of the State, Eshkol first became director-general of the Defence Ministry, then served briefly as Minister of Agriculture, and later became Finance Minister. He was appointed Prime Minister and

Minister of Defence after Ben-Gurion's resignation in 1963, giving up the Defence portfolio to Moshe Dayan just before the outbreak of the Six Day War. Moshe Sharett (1884-1965) Israel's first Foreign Minister (and second Premier) had headed the Jewish Agency's Political Department throughout the stormy pre-State period. Arriving with his parents from the Ukraine in 1906, he was one of the first pupils of the Herzl Gymnasium. In World War I, he was drafted into the Turkish Army, where he served as an officer.

Yisrael Bar-Yehuda (1895-1965)
A member of Kibbutz Yagur and a leader of the kibbutz movement, Bar-Yehuda (Abdus Avoda), became Minister of the Interior in 1955. He was not included in the 1959 Cabinet, because of a wide range of crisis, including the "Who is a Jew?" issue, but returned as Transport Minister, in 1962 when Yitzhak Ben-Aharon resigned from the post.

Yisrael Barzilai (1913-1970)
The Polish-born Mapai leader, a founding member of Kibbutz Negba, served as Health Minister from 1955 to 1958, when he became Minister of Posts. Three years later Mapai left the Coalition. When Mapai joined the Alignment in 1966 Barzilai returned to serve as Health Minister.

Yisrael Barzilai (1894-1965)
The German-born Zionist leader immigrated in 1936 from Poland and served as head of the land and served as head of the Jewish Agency's Commerce and Industry Department. Barzilai was appointed Minister in the Provisional Government in 1948. He headed the General Zionist Party and later the Liberal Party which grew from it. He became Commerce and Industry Minister again in 1952, serving until the party left the Cabinet in 1960.

Yisrael Barzilai (1870-1970)
A leader of Polish Jewry, Barzilai immigrated in 1933 and joined the Jewish Agency. He became its first Minister of Interior. Barzilai, an author and an editor, Gruenbaum played an active role in efforts to save European Jewry during the Holocaust.


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ISRAEL'S POLITICS OF STABILITY

the eve of the declaration of independence, Israel had already formed essential governmental institutions. The transition from the Mandate to the establishment of the State was very rapid. It had been decided to make maximum use of existing institutions inherited from the democratic government of the Yishuv. The parliamentary framework was set up at the beginning of 1948. The judicial system of the Mandate was retained virtually intact. The President and the Cabinet and the local government were established by the Basic Law.

Early on, the main government institutions have retained their structure during the past years. The Knesset still has 120 seats, despite the fact that the population of the country has tripled. Although there are areas with larger populations, smaller parliaments, no other country has had such a large increase in voters without considering enlarging its parliament. There was an attempt in 1972 to change the membership of the Knesset, but it never reached the stage of a formal proposal.

Likewise, there has been virtually no change in the basic structure of the judicial system and the creation of certain judicial courts, the chief of which is the Labour Courts. Both the judicial system and the Ministry of the Bench in the House of Justice have been retained.

The courts remain strictly professional and all attempts to "politicize" them with laymen have failed. So have several attempts to limit their functions.

The same is true of the religious courts. Although public opinion has been aroused on a number of occasions over the position of religion in the State, it has not led to any change in the powers or responsibilities of these courts. By and large, the political system has retained its autonomy.

No radical change

Although there was a certain amount of legislation of a constitutional character during the examination of the structure of the government and the Presidency, no radical changes have been made.

The composition of the Executive remains flexible. Ministries can be added or sloughed off without requiring any change in the law, and this has been done from time to time in accordance with the needs of the occasion. For instance, when a coalition has been formed.

Extra-ministerial offices for coordination have been established. Nor has the Prime Minister ever surrounded himself with a constellation of advisers and coordinating committees. The holder of this high position continues to be mainly responsible for the formation of foreign and defence policy, and must totally ignore domestic issues. The Prime Minister's Office does not coordinate the activities of different ministries. Occasionally, the authority of the Prime Minister is required to resolve exceptional crises.

No basic change occurred in the early '60s with the establishment of the Cabinet Security Committee. This body, which has been permanent, is, however, far from being an "inner Cabinet." Its function is to involve other than the Minister of Defense and the Prime Minister, especially those from the ruling coalition parties, in decisions on matters — not so much for

the purpose of shaping policy as to keep them informed.

The Presidency has not been changed at all. It has not been vested with any authority which would alter the purely symbolic character of the office. The President of Israel still does not have even the minimal powers exercised by the figurehead presidents of Italy and West Germany — or the constitutional monarchs of England and Belgium — the dissolution of parliament, say, and the ordering of a general election.

One of the most neglected areas from the point of view of organization and authority has been local government, where no significant change has been made since the first elections in the early

The longevity of the governmental institutions with which the State was established, and a pervasive atmosphere of flexibility, are two of the characteristics of Israel's political system, writes Dr. SHEVAH WEISS of Haifa University.

'50s, although several new ideas have come under discussion — for example, a "roof structure" for groups of neighbouring municipalities. If this ever gets beyond the discussion stage, we may see larger municipal bodies in the Dan region (embracing Tel Aviv) and the Greater Haifa area. But some municipalities in both parts of the country are jealous of their existing powers and do not favour broadening the present framework.

The local government electoral system is exactly the same as it always was, and successive attempts since 1958 to change the method of electing mayors have met with failure.

The State Comptroller still exercises his original functions in the examination of the acts of commission or omission by State agencies and public bodies. The recent additional duty of handling complaints by the ordinary citizen has not substantially changed the Comptroller's functions, and the Public Complaints Commissioner is in no way as powerful as an Ombudsman.

Recently, there has grown up the practice of setting up ad hoc committees to investigate special problems connected with government and public administration. Thus the Etzioni Committee was appointed by the Cabinet to investigate corruption in football, the Gvati Committee to inquire into the management of Lod Airport and the Gvati Committee into the operation of Ashdod Port.

The proliferation of these ad hoc committees suggests that regular investigating institutions are being bypassed for no good reason. The State Comptroller, after all, is explicitly empowered to inquire "whether the bodies under examination have been thrifty, efficient and morally upright." For all practical purposes, thrift, efficiency and morality cover the very matters which the special committees have been appointed to investigate.

This circumvention of the existing institutions makes it quite apparent that not only are they deliberately kept unchanged, but that they are bypassed when this

seems to the top political leadership, especially the members of the executive branch, to be politically expedient.

Stable yet dynamic

How, then, do Israel's government authorities operate within the existing structures? How are they affected by the dynamic society they serve? In answering these questions we will confine ourselves to some central issues.

The Knesset has virtually lost such little power as it once had. Most legislation is initiated by the Cabinet, and the Knesset's contribution is marginal. The number of private members' bills that have gone into law is negligible: of the 1,366 bills that became laws from the beginning of the First Knesset to the third session of the Seventh Knesset, only 71, or 5.3 per cent, were private members' bills. This is much lower than in the British, French and Italian parliaments.

This may be due in part to the comparatively small size of the Knesset. But only in part. An examination of 58 of the successful private members' bills shows that a total of 42, or 73 per cent, were introduced by members of coalition parties, either on their own or together with a member of an Opposition party. Only 16 of them (27 per cent) were introduced by Opposition members. In other words, hardly more than one per cent of all the bills passed by the Knesset were initiated privately by Opposition members.

We can conclude from this that only a private bill which is not the subject of inter-party debate (such as a bill introduced jointly by members of a coalition and Opposition party) or one which is not opposed by the Government stands any chance of passage.

It must also be noted that 43 of the 58 bills discussed (74 per cent) were amendments to existing laws, and that the number of new laws passed was only 15. All attempts by members of the small parties in the Knesset, especially those of the Opposition, both left and right — to restore the power of the House have been strongly resisted by the large parties.

There can be no doubt that the new law for the distribution of surplus votes according to the de Hont system — one of the very few political innovations of any substance in the past 25 years — was intended primarily to reduce the power of the small parties. This in turn could result in a further dwarfing of the Knesset's stature, the reduction of its influence on the development of policy, and its isolation from the main sources of political power.

The "kitchen"

On the other hand, in the Cabinet, the small group of leading Labour Party (formerly Mapai) ministers has always been responsible for major decisions. Mrs. Meir's famous "kitchen" is merely an updated version of Mr. Ben-Gurion's group known as Sareinu — "our ministers." These ministers usually gather at the Prime Minister's home on Saturday night and make decisions which they bring before the Cabinet for discussion and approval on Sunday.

This would seem, therefore, to be an unofficial "inner Cabinet" of the Israel Government. Participation in these sessions is not a matter of the relative importance of the various ministries, but the personal standing of an individual, and especially his closeness to the Prime Minister.

THE Presidents of Israel have made hardly any attempt either to expand the authority they possess or to gain any new powers. Indeed, Itzhak Ben-Zvi and Zal-

man Shazar shared the view of their own colleagues in the Labour Party leadership that the President should avoid any intervention in the political process.

Unless something drastic is done to check the process of erosion in the prestige of the Presidency, this is likely to become a superfluous office. As Prof. Benjamin Akzin has observed, the proliferation of unnecessary political and social institutions which attract feelings somewhere between pity and cynicism can undermine both the faith of the public in the entire political order and the political order's faith in itself.

UNLIKE the Presidency, the Supreme Court has not refrained from exercising its authority to the full. Moreover this institution, especially when it sits as the High Court of Justice, has successfully expanded its powers beyond the original intention of the legislature.

In its decision in the case of A. A. Bergman v. the Minister of Finance and the State Comptroller in 1969, the Court acted as a sort of constitutional tribunal and established a potentially important precedent by declaring void an Act of the Knesset which it deemed to be in conflict with the Basic Law. In doing so, the Court was for once using its authority very much in the manner of John Marshall, the early 19th century Chief Justice of the U.S.

Without any doubt, the Supreme Court is the most dynamic political institution in the State of Israel, largely because it has interpreted its powers liberally. Acting within a somewhat narrow conception of its own powers, the State Comptroller, too, has become an institution of considerable influence. Over the years, the office has gained the respect of public opinion. As with the law courts, this respect for the office

came with the recognition that it is in the nature of an anti-body with which the regime inoculates itself against its own ills.

Successive State Comptrollers have skillfully exploited public sympathy to strengthen their position. As a result, the public bodies that have come under examination have been in greater fear of the publication of adverse criticism than of any actual punishment that may be meted out to them.

The annual reports of the Comptroller have served, among other things, as a protest against bad administration and have been a cathartic experience for public and government alike. But this has had the result of making them a part of the establishment. Recently, there have been an increasing number of cases in which the Comptroller's recommendations have not been implemented, and in which the defects to which he has drawn attention have not been corrected. Moreover, the bodies criticized have begun not only to defend themselves, but to launch counter-attacks against the Comptroller's conclusions.

Grass roots

AT the local government level — at the grass roots — firm direction in the shape of over-all coordination and control has been conspicuously lacking.

It often happens that because there is no proper coordination at regional or district level, ad hoc decisions have to be imposed from above. Some ministries, it is true, working at the local level on their own projects, force a degree of coordination on neighbouring municipal authorities and other responsible bodies and departments. The Ministry of Transport sometimes works in this way, and so does the Ministry of Education, the Ministries of Health and Interior hardly ever. Very often, indeed, ministries go so far as to deny the importance of such coordination. (Continued on page 58)

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ISRAEL'S POLITICS OF STABILITY

(Continued from page 57)

dition, and at times turn their backs on it for party political reasons. Much the same may be said about the cooperation between ministries, which is one of the reasons why most of the problems of ecology and the environment have so far failed to get proper treatment.

True, the Israeli political mind is preoccupied most of the time with matters of greater urgency than the administrative coordination of central and local government activities. There is foreign and defence policy to be formulated, and Government expenditure to be brought into some sort of balance with revenue. Furthermore, there is a certain *modus vivendi* whereby the government machinery can be made to work from one agreement to the next, making flexible use of the possibilities created by any given situation.

Informality remains, after 25 years, the hallmark of the Israeli system of government, where the system has been given a formal, sometimes a rigidly constitutional, shape.

ARE we to conclude, then, that Israel is tending toward a condition of lawlessness? Such a conclusion would be completely unwarranted. What is true, however, is that there is a strong similarity between the country's policy-makers and a great many members of the public in their recognition of the legitimacy of flexibility. Neither attaches any particular importance to the strict observance of the formal rules. Both take the rather optimistic attitude of "live and let live."

Perhaps this explains the Israeli acceptance of deviation from the legal norm. Not only do "law-abiding types" who take the formal rules too seriously fail in government; their failure is attributed to their inflexibility.

It was for this reason that Aluf (Res.) Haim Laskov was unable to keep his post as Director of the Port Authority. And the rupture between David Ben-Gurion and his party colleagues began during the "Lavon Affair," when the then Prime Minister refused to end the matter on the political level and sought to have it brought before the courts.

The source of this ambivalent attitude towards government institutions is difficult to locate. For what we face here is a strange phenomenon: on the one hand, an energetic use of the possibilities inherent in the instruments of government; on the other, the systematic circumvention of many of those very instruments. In other words, there is a sharp dichotomy between structure and function.

This "lawlessness" may stem in part from traditional sources — from the Jewish people's long ex-

perience in getting around unfriendly host governments — but it is certainly largely new, a product of the soil of Israel itself. Many people believe that the very dynamism of Israel society is in great measure a result of this ambivalent attitude toward the rigid rules of the political game. Some people also feel that this flexibility ensures greater realism in governmental policy-making.

What is certain is that this "anomie" is not the product of social disintegration or alienation. Indeed, it may by now have become an integral part of the political system and may be largely subject to government control.

Question of leadership

THE dynamics of the State of Israel have been such that the future of its political system is extremely difficult to forecast. One aspect of it, however, is important enough to warrant some attempt at prediction. This is the question of the leadership of the country's

principal political group, the Labour Party.

What is already clear is that the Labour Party's long — well-nigh permanent — tenure of office has enormously strengthened the power of its apparatus, and that party interests have triumphed over party principles. Personalities of the stature of David Ben-Gurion, Berl Katznelson or Haim Arlosoroff are conspicuous for their absence from the party's leadership today.

Secondly, the influx of immigrants into the ranks of the party has increased the importance of the party organizers, who have become the intermediaries between these new members and the state institutions. The intermediaries have also been experienced "ballot brokers" for the day of judgment — election day. It is thus no accident that many of these political brothers draw much of their political support from the party branches in new immigrant settlements.

Thirdly, in recent years few men of any intellectual calibre, and fewer still of greatness of spirit have joined the party ranks. The "founding fathers" have become isolated in one stratum: the rest are mere functionaries. On the other hand, the "bright boys" drawn from the upper echelons of Zahal have shrunk from the dull, stifling work of the party bureaucracy, and have therefore not managed to achieve positions of power. And having come in at the top, they have not won the support of the bureaucratic rank and file.

Finally, the success of the party's operatives in acquiring real power in lower-level bureaucracies, such as local councils and economic enterprises of the Histadrut, is now bearing fruit. Having accomplished this, some of them have developed enough self-confidence to seek real power. Joining the party's Leadership Bureau has become the normal and recognized route to such important administrative posts as Secretary-General

of the Histadrut, Secretary of the Labour Party, and Tel Aviv Mayor.

If this is only the beginning of a process, we can fully expect the next Cabinet, the large ministries, and even the Knesset to be manned by somewhat colorless figures of this type. To the extent that the composition of the Bureau is an indication of the change in the nature of the party leadership, the situation will have profound repercussions on the future leadership of the nation.

In the words of the great political scientist Roberto Michels: "The history of the Labour Movement provides ample testimony of how a party grows progressively weaker and more backward as the power of the organization grows. The party loses its revolutionary drive, and becomes lethargic not only in its actions but also in its thinking. The party clings with increasing stubbornness to what it calls its brilliant old tactics, the tactics which have assured the growth of its membership."

It is vital for the future of being of this country that such fate shall overtake the Labour Party.

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


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
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
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



THE JERUSALEM
POST

25th INDEPENDENCE DAY



Sunday, May 8, 1978

25th INDEPENDENCE DAY



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
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ISRAEL — Israel's Grand Old Man — and forward — on the 25th anniversary, in an interview with Page 8.

THOSE WERE THE (INDEPENDENCE) DAYS — A pictorial reminiscence of some memorable Independence Days. By M. Pina and David Rubinger. Pages 7-9.

A VERY SPECIAL CASE — Prospects for the future are bright, and Israel can expect to continue to live dangerously, writes David Vital. Page 11.

THE WHEEL — Lea Ben-David looks at what is happening in the Middle East. Page 13.

THE SMALL VOICE OF REALISM — Daniel Dahan sees the Arabs experiencing a period of "hesitancy and uncertainty," perhaps of transition in their attitudes towards Israel. Page 15.

"Since the mid-1950s, except for the intervals of rearmament after Israel's two preemptive strikes, the weapons inventory of the Egyptian armed forces has consistently exceeded that of Israel. Yet we can see in retrospect that at no time could Egypt validly claim military superiority over Israel..."

"Israel's insistence on remaining militarily more powerful than its Arab neighbors derives from elementary rules of a military balance. The challenged state can deter or defeat the challenger only through military superiority."

JACOB C. HUREWITZ

A MILITARY POWER — A review of some of the reasons for Israel's emergence as a major regional military power, by Haim Herzog. Page 17.

ENDING FLYERS — Some of the first squadron in the 1st Force are described by Ilia-Fa. Pages 20-21.

DEFENCE EXPENDITURES AND THE ECONOMY — David Kuchav discusses the challenges faced by defence-related industrial branches as military spending levels off. Page 24.

"One country that has made great advances since the war, including great capacity to make effective use of oil, has been Israel. It is singularly unendowed with natural resources. It has no oil wells, few minerals, insufficient water and not much space. But... a highly educated elite, the sense and reality of social justice, an effective government and a strong sense of purpose are all present. So there is a rapid progress. The Israelis, were they forced to it, would better do without their oil than without their education, their sense of shared responsibility and shared gains, their public administration and their clear view of their destiny."

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH

A REMARKABLE RECORD — The country's 25 years of economic development are reviewed by David Horowitz. Page 25.

A not-so-optimistic look at Israel on its 25th anniversary, by Helga. Page 27.

A COMMON DENOMINATOR — Dr. Haim Syrkin discusses Israel-Diaspora relations. Page 28.

A CHANGE IN JEWISH SELF-IMAGE — Paris correspondent Jack Maurice talks with some French Jewish leaders. Page 30.

TOURING WITH OLIM — New immigrants visit some War of Independence battle sites, accompanied by photographer Israel Simionaky. Pages 32-33.

COMMUNITIES WITHOUT COMPLEXES — A discussion of Israel's social gap, by Deputy Knesset speaker Yitzhak Navon. Page 35.

THE ISRAELI AS A JEW — Simon Herman reports on the results of a survey of young Israelis. Page 36.

THE COST OF LIVING AND THE WAR OF ATTRITION — A story, by A. I. Acker. Pages 40-41.

DEVELOPING AN ISRAELI SYNTHESIS — Gideon Ophrat discusses the Israeli arts. Page 43.

NEW HEBREW WORDS — From the street and the academy, by Judith Peres. Page 45.

ISRAELI SCIENCE — Macabee Dean talks with physicist Yuval Ne'eman and biologist Michael Feldman about Israeli contributions to the world of science. Pages 47-48.

THE SCHOOL FOR DIPLOMATS — The beginnings of Israel's foreign service are described by Walter Eytan, principal of the pre-state school for diplomats and other civil servants. Page 51.

AN ISRAELI ALBUM: Photos, and brief biographies, of former Presidents, Prime Ministers and Cabinet Ministers who died during the State's first 25 years, compiled by Moshe Ron. Pages 51-56.

"As hectically put together as the United States, Israel yet seemed invested with... a certain dimension of nationhood that America fully did not have: a general cohesion deriving from the protean circumstances of their common epic experience of Jewishness in exile... With this profound affinity of (the Jews') community despite their disparity, Israel seemed, at the same time, possibly the most rampantly democratic society, yet fashioned on earth... More than his own country, the American thought, there had improbably transpired here on the other side of the globe the kind of nation that would have fulfilled and gladdened the heart of Whitman."

MARSHALL FRADY

ISRAEL'S POLITICS OF STABILITY — Basic institutions have not changed, and a spirit of improvisation pervades the Israeli political scene, writes Shevah Weiss. Pages 57-58.

STRANGERS IN PARADISE — Anan Sa'ad talks about the situation of the Israeli Arab. Page 61.


VIEW FROM THE SUPREME COURT — Chief Justice Shimon Agranat analyses the development of the Israeli judicial system. Pages 63-64.

BORN WITH THE STATE — Yitzhak Hermon, born on May 15, 1948, is interviewed by Marina Levin for the third time. Previous interviews were in the Poste 10th and 18th Independence Day supplements. Page 67.

FOUR YOUNG ISRAELIS AT 25 — Philip Gilson talks with young people who grew up with the State. Pages 69-70.

ON THE COVER OF THIS SPECIAL 25th INDEPENDENCE DAY SUPPLEMENT: Gobelin tapestry, designed by Marc Chagall, the third of the three hanging in the Knesset reception hall, shows Israel celebrating: at right, biblical figures dance with shofar and cymbals, behind King David with his harp; at top right, a group of klezmer, itinerant East European Jewish musicians, dance around the Ark of the Law; at left, modern Israel, rooted again on the land, dances and celebrates the Revival. At top, centre, is the focal point of Judaism throughout the ages, the Eternal Jerusalem. Photograph is by David Rubinger.

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Ben-Gurion looks back and ahead

Israel's elder statesman recalls
his beginnings and sets out
future tasks in an interview
with *The Post's* ARI RATH.



(Israel Sun)

Ben-Gurion, Israel's Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, the man who proclaimed the State of Israel, on both sides of the River Jordan, would become ours. This has nothing to do with the British Mandate; it is a question of our state. *Mandat* — *Shmandat*," he says, using his famous dismissive phrase for the rule of outside powers in Israel's historical development. "But in the course of time I realized that a good part of this area would not be ours and that we would have to confine ourselves to the major part of this side of the River Jordan."

Settle the land

It was in this context that the former Premier and Israel's elder statesman clarified his view on Israel's present policy in the administered areas — mainly in Judea and Samaria, the West Bank of the River Jordan. He realizes that nowadays a number of politicians, mainly from the "dove-ish" camp, often quote the opinion he voiced shortly after the 1967 Six Day War that for real peace, Israel should give back all the territories, except for Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.

"That was then, right after the war, on condition that peace, true peace, would come right away. But peace did not come, to this day they don't want to make peace with us, *halas* — finished. So there is no peace and we must do certain things."

It was not a question of his having changed his mind; it was circumstances that had changed. "We should therefore do everything we can to settle in every part of the Land of Israel on this side of the River Jordan. This is something we wanted to do then, and we can do it now. We should seriously set about establishing as many settlements as possible in the West Bank, but not by displacing Arabs. This should be one of our foremost tasks."

He recalls how, following the Arab invasion and the 1948 War of Independence, Israel had added areas to its territory that had not been included in the U.N. partition scheme of 1947.

"The question of the borders of our state went through a number of changes over the years," he explains. "First I believed that the entire Land of Israel, on both sides of the River Jordan, would become ours. This has nothing to do with the British Mandate; it is a question of our state. *Mandat* — *Shmandat*," he says, using his famous dismissive phrase for the rule of outside powers in Israel's historical development. "But in the course of time I realized that a good part of this area would not be ours and that we would have to confine ourselves to the major part of this side of the River Jordan."

"The U.N. decision of November 29 (1947) was not so important. The real partition did not take place when the U.N. decided. The Arabs waged war against us, in violation of the law, and we had to fight back. As a result, we gained areas that should have been in the Arab state, such as Beersheba, where not a single Jew lived at the time. Today, there are close on 100,000 Jews there. This has changed the entire situation."

"The Egyptians made the same mistake as they made again later on. They started war against us in defiance of the law, and we fought them, driving them back all the way to Egypt. We took from them all the areas which according to the U.N. did not belong to the State of Israel. But we decided nevertheless that those areas should be part of Israel."

Mr. Ben-Gurion recalls here how, in 1948, he was voted down in the Cabinet by members of his own party when he proposed a military campaign that could have secured the bulk of the West Bank for Israel. "I know that we could have got the whole of Jerusalem and the area all the way down to Hebron within 10 days. But the Cabinet decided against it and there was nothing I could do."

Cabinet discussion
"In those days I was not in the habit of discussing Government matters beforehand with members of my party who were in the Cabinet. I could not understand why they voted the way they did, but I couldn't change the decision. I knew, though, that there would be similar situations in the future, and when we had to take an important decision on the war against Egypt, I called in my three party colleagues in the Cabinet — Moshe Sharett, Eliezer Kaplan and David Ben-Zur — and explained the situation in — and the proposal, which was proved my proposal, which was then carried by the entire Cabinet. "Other areas were added, thanks to the diplomacy of Moshe Dayan, when some of the Iraqi troops decided to withdraw during the truce period. The Jordanian Arab Legion wanted to move in instead, but Dayan, the military commander in the area, objected."

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Mr. Ben-Gurion recalls here how, in 1948, he was voted down in the Cabinet by members of his own party when he proposed a military campaign that could have secured the bulk of the West Bank for Israel. "I know that we could have got the whole of Jerusalem and the area all the way down to Hebron within 10 days. But the Cabinet decided against it and there was nothing I could do."

Cabinet discussion
"In those days I was not in the habit of discussing Government matters beforehand with members of my party who were in the Cabinet. I could not understand why they voted the way they did, but I couldn't change the decision. I knew, though, that there would be similar situations in the future, and when we had to take an important decision on the war against Egypt, I called in my three party colleagues in the Cabinet — Moshe Sharett, Eliezer Kaplan and David Ben-Zur — and explained the situation in — and the proposal, which was proved my proposal, which was then carried by the entire Cabinet. "Other areas were added, thanks to the diplomacy of Moshe Dayan, when some of the Iraqi troops decided to withdraw during the truce period. The Jordanian Arab Legion wanted to move in instead, but Dayan, the military commander in the area, objected."

"The U.N. decision of November 29 (1947) was not so important. The real partition did not take place when the U.N. decided. The Arabs waged war against us, in violation of the law, and we had to fight back. As a result, we gained areas that should have been in the Arab state, such as Beersheba, where not a single Jew lived at the time. Today, there are close on 100,000 Jews there. This has changed the entire situation."

"The Egyptians made the same mistake as they made again later on. They started war against us in defiance of the law, and we fought them, driving them back all the way to Egypt. We took from them all the areas which according to the U.N. did not belong to the State of Israel. But we decided nevertheless that those areas should be part of Israel."

because the movement and replacement of troops was forbidden under the truce agreement. The two sides finally agreed to split up the territory held by the Iraqis between themselves. As a result, Israel gained access to Afula through the Wadi Ara."

WE try to move away from the days of 1948 to some of the problems that concerned Mr. Ben-Gurion during his Premiership. As far as the question of religion is concerned he still believes that one should not upset the so-called *status quo* which he agreed upon with the religious parties in the early days of the state.

Unity of people

"It is better to maintain the unity of the nation in every respect. Many Jews who come here from other countries would not be able to accept marriage without a rabbi. Most marriages in Israel are consecrated according to Jewish law and in cases where this is impossible, people can go to Cyprus and get married there in a civil ceremony. But there is no need to introduce civil marriage here."

He adds: "I say this although I myself got married in the U.S. without a rabbi and my son Amos, who fell in love with a British nurse in a military hospital in England, married her before she had time to go through a proper conversion."

Mr. Ben-Gurion thinks that the social gap is still one of Israel's gravest problems. "There are many people in this country who do not get what they should. They should be given a good education and decent housing. I have recently seen Jews living in places that are really terrible. I was ashamed to look at them."

Speaking of immigration from the Soviet Union, Mr. Ben-Gurion dismisses the notion that he was one of the first people to predict years ago, that the day would come when Russia would open its gates and let its Jews go.

"Aliya from Russia is no doubt very important. At the moment in Jerusalem. Every Jew should."

it is increasing steadily, but it is difficult to know with the Soviets what is going to happen, whether this will go on for many more years. I would not venture to predict. We should also be concerned about the Russian immigrants who are leaving this country."

He thinks highly of Israel's youth. "They should go on volunteering for different tasks, as they used to do," he urges. He dismisses what he terms the "myth" of the Second Aliya — the immigration of the Founding Fathers at the turn of the century.

"At the time, the Second Aliya people thought there was nobody like them, didn't think so and my disbelief was confirmed when it was proved that only about ten per cent of the Second Aliya stayed here."

DAVID Ben-Gurion, now in his 87th year, still puts in a long day working on his memoirs, all in his own handwriting. "When I left the Government 10 years ago, I took upon myself one task — to write and tell the youth of today what we did here before the State of Israel came into being. I hope to be able to do this for several more years. There is a great deal to tell, but I am no longer as young as you."

Going to the parade
Although he needs an occasional reminder over a name or a place, he still has an amazing memory for the detail of political developments and significant events. Reluctant to speak about Israel's future and to predict what it will or should be like here in another 25 years' time, he responds without hesitation to the question as to what he regards as the most important task for the next few years.

"We have to concentrate our efforts to settle the State of Israel on this side of the River Jordan. I know that some settlements are being established, but not everywhere that they could be. This is the main thing that has to be done in the years ahead."

"Yes, of course I am going to see the Independence Day parade in Jerusalem. Every Jew should."

A high-contrast, black and white photograph of a hand, possibly wearing a glove, with fingers spread, set against a textured, grainy background. The hand is positioned palm-up, with the fingers slightly curved. The background has a mottled, speckled appearance, giving it a gritty, artistic feel. The lighting is dramatic, with deep shadows and bright highlights on the hand's surface.

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Kaifa, 1953: some of the transport is four-legged.

Those
were the
(Independence)
Days...



Jerusalem, 1960
Dancing on
Jaffa Road.




Jerusalem, 1958: Tenth anniversary in the Hebrew University stadium.




BeerSheva, 1964: Craning necks to see the air force.



Jerusalem, 1967: The only tanks were of cardboard.



1968: This year in reunited Jerusalem.



Haifa, 1953: A Navy unit passes the reviewing stand.



Beer Sheva, 1949: An enthusiastic crowd prevented the parade by blocking the route.



Ramle, 1954:

Many got some of the best seats, on the roof.

by Hans H. Film (6)
David Robinson.

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FOR THE RIGHT OPENING
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The prospects before Israel are harsh, and the country can expect to continue to live dangerously, writes DAVID VITAL, professor of political science at Haifa University and a specialist on the subject of small states.

vision — or is fan-
by the proper term? — of
attractive society has
managed, superbly
It is said to
the Founding Father,
of all that was ele-
and "aristocratic"
his particular loathing
shared, professional politi-
would make of us all. But
probably he would end up
at modern Israel with
eye. For his essen-
the State, has been
and with it the mech-
by which he hoped the
and finally be assimilated
Indeed, singly and pri-
at on bloc and publicly
the society of nations.
that extent, despite the dis-
between his vision and
the present celebra-
of the 25th anniversary of
the State of the
first and foremost, a
of Herzl's formula
We are his heirs,
he heirs, say of Ahad
nor of any one of the
state figures — Welz-
for example.

Today, we know better
Neither the State, nor
Jewry at large
been granted the com-
national. Despite the im-
changes since 1948, the
is still a subject of vio-
and their con-
source of pain and ten-
to themselves and to
We have remained a pe-
ple and the State is a
a date. Our acceptance
international community
to spoken and un-
reservations; we are
politically and vilified
and systematically by
ponents of two of the
great powers on earth
all but one of the prin-
ciples of the continent to
be being geographically.
of course, we are beset by
in our immediate

Question of survival

the jargon of political
our external environment
extremely hostile one. Nor
any convincing evidence
it is likely to grow less so
sure. The establishment
may have completed
total emancipation of the
but it has not solved the
of their national survi-
can even be argued that
is still more precariously
before, in that there is now
target at which all the
hostile to us can aim.
then, are our prospects?
question is too large a one
to be anything but pre-
to attempt to answer it
But the problem of Israel
state among other states has
two salient aspects which
it worth trying to identify
on occasion of our half-

fundamental one is that we are
— overwhelmingly —
under the forces hostile
Generally speaking, the
the viability of the State
before dependent inter alia
the (variable) factors:
The solidity and cohesion
of the opponents of Israel.
The degree of extrinsic
support that Israel can
muster.

Israel's own intrinsic capa-
bilities, that is to say, its
and military resources,
quality of its social structures,
ability of its political leader-
ship, the degree of con-
sensus among citizens at large
to place in those

It follows that it is a major,
long-term interest of this country
to divide Russians from Arabs
— much more profoundly and
visibly than they are now divid-
ed — both as part of a general
strategy of whittling away the
anti-Israel cohort and, of course,
in an effort to mitigate Russian
hostility to us *tout court*.
It cannot be said that the
search for an accommodation
with the Russians in the United

and artificial (if politically notwith-
the Russians on the basis
of an acceptable *modus vivendi*
has over figured high on the
Government's agenda since the
early disappointment of 1948-49.
This is not to say that it would
be easy to come to an under-
standing, or even that it is
necessarily possible. The price
may turn out to be too high for
us to pay. And, conceivably, the
Russians may decide that hostil-
ity to Israel (and to the Jews in
general) is more profitable to
them than co-existence. But we,
at least, should be clear in our
own minds about our own
targets.

Not just the Arabs

It would be a mistake to for-
get that only a very short time
has elapsed since we were literally
on the point of involvement
in a shooting war with Arabs
and Russians. Nor is it too dif-
ficult to envisage a state of
affairs in which more or less the
same threat will recur. The point
is that it is not Arab hostility
alone with which we have to
 contend, nor is Russian hostility
to us solely a consequence of
their political alignment with
some of the major Arab States.

The Soviet Union is set upon
arrogating to itself the status of
paramount power in the Middle
East. Within the area, it has en-
countered the covert and overt
resistance of several local minor
powers — Israel among them.
Both within and outside the area,
it is resisted by the United
States. But the long-term inter-
ests of the super-powers in the
Middle East differ in kind, and
there can be little question that
the area is ultimately of higher
priority to Russia than to
America. Nor are the Americans,
in the aftermath of the Vietnam
War, capable of, or interested in,
maintaining their foreign com-
mitments at the old level, let
alone extending them. Accord-
ingly, for all these reasons, the long-
term thrust of the Russians is
likely to be more powerful and
longer sustained than American
resistance to it.

It follows that it is a major,
long-term interest of this country
to divide Russians from Arabs
— much more profoundly and
visibly than they are now divid-
ed — both as part of a general
strategy of whittling away the
anti-Israel cohort and, of course,
in an effort to mitigate Russian
hostility to us *tout court*.
It cannot be said that the
search for an accommodation
with the Russians in the United

It is perfectly true that
the array of forces
confronting Israel is
impressive and
it is in no sense
the constituent parts
of concerted action
to place in the United

ing the recent conflict between the
White House and the Congress
(over the involvement, real and
alleged, of the CIA in Chile, for
example), only a very brave spirit
would predict that the conduct
of American foreign policy will
remain on the same even keel
beyond 1976 and into the 1980s.
As for the Jews of the U.S.,
the other rock on which the
special relationship is founded,
there again everything suggests
change, and much suggests a di-
minution of any practical role that
American Jewry will be free to
play in the political arena. So
there is more than the much
trumpeted energy crisis and its
implications for American rela-
tions with the Arab oil states to
suggest that the Israel-American
relationship has reached its peak.

THE second question, that of
the support Israel can muster
to help offset the preponderant
forces arrayed against it, is as
vital as it is complex. There are
few enough friends in fair
weather; there are fewer still, if
any, in foul. The psychological
consequences of our quasi-isola-
tion are, at present, more worry-
ing perhaps, than the strategic.
But in the long term, the highly
excitable frame of mind in which
we watch events outside our bor-
ders and beyond our immediate
control is of little importance
compared with the comparative
fragility of the king-pin of our
international position — our
special relationship with the U.S.

Ties with U.S.

To term the present American-
Israeli entente fragile, is certain-
ly not to minimize the very great
benefits we have derived from it.
(One can safely leave the Ameri-
cans to assess their own benefits.)
Still less is it to suggest that
our relations with what is still
the most powerful of all states
on earth should not be at the
top of the Government's list of
political priorities. But the
entente remains just that: a con-
junctural understanding founded
on a meeting of minds on a num-
ber of important issues and the
ascription of less than critical
weight to other issues on which
there is latent or even present
conflict of interests.

The present situation may
change. The minds at work in Wa-
shington (as in Jerusalem) are
bound in time to be replaced by
others of a different cast. Watch-

ing the recent conflict between the
White House and the Congress
(over the involvement, real and
alleged, of the CIA in Chile, for
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tions with the Arab oil states to
suggest that the Israel-American
relationship has reached its peak.

Taking up slack

How can the slack be taken
up when the entente goes
into its slow decline? There is
still no coherent European power
to replace America, nor much
prospect of one. The most we
can hope to gain from the
Russians is a measure of cool
tolerance. The Chinese are too
hostile and too distant.
The Japanese, as they advance to
centre stage, are unlikely to wish
to embroil themselves in the
Middle East. Moreover, and more
fundamentally, Israel is indis-
pensable to no one. A loosening
of ties with it entails only
moderate loss; some (like the
French and, sporadically, the
British) have gone so far as to
account disengagement from us
as pure gain. We have no re-
sources which others covet.
Neither our industrial nor our
military capabilities are great
enough to tip the scales in inter-
national power strategic balance. In a
word, we are too small a power
to attract the support of major
states by virtue of our intrinsic
strength alone.

The great powers

Support accrues to us, when
at all, as a function of the great
powers' policies in the Middle
East. For within the region we
are, beyond a doubt, a force to
be reckoned with. But for all
practical purposes, only the
Americans and the Russians to-
day can and do play a role of
strategic consequence in the

Middle East, and since it is only
the Russians who are likely to
continue, more or less indefini-
tely, to regard the affairs of the
region as of very high importance,
the dilemma of how to compen-
sate for a possible slow evolution
in American foreign policy is
unlikely to be resolved — barring
some radical, unforeseeable
development.

The nub of the matter is, in-
deed, in the third aspect of the
problem, namely that for a
country destined, it seems, to
live in semi-isolation, Israel is
too small for comfort. A great
deal can still be done to make
the most of our slim resources.
But the economic and social costs
are high and the results are, of
course, entirely insufficient to
project us into the league of
major states which alone have
some prospect — and even that
doubtful, as the example of
Gaullist France shows — of pur-
suing a course of self-reliance.
Nor, evidently, do they suffice
to persuade the Arabs that the
sources of our present strength
are not ephemeral, not, as it
were, borrowed. That we can
reasonably congratulate ourselves
on having done remarkably well
in the circumstances, does not
alter the familiar fact of inter-
national life that strength accrues
to the strong and that weakness
saps further at the weak.


THE prospect before us is,
therefore, a harsh one. It
suggests that for as far ahead
as one can see, our political and
military condition will be a pre-
carious one and that we will con-
tinue to live dangerously. We
will have to continue to rely on
adroit manoeuvre, on the tran-
sient, easily eroded contingencies
of the international political
situation, on what small weight
we can bring to bear on the deli-
cate balance of the mechanism.
It will be, as before, a hand-to-
mouth existence. The present ten-
sion in our lives is unlikely to
be dissipated.

A Jewish condition

It seems, in a word, that we
cannot wholly escape the grim con-
sequences of our own small num-
bers, and that our condition will
have a great deal more in com-
mon with the classic and
familiar condition of the Jews
than might have seemed likely in
the first flush of independence
25 years ago. We have remained
a special, isolated and peculiar
case.

Some may welcome this pros-
pect because it, at least, makes
clear the relationship between
ourselves and our fathers and
may be taken as evidence of the
underlying, organic continuity of
Jewish history. Others may be
moved to disappointment, if not
to revulsion, for that very reason.
But relief and anguish would
both be beside the point. We are
what we are; our affairs are
thus and not otherwise. The
notion that one can induce rad-
ical and significant changes in
one's circumstances virtually at
will and in the light of one's
interests as one perceives them
at a particular time, is a puerile
one. A people can undergo sharp
and visible changes — a revolu-
tion — only rarely and only in
the wake of massive internal and
external upheaval. The Jews have
undergone one such upheaval in
this century. There is no cause
to think there will be another.
In fact, to recollect the tragic
events that preceded the es-
tablishment of the State is to
grasp the true measure of the
extraordinary improvement in our
condition that they engendered.

Our business now is to consol-
idate what has been achieved and
to invent and refine norms and
structures that are consistent
with it and with the process of
consolidation itself. It will not
be easy. It is unlikely always to
be very pleasant. But it will not
be dull; and in any case, as
always, we will have no choice
in the matter.



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Student at the Hebrew University, left, and Arab workers in Jaffa wear similar puzzled expressions.

(Werner Braun, Rachel Hirsch)

The Israeli Arab: stranger in paradise

Of Israel's most sensitive problems is that of her Arab citizens who, from a subdued, ghetto community of 150,000 in 1948, have grown to a strong ethnic entity with its own. This recently became apparent in the position of the Arab citizen required a dramatic change in order to narrow the gap that exists between him and the rest of Israeli society.

However, lip-service has been paid to the proposition that they are full equals as citizens, too. It has been done in a positive way to make them feel that this is only in 1966, 18 years after the establishment of the state, that the first major step to give them the same official status as the Jewish population has been taken: the lifting of the emergency laws.

Then, unspectacular work has been going on to improve their status, especially since Mrs. Meir became Prime Minister, and it is coming to the notice of an increasing number. Most recently, it has been reported that the vast and enormously valuable properties of the Arab community are to be handed over to regional Arab community councils. At the same time, Mrs. Meir has announced that more positions in the civil service are to be reserved for Arab high school and university graduates.

Basically enough, the Government's concern with the situation of the Arab citizens is the country's Arab citizens coming into view just when the Arab countries have begun to worry about the Arab.

Some have denied any links between the Israeli Arabs, who were called "traitors," in the Arab East capitals, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad, and the Arab National Movement. They have suddenly begun to have their concerns for and with the Israeli Arabs. And the Palestine Organization has refused to receive in its territory. And the Palestine Organization has refused to receive in its territory. And the Palestine Organization has refused to receive in its territory.

It was now that the Israel Arab's crisis of identity reached its climax. For his fellow Israelis, he belonged to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; for these Arabs, he was an Israeli, no different from the rest of the population across the Green Line. For both sides, he was "one of them," not "one of us."

It is the younger generation that seems to have been affected most strongly by the situation, their social problems leading to political grievances.

The flow of Arabs from the administered territories into Israel has inevitably led to inconveniences for the Arab citizens, ranging from petty irritations to serious frustrations. When "incidents" occur, he, like his fellow-Arabs from the territories, has to submit to being searched and checked. It has become far more difficult than it used to be for him to rent a room from a Jewish landlady. The Arab intellectual, in particular, is finding himself restricted, because instead of mixing with his Jewish peers, he is faced with the necessity of

ances over the restrictions of military government and security zones, as well as expropriation of their lands.

The third phase, starting in 1966, saw a virtually complete acceptance of the State of Israel, in which they were beneficiaries of the economic boom and were relieved of the restrictions of military government in their own areas. "Oddly enough, though," says Mr. Toledano, "it was then that the Arabs began to question their own identity."

And that problem, as we have already seen, was exacerbated by the events of 1967 and their aftermath.

being shaped to provide for the expansion of the educated Arab population.

IN stressing the official policy of "Arabizing" the institutions in Arab-populated areas, Mr. Toledano spoke of the instructions that have been issued to all Ministries to employ more Arabs, and he pointed out that the decision to transfer Waqf property from the Custodian of Absentee Property to Moslem local councils will help them to run their affairs independently for the benefit of their communities.

Another straw in the wind is the report that all political parties are considering opening their doors to Israeli Arabs.

All these developments lend colour to the belief that the Government has recently come to realize that a new Arab leadership is emerging in Israel to threaten the position of the traditional "establishment" leadership and the extremist anti-establishment leadership which until now have competed for the allegiance of the Arab in the street.

A recent Government study is reported to have found that the average Israeli Arab sees his destiny as firmly linked to Israel, unlike his fellow-Arab on the West Bank, who lives a day-to-day existence, under the unpredictable protection of the Geneva Convention.

The study is said to have stressed, however, that new "positive roles" are emerging among the younger generation who will not feel that they are a complete part of Israel until they are allowed to take their share in running the country's affairs.

Despite the apparent "new look" in the Israeli establishment's attitude to its Arab population, there seem to be no illusions about the difficulties that may still lie ahead before this unique minority is fully integrated in the life of the State.

The major barrier to the full integration desired by Jew and Arab alike is the Middle East conflict itself.

The Israeli Arabs feel oppressed both spiritually and physically, by the continuing crisis. They are affected on the one hand by the radio and television propaganda directed at them from neighbouring countries and on the other by Israel's reaction to military and terrorist threats.

They are confident that Israel is fully capable of dealing, in the long run, with the roots of the tension in the region, and that when that has been accomplished, their integration will be completed. But their greatest aspiration is a political settlement of the Middle East conflict. This country is, after all, their paradise, and they want to stay, feeling that they are strangers in it.

Great strides have been made in the absorption of Israel's 400,000 Arab citizens into Israeli society. Most of them see their destiny as firmly linked to

ambivalence created by the Middle East conflict remains a major obstacle to their full integration, writes Arab affairs reporter ANAN SARADI.

the Israeli Arabs, they could not be immune to the political developments surrounding them, especially after the Six Day War.

After having been completely cut off from the rest of the Arab world for 19 years, they suddenly saw the barriers torn down between themselves and more than a million other Arabs on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. While this did not radically affect their commitment to Israel, it was bound to open up new vistas for them, visions of contact and identification with a wider Arab brotherhood.

Here, however, they were in for a bad shock: nobody was prepared to welcome them back into the family. For in a matter of weeks, Arab political intrigue, the concept of a Palestinian entity was now introduced into the regional scene. There were two main reasons for this: the promotion of an emergent sabotage movement which might be able to compensate for the Six Day War defeat and to carry out so-called guerrilla warfare; and the need to minimize the influence of Jordan's King Hussein, who was to be made the scapegoat for the Arab defeat in June, 1967.

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reorienting himself to a narrower society, especially in the villages. It is not mere chance that some of the 350 Israeli Arabs who have been involved in sabotage activities in the past six years have spoken of the social difficulties that confronted them in the aftermath of the 1967 war.

That figure of 350 is emphasized by Mr. Shmuel Toledano, the Prime Minister's Adviser on Arab Affairs. "I think most people will agree that this is a very small number out of an Arab population of 400,000," he says. He does not disguise the fact that the Government views any sabotage activity among Israeli Arabs as a matter of gravity but he is inclined to ascribe it only in part to nationalist motives.

Because of their special position in a Jewish State which is fighting for survival against Arab threats, Israeli Arabs have gone through three major phases, all of which have left their mark on their attitude towards the State.

The first phase, from 1948 to 1955, was one of bewilderment, the Arabs, changed from a majority into a minority, and the taint of their future, and the Israelis facing the new experience of dealing with Arab subjects.

The Arab Affairs Adviser believes that such resentment as the Israeli Arabs feel stems largely from a sense of social rejection that has been present ever since the State was established.

He points out that, in contrast with the Jewish community, which already had an established leadership when the State was set up, the Arab elite fled the country, leaving behind about 150,000 compatriots, more than 90 per cent of them illiterate fellahs.

The Arab population — which still maintains its old proportion of 70 per cent Moslems, 20 per cent Christians and 10 per cent Druses — was concentrated in Galilee, the Triangle and the Negev. They lived mainly in 115 remote villages, only 10 per cent of the total being found in the big cities.

"When Israel was born," says Mr. Toledano, "there was an enormous gap between Jews and Arabs. The gap certainly has been diminished, and he is confident that this gap will have been closed completely by the middle of the next decade. Even now, the changes in the educational field are remarkable.

Twenty-five years ago there were 10,000 pupils and 300 teachers; today there are 130,000 pupils and 4,000 teachers. More than 200 Arabs are graduating from the universities every year, and the number is expected to reach 300 by 1976 — not far short of the total of 340 who have graduated in the last decade. In the coming school year, some 10,000 pupils will be attending from high school, and Government plans are

It is the younger generation that seems to have been affected most strongly by the situation, their social problems leading to political grievances.

Supreme Court

(Continued from page 63)

erty being used for Reform services.

In upholding the petition of the Reform group the Court reasoned that as the meeting-hall had been often put at the disposal of other groups of residents for their respective social purposes, it was not right to discriminate against the petitioners, who were their equals. There was no valid ground for such discrimination since the council had no jurisdiction in matters of religion and could not dictate to the petitioners the form of their religious worship. To do so, said the Court, was also contrary to the spirit of the Independence Declaration, which guaranteed freedom of religion.

This case may be compared with one in which the Court refused to interfere with an order by the Controller of Road Transport, closing part of a street near a big synagogue in Jerusalem to motor traffic during the hours of prayer on Shabbat and certain Jewish holy days.

In making the order, said the Court, the official did not exceed his discretionary authority to regulate street traffic. The purpose was to enable the people in the synagogue to pray and meditate without being disturbed by the noise of motor traffic, and their religious interest in doing so was legitimate. It was therefore a matter of weighing this interest against the slight inconvenience caused to the petitioner and other drivers who, as a result of the order, had to go a very short distance out of their way. The Court found that, in the circumstances, the petitioner's complaint of religious coercion was unjustified.

IN the wake of the Six Day War, a number of disputes came before the Court which raised novel and peculiar questions. One involved the complaint of a group of Jews that the police were preventing them from holding prayers on the Temple Mount site. In a majority decision, the Court ruled that it was precluded from interfering in this matter by reason of a Mandatory provision depriving the courts of jurisdiction in matters connected with the Holy Places. The minority justices concurred in this result on other grounds.

Another case, which reached the Court from the West Bank, concerned a labour dispute between the manager and employees of a Bethlehem hospital. Under the Jordanian law in force in the area, labour disputes are to be settled with the aid of arbitration machinery. However, in this case the employers' and workers' organizations which were required to be represented on the arbitration board did not exist. To remedy this defect, the Military Commander of the area amended the Jordanian law to the effect that in the absence of such organizations the parties could themselves appoint representatives to be members of the board.

In court, counsel for the manager protested that under international law, the Military Commander had no power to amend the Jordanian law. It was nevertheless decided, with one dissent, that this was legally possible by virtue of an enabling provision in the Geneva Convention. The division in the Court turned on the question of whether the words of the provision were wide enough to cover this type of amendment.

It remains to make brief mention of a case in which the Court was almost faced with having to decide a question of constitutional proportions. The question was whether it had the power to void a law of the Knesset passed by an ordinary majority, which was inconsistent with an entrenched clause in a "basic" law stipulating that it could only be

altered by a special majority. As the Attorney-General, representing the respondent Minister, informed the Court that he did not wish to argue this constitutional question on his own motion, the Court expressly reserved it for future consideration and dealt with the question of inconsistency on its merits. In the end it upheld the petitioning citizen's contention on this basis.

After the decision the Knesset passed the new law again by the required majority. It also incorporated the amendment proposed by the Court to overcome the substantive defect which the

petitioner had pointed out. This is a fine example of the cooperation between the legislative and judicial partners in the law-making enterprise.

In concluding this somewhat eclectic survey of the Supreme Court's performance during these 25 years, this writer does not feel


free, for obvious reasons, to venture a prognosis of the direction of its judicial activity in the future. But he is without qualms in revealing his confidence that the Court will continue to hold up to the public an image of liberty and the impartial administration of justice.




Greetings from
TNUVA
to Israel's 25th Day
of Independence




weidenfeld and nicolson jerusalem



My Country
by Abba Eban
The story of the twenty-five years of courage, dedication and perseverance which have built the State of Israel.



Bar-Kokhba
by Yigael Yadin
The story of the legendary Jewish hero revealed through scrolls, scriptures and other archaeological findings.



Moshe Dayan
by Shabtai Tevet
The fascinating biography of Israel's most charismatic military and political leader



Golda Meir Speaks Out
edited by Mario Syrkin
The opinions and thoughts of an extraordinary personality as revealed through speeches covering her entire career.



A SALUTE TO THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL
on the 25th anniversary of the State

HADASSAH

The Women's Zionist Organization
of America

pledges continued
support to:

- MEDICINE
- DENTISTRY
- EDUCATION
- VOCATIONAL GUIDANCE
- YOUTH ALIYA
- KEREN KAYEMET
- PROGRAMMES FOR U.S. YOUTH

Jacques Lipchitz examines a model, at the Hadassah Mount Scopus Hospital, of the site where his 39 foot statue, "The Tree of Life," is to be erected.

A WORD OF GREETING FOR THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL — MAY 1973

The twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Day of Independence of the State of Israel — a day of awe and wonder. As it is written in the book of Isaiah,

"Who has heard such a thing? Who has seen such things? Shall a land be born in one day? Or, shall a nation be brought forth in a moment? For as soon as Zion was in labour she brought forth her children" (Isaiah 66:8).

This miracle has taken place! It is the fulfilment of the promise of the Eternal One for His people. Even before this great event, the Almighty One had begun to fulfil His promise that in the last times Israel would be brought home out of all the nations to her own land (see Ezekiel 38:8).

"Therefore, behold, the days are coming, says the L-rd, when it shall no more be said, As the L-rd lives Who brought up the children of Israel out of the land of Egypt, but, As the L-rd lives Who brought up the children of Israel from the land of the north and from all the countries to which He had driven them. And I will bring them again to their land that I gave to their fathers" (Jeremiah 16:14-15).

The Almighty One has performed still another miracle. He has kept and blessed Israel throughout these twenty-five years,

'for the L-rd fought for Israel' (Joshua 10:14b).

On this Twenty-Fifth Anniversary we celebrate with Israel by giving thanks and praise to the G-d of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Not only did He give promises to His People, but He fulfilled them before the whole world — to His glory. He will also fulfil them by preparing His people for the coming of the Messiah. We wish to accompany Israel along these ways of preparation and to stand by her — deeply conscious of our German guilt during the years 1933-1945, which is a constant grief in our hearts. Wishing Israel every blessing, we greet her on her great festive day.

Mother Basilea
The Sisterhood of Mary
Darmstadt-Eberstadt, W. Germany

Four Israelis at 25

AMNON Antebi was born in Jerusalem on April 13, 1948, a time to participate in the founding of the Jewish state. On his father's side he comes from a long family settled so long ago that nobody knows how many generations of them lived in the Holy Land. His father, Emanuel Antebi, served in the British Army as a sergeant in World War II, and later, in the War of Independence. When involved in wars and other things he worked for the Jewish Agency. Amnon's mother, Chaya Grabelsky, came to Israel as a girl in 1935, and became secretary to Gershon Agmon, editor of *The Palestine Post*. She remained at *The Post* ever since.

Amnon was educated at the Jewish Gymnasium until Grade 10 when his father was sent to the United States on a mission for the Jewish Agency, which interrupted Amnon's studies but enabled him to have a really good time. After his father returned to Israel, he studied for external matriculation, but was called to the Army before he had finished. He joined the Negev Brigade, and in the Six Day War fought in the battle of Latrun, and went on down to the Sinai. In the years that followed, he served in the Jordan Valley and at Karameh. Many of his friends died in the War and Amnon's. Like his father before him, he became a sergeant. His older brother was also a paratrooper; they have one younger brother, now in the Army. After the Six Day War Amnon studied his matriculation on his own. The University of the Negev accepted him while he still had no matriculation subject to complete, and he spent a year in Jerusalem. Then he transferred to the Hebrew University, where he is studying economics, and hopes to get his B.A. next year. After that? Maybe a master's degree, maybe a doctorate — he doesn't know. In taking first things first, and his sights are set at the moment only on a B.A. Unmarried, he lives at home: his mother and father. He does not work at the Bank of Israel, which enables him to pay his own university fees and personal expenses.

Amnon believes that Israel's overriding objective must be the achievement of peace with the Arabs. "I don't know if there is much hope of getting peace in the near future, but we must do it. We can't go on for ever at war with each other: one day we'll have to live together. In terms of practical politics, I don't see that we have much alternative to our present policy, but our attitude must be that peace is more important than anything else."

For this reason he believes that Israel should be prepared to surrender most of the territories if the Arabs agree to sit at the table in a "suffice." "I am ready to fight again and again to defend Israel, but I am prepared to fight just to hold the territories that are now in our hands. Frankly, I don't see the same about Hebron as I do about Tel Aviv, I don't think it is as Jewish as Tel Aviv. I don't love his own land. I don't want to see the occupied areas, except for the Old City of Jerusalem are part of us."

"Peace seems to me more important than pieces of territory. But by peace I mean much more than an armistice, I mean the kind of peace they have in Europe, where people can go any-

where. I visualize the Arabs and the Jews visiting each other's lands freely, subject only to customs control, so that Israelis can go to Beirut freely — and not in a raid — while Arabs can come as they like to Israeli cities. Once we reach that kind of peace, ownership of this land or that land becomes unimportant. I don't believe that either the Jews or the Arabs can hate each other indefinitely. Politically and strategically we can carry on with the status quo till the Arabs realize that it is impossible for them,



ALIZA ELION
(David Rubinger)



ISRAEL MERMELSTEIN
(Philip Gillon)

but in other respects the present position is very hard on us. We don't know what our future is."

Assuming the Arabs remain obdurate and never talk peace, as a result of which the areas get tacitly absorbed if not legally annexed, how should we handle the Arabs living in them?

"We will certainly have to give them full rights as citizens. Israel can't have two classes of citizens. It would be against every value we hold dear. That is why it would be much better to give up the areas and the Arabs living in them."

Does he know any Arabs personally? Does he feel as close to Israeli Arabs as Diaspora Jews?

"I don't know many Arabs. Those I do know, I judge entirely on their merits as individuals — the same applies to Jews from abroad, or from Israel, for that matter. I do feel that we are closely linked to the Jews of the Diaspora. First of all, we're dependent on them. It's good for them to know that there is a Jewish state, even if they don't come to live here. A man needs his own home. If they feel more at home where they are, they'll stay there. If they feel less good there, they'll come here. Every-

one must make his own decision. We feel responsible for the Jews outside Israel: for example, the sufferings of Russian Jewry really hurt us personally... I think there'll always be ties between Jews everywhere: we feel for them, they feel for us."

Amnon is not Orthodox but respects tradition: he fasts on Yom Kippur and would not eat bread on Passover. He likes Kiddush on Friday nights, but will travel to watch a football match or go to the beach on Shabbat.

He does not accept the image of the sabra as arrogant, rude and stand-offish as a correct one. "I think that most of us are a

weekend leave, three weeks after the fighting stopped. The Weiss family is strictly Orthodox. David and his two younger brothers observe all the mitzvot to the best of their ability. He finished eight grades of primary school in Netanya, then went to Boys' Town in Jerusalem, a vocational high school, where he learnt offset printing. When he finished school, he joined a Nahal garin of Boys' Town graduates. The Nahal command took him out of the garin, and he was

The celebration of the 25th Anniversary of Statehood is a miracle in the eyes of an older generation, still full of wonder that they lived to see Israel emerge from the days of the riots and the Holocaust. But do younger people, who have reached the age of 25 together with their country, think the same way about it?

PHILIP GILLON discusses their feelings and opinions with four 25-year-olds.

sent first to an N.C.O.'s course, and later on an officer's course, although he maintained his close ties with the garin. When the Six Day War broke out, he was a sergeant, and fought in Sinai: after it was over, he became a lieutenant. He served for three bitter years on the Suez Canal, right through the War of Attrition. "Once, a few days before I took over a post, the officer whom I replaced had just been killed. After I finished, the man who relieved me was killed by a shell, together with seven other men."

After the War he rejoined his garin, which set out with high hopes to establish an urban kibbutz in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City. They had marvellous dreams of running a cooperative printing press and other factories, applying the vocational skills they had acquired in Boys' Town, while living close to the Western Wall. But promises of support from the religious political party were not fulfilled, and eventually the garin broke up.

David and some of the others however were left with a determination to live in the Old City. He applied for an apartment in the Jewish Quarter, and, after several years, obtained one. His wife, also from Netanya, though they met in Jerusalem — is also Orthodox and they have a

14-year-old daughter. David now works as a printer. "I don't believe that there will be peace with all the Arab states at any time in the foreseeable future," he says. "Perhaps with Jordan alone. Peace will only come when the Arabs realize that they have no hope of ever defeating us in war, and this is a lesson they seem unable to learn. However often they are beaten, they deceive themselves quickly. Would he give back any of the occupied areas for peace? "Practically nothing — perhaps part of Sinai, if the Egyptians offer to make peace. We have made so many sacrifices to get to borders from which we can defend ourselves that I don't see why we should give them up. None of the wars was of our making. The greatest danger to peace is that the Arabs think that war is a sort of game — they play it when they feel like it, and, if they lose, they expect everybody to go back to where they were, and then they play over again. This is what happened in 1956. Every time they start trouble, we lose precious men. They don't mind about their soldiers getting killed in the same way as we do — they don't value individual life as much. We are comfortable in these borders, and that is what keeps the Arabs from starting the war again: we should stay where we are."

How long can we live in this state of neither war nor peace? "As long as we have to. The first criterion for Israel is security. They wanted to destroy us, why should they be rewarded? Why should our dead have given their lives for nothing? Besides, we have historic rights to the area — Hebron, for example."

Does he believe then that Jews should settle everywhere in the areas? "Yes."

And should Arabs settle anywhere they want, on either side of the "green line?" "No. Only in areas that are not sensitive from the security point of view. As I said, security must come before all else."

Would he give the vote to Arabs in the areas? Is he worried by the demographic danger described by Pinhas Sapir? "I'm worried by it, but we'll have to live with it, as we have to with so many other problems. We have to help the Arabs in every way possible — economically, in agriculture and industry, with housing, education, higher standards of living. In fact, we are already doing so. As for the vote and the question of demography, I don't think we need at this stage to decide these questions as a matter of principle, but should leave them to the future. So many unpredictable miracles have taken place in the modern history of the Jewish people — and catastrophes too, admittedly — that we don't have to decide now on the future. There may be an aliyah of great dimensions — nobody dreams that the Russians would come, for example, so who knows what will happen? If we get enough immigrants, the whole picture will change."

Does he agree with giving privileges to immigrants? "I wouldn't take anything away from them, but I certainly think that we sabras are not getting a fair deal. We fought for Israel and still fight for her. In every other country, ex-servicemen are helped to get cheap housing and

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AMNON ANTEBI
(Murray Bloom)



DAVID WEISS
(Weiss)

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FOUR ISRAELIS AT 25

(Continued from page 69)

easy mortgages. I had to wait five years till we could get a home, even though it was in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City, and it cost us IL85,000. We got a loan of IL37,500 at 11 per cent. Our parents helped as much as they could. The rest of the money we borrowed on short-term at 14 per cent. How can we re-pay debts like these on Israeli salaries? I don't begrudge the immigrants anything they get, but I do say that there must be complete rethinking about what are the rights of the sabras."

ISRAEL Mermelstein was two years old when his parents immigrated to Israel in 1950 from Transylvania, where he had been born. Both of them had been in concentration camps.

The Mermelsteins were among the very first settlers to come to the Afikim unit of Ashkelon, which the South African Jews were building in 1950. After working as a guard, Israel's father was given a shop in the Civic Centre and he has prospered. Today the family has a house in what is considered the best part of Ashkelon.

Israel completed his primary school education in Ashkelon, then went to a vocational high school in Netanya. During the Six Day War he was still at school, and was called up only some months after the War was over. The Army sent him on a technical course, and he served, and still serves, when on reserve duty, in a technical unit. After completing his Army service he went to night school in Tel Aviv to study for his vocational matriculation, at the same time helping his father in his Afikim hardware shop whenever he could.

He then passed his entrance examination for the Beersheba Technical College.

When he finishes his two-year course, Israel will be qualified as a practical engineer. If things go right, he may go on to the Haifa Technion and become a fully qualified engineer after three more years of study, or he may — he dreams — go to study in the United States. "I must pass in Beersheba first," he points out. Unmarried, he lives at home with his parents, but rents a room in Beersheba during the week together with a friend.

Education, he agrees, has not come easily to him. "For some people, things come easily, for others the hard way. I'm afraid that I belong to the second group. But my parents encouraged me to learn, so I stuck to it."

Need to struggle

He thinks that his principle that life is easy for some and harder for others applies to nations as well as to individuals. The Jewish State is one of those which has had to struggle hard and to suffer to come into existence. This struggle still goes on.

"For example, when students are called up for reserve duty, it is not only the service that affects us, it is also the loss of studies. We lose the tempo of learning, and it is impossible to make up what we have missed. Fortunately, the Army has now cut down the amount of reserve service."

Does he think that Israel should make concessions for peace? "Certainly we should, as soon as the Arabs agree to talk peace. One of our basic aims must be to get peace. It is impossible for both the Arabs and us to carry on indefinitely in a state of war with each other. All over the world men are realizing that war does not provide the answers. Look at Vietnam. How many people died there for nothing? There's no point in killing or injuring another man just to prove

that you are stronger than he is.

"The problem is to make the Arabs see this. I believe that most Israelis see it, and would gladly meet the Arabs more than half way if they made a real gesture showing that they want peace. Once they do this, our leaders and theirs can sit around a table, drink coffee, talk, ultimately we'll get an agreement."

Should Israel take the initiative, and withdraw from some points as a gesture, as suggested by Yitzhak Ben-Aharon?

"No. If we withdraw before they meet us at the table the Arabs will think we're weak."

First of all, their whole attitude has to change, they have to learn that it's impossible to break us by force, that they have to live with us. They still talk about driving the Jews into the sea, they have to cool down and realize that their attitude is hopeless. The initiative, the proof of change, must come from them.

Our leaders have said again and again that they are willing to negotiate without any pre-conditions. Now it's up to the Arabs. I think our policy is correct, we must sit tight where we are, endure whatever suffering is forced on us, and wait till the Arabs admit that force is not the answer. It's a strain, this policy, but it's the only realistic one."

What if the Arabs never learn the lesson?

"I hope they will. If not, we'll just have to carry on. I hope that by the end of our century our children won't have to do any fighting."

ALIZA Elion was born in Johannesburg on April 26, 1948; three weeks after her birth, her father Ted went off to Israel as a member of Machal (volunteers from abroad). He had served in the South African Army in the Western Desert and Italy during World War II. A pharmacist, he had volunteered for the artillery, and had been a gunner in the Desert until pulled out by the Army, which needed pharmacists, and moved to the Medical Corps. Aliza's mother, Hannah, a physiotherapist, served in the same Corps in Egypt and Italy.

In November, 1948, she went to Israel with her baby to join her husband. At the end of the War of Independence Ted worked in Tiberies for a while and then moved to Haifa, where he was a pharmacist in the Defence Forces for several years. In 1955, he left the Defence Forces and the family moved to Ashkelon, where both he and Hannah worked in the Health Centre, which later perished from lack of official backing. He moved to Kupat Holim, and is now an inspector of all its pharmacies in the South. Hannah works in the Ashkelon Hospital. Aliza has two younger sisters, one in the Army.

After matriculating brilliantly from the Ashkelon High School, Aliza went with a group of fellow-scouts into a Nahal garin. During the Six Day War they were at Biranit, on the Lebanese border, and she was on duty in the watch-tower one day when she saw what seemed to be the entire Lebanese Army advancing towards her. She wondered for a few anxious moments how she was going to keep it at bay with her rifle, but wiser counsels apparently prevailed in Beirut, and the Army withdrew in good order. Then Nahal sent her as a social welfare officer to Yeruham, at the time suffering from the recession, and considered a failure among the development towns. She found the work very hard but very satisfying and she still flirts with the idea of going some day to live in Yeruham, if her other plans do not mature. While there she began to write stories with a folklore

basis, and she played around with writing film-scripts and plays.

When she finished her Army service she went to the Hebrew University with the intention of eventually becoming a teacher. But, she says, she made the mistake of studying English — although she spoke and read it fluently, she had a fanatical resistance to the language, and was obsessed by Hebrew. She was busy in her spare time trying to write plays, dreamt of becoming a dramatist, producer, director, actress: after a year, she transferred to Tel Aviv University because of the good drama school there. She finished her B.A. in drama and English — English, because everyone told her that she had to have something practical to fall back on if she couldn't earn a livelihood in the theatre.

Theatrical successes

She has had some successes in the theatre. (She watches anxiously as I note this down, and stresses that those "successes" are very small and only student beginnings.) One of her plays was put on by the Tel Aviv University group and in an afternoon theatre club in Tel Aviv.

She dramatized a Michael Kacars play for a group called Razcorial, founded by Yankel Raz, and it was put on at Tsavta, as well as in Jerusalem and Ashkelon. She also acted in the play.

"But don't make a big thing of anything I've done," she insists again. "It's still very small, student stuff. I don't think I'm a good actress; they pick me because I'm tall, and dark, and have long black hair, and can look dramatic. My main interests are in writing and directing. But it's still difficult to say if I will stay in the theatre all my life; I don't know if I'm gifted enough. I don't plan ahead. In the meantime I'm enjoying life immensely — and theatre is the only thing I know so far."

She is now doing her M.A. in drama. Sharing a room in Tel Aviv with a friend, she has supported herself by doing any and every kind of job. She washed the steps of a shop on Hayarkon Street; was a guide in an art gallery; taught English in a high school near the Central Bus Station; modelled coats for a small factory in Ramat Gan; translated for "Yediot Aharonot"; translated a book on modern Yiddish poetry from English to Hebrew. Her parents pay her fees, she pays the rest.

"My best job was modelling coats. I only had to do it about once a day, when a buyer would come in to see the styles. The rest of the time I was free."

The prevailing situation does not affect her directly in any way: girls in her group were discharged from the Army when they were released.

About the political situation, she says: "I've lost any ability I ever had to understand political developments. It's hard to express a clear opinion. Sometimes I think we do not do enough to consider a new approach — we should offer to give back some of the areas, not all of them. There seems to be a lot of merit in Ben-Aharon's idea of our taking the initiative: we should certainly do everything possible to prevent a renewal of the fighting. But I admit my ideas about politics are superficial."

Type of society

"What does concern me very much is the type of society that is evolving. I was in South Africa two years ago on a visit to my uncle. If we keep the areas indefinitely on the present basis, we may end up developing the same sort of relationship with the Arabs there that the whites have in South Africa with the Africans. Even if this is not confirmed in law, and even though the people don't want it, history may manoeuvre us into that kind of position. Such a situation would be catastrophic for Israel. So I think that we have to get rid of the areas as soon as our strategic needs make it possible for us to do so."

She is very worried about the kind of society that is developing in Tel Aviv. "It's very materialistic. I think that some

of my contemporaries value material things too much. It's beginning to become an obsession here — large homes, furniture, cars, washing machines, money. I feel great pressure on me to get into the rat race, but I'm determined not to do so. Either it'll be the theatre or teaching in some place like Yeruham."

She is not sure whether she would call herself a Zionist. "I'm an Israeli writing and speaking Hebrew. I didn't identify with the Jews of the world until the Russian immigration began. This moved me very deeply. I'm not so concerned about the Western Jews; they can come here if they want to do so, they needn't if they don't want to."

There is no doubt, according to Aliza, of the right of immigrants to get special consideration, provided that these are not given automatically, but according to criteria of social and economic needs. She does not think that similar benefits should be granted to the young sabras.

"I don't think that we are getting such a raw deal. Why should everything be given to us as a platter by the State or our parents? It's madness to say we must have apartments with three rooms, cars and so on at somebody else's expense. When I get married I'll manage somehow. I'll live in one rented room if necessary. I don't expect other people or the Government or my parents to support me."

MANY clichés are thrown at the sabras — they are said to be rude, ill-mannered, arrogant, insensitive. Critics claim that they do not say "please" and "thank you" like nice little English boys, do not stand up for their elders in buses, talk at the tops of their voices in public places, cheat in school, and have abandoned their elders' values.

In my experience, these accusations are generally nonsensical apart from rare exceptions. The sabras are extremely shy, modest, sensitive, courteous, and honest. Frankness and good nature expressed out loud are not faults; soft voices are not moral values. And it is good to know that the young are so deeply concerned about the moral implications of the position in which history has placed them.

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